invocation privilege in California

2022“To avoid the potentially prejudicial impact of having a witness assert the privilege against self-incrimination before the jury, [it is] recommended that, in determining the propriety of the witness’s invocation of the privilege, the trial court hold a pretestimonial hearing outside the jury’s presence.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 441 .) When there is a dispute about 16 whether a witness may legitimately rely on the privilege, “[s]uch a procedure makes sense under the appropriate circumstances.” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 442 .) “[I]t is the better practice for the

2021“To avoid the potentially prejudicial impact of having a witness assert the privilege against self-incrimination before the jury, [it is] recommended that, in determining the propriety of the witness’s invocation of the privilege, the trial court hold a pretestimonial hearing outside the jury’s presence.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 441 .) When there is a dispute about whether a witness may legitimately rely on the privilege, “[s]uch a procedure makes sense under the appropriate circumstances.” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 442 .) “[I]t is the better practice for the cou

1962The invocation of the defense necessarily assumes that the act charged as puhlic offense was committed.” (Emphasis added.) The holding in Lee was followed in People v. Gelardi, 77 Cal.App.2d 467, 477 [ 175 P.2d 855 ], which quotes the language of the court above emphasized; the Supreme Court without a dissenting vote thereafter denied a hearing in Gelardi .

1962The invocation of the defense necessarily assumes that the act charged as puhlic offense was committed.” (Emphasis added.) The holding in Lee was followed in People v. Gelardi, 77 Cal.App.2d 467, 477 [ 175 P.2d 855 ], which quotes the language of the court above emphasized; the Supreme Court without a dissenting vote thereafter denied a hearing in Gelardi .

2018As the Supreme Court has put it: "Allowing a witness to be put on the stand to have the witness exercise the privilege before the jury would only invite the jury to make an improper inference" from the invocation of the privilege. ( People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730 , 743, 280 Cal.Rptr. 440 , 808 P.2d 1197 ; People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96 , 130, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 212 , 91 P.3d 164 ["having the witness exercise her privilege in the jury's *571 presence would be 'in direct violation of Evidence Code section 913 ' " 16 ]; People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959 , 1011, 77 Cal.Rptr.

2018As the Supreme Court has put it: "Allowing a witness to be put on the stand to have the witness exercise the privilege before the jury would only invite the jury to make an improper inference" from the invocation of the privilege. ( People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730 , 743, 280 Cal.Rptr. 440 , 808 P.2d 1197 ; People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96 , 130, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 212 , 91 P.3d 164 ["having the witness exercise her privilege in the jury's *571 presence would be 'in direct violation of Evidence Code section 913 ' " 16 ]; People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959 , 1011, 77 Cal.Rptr.

2023(See Yeager v. U.S. (2009) 557 U.S. 110, 118 [retrial following a mistrial due to a hung jury is a continuation of the initial jeopardy and therefore not barred]; People v. Williams (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 398, 408, fn. 4 [“a mistrial results in a mere continuation of the jeopardy, thus prohibiting the invocation of that clause by a defendant”]; In re Dale S. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 952, 956 [double jeopardy principles do not apply where a second proceeding is a continuation of the original proceeding].) 11 2.

2023(See Yeager v. U.S. (2009) 557 U.S. 110, 118 [retrial following a mistrial due to a hung jury is a continuation of the initial jeopardy and therefore not barred]; People v. Williams (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 398, 408, fn. 4 [“a mistrial results in a mere continuation of the jeopardy, thus prohibiting the invocation of that clause by a defendant”]; In re Dale S. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 952, 956 [double jeopardy principles do not apply where a second proceeding is a continuation of the original proceeding].) 11 2.

2023(See Yeager v. U.S. (2009) 557 U.S. 110, 118 [retrial following a mistrial due to a hung jury is a continuation of the initial jeopardy and therefore not barred]; People v. Williams (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 398, 408, fn. 4 [“a mistrial results in a mere continuation of the jeopardy, thus prohibiting the invocation of that clause by a defendant”]; In re Dale S. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 952, 956 [double jeopardy principles do not apply where a second proceeding is a continuation of the original proceeding].) 11 2.

2023(See Yeager v. U.S. (2009) 557 U.S. 110, 118 [retrial following a mistrial due to a hung jury is a continuation of the initial jeopardy and therefore not barred]; People v. Williams (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 398, 408, fn. 4 [“a mistrial results in a mere continuation of the jeopardy, thus prohibiting the invocation of that clause by a defendant”]; In re Dale S. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 952, 956 [double jeopardy principles do not apply where a second proceeding is a continuation of the original proceeding].) 11 2.

2023(See Yeager v. U.S. (2009) 557 U.S. 110, 118 [retrial following a mistrial due to a hung jury is a continuation of the initial jeopardy and therefore not barred]; People v. Williams (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 398, 408, fn. 4 [“a mistrial results in a mere continuation of the jeopardy, thus prohibiting the invocation of that clause by a defendant”]; In re Dale S. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 952, 956 [double jeopardy principles do not apply where a second proceeding is a continuation of the original proceeding].) 11 2.

2023(See Yeager v. U.S. (2009) 557 U.S. 110, 118 [retrial following a mistrial due to a hung jury is a continuation of the initial jeopardy and therefore not barred]; People v. Williams (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 398, 408, fn. 4 [“a mistrial results in a mere continuation of the jeopardy, thus prohibiting the invocation of that clause by a defendant”]; In re Dale S. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 952, 956 [double jeopardy principles do not apply where a second proceeding is a continuation of the original proceeding].) 11 2.

2021(People v. Trujeque, supra, at p. 268 .) “To avoid the potentially prejudicial impact of having a witness assert the privilege against self-incrimination before the jury, we have in the past recommended that, in determining the propriety of the witness’s invocation of the privilege, the trial court hold a pretestimonial hearing outside the jury’s presence.” (People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 441 ; see People v. Lopez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1555 [“Initial inquiries intended to test the validity of the claim should be conducted outside the presence of the jury”].) While recommended,

1992Code (1986 ed.) § 913, p. 80].) To avoid the potentially prejudicial impact of having a witness assert the privilege against self-incrimination before the jury, we have in the past recommended that, in determining the propriety of the witness's invocation of the privilege, the trial court hold a pretestimonial hearing outside the jury's presence. ( People v. Ford (1988) 45 Cal.3d 431, 441, fn. 6 [ 247 Cal. Rptr. 121 , 754 P.2d 168 , 76 A.L.R.4th 785 ].) This was done here. *442 A defendant's rights to due process and to present a defense do not include a right to present to the jury a speculat

2000Moreover, the prosecution did not seek to limit the scope of defendant’s testimony, a course of action which also might have obviated the result we are compelled to reach.” (People v. Campbell (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 867, 878, fn. 10 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 340 ]; see In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 720 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 429 , 523 P.2d 229 ].) The People do not dispute that they agreed to a form of immunity in exchange for Griego’s testimony, but urge this court to characterize it as a “limited form of transactional immunity,” analogous to use immunity.

2000Moreover, the prosecution did not seek to limit the scope of defendant’s testimony, a course of action which also might have obviated the result we are compelled to reach.” (People v. Campbell (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 867, 878, fn. 10 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 340 ]; see In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 720 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 429 , 523 P.2d 229 ].) The People do not dispute that they agreed to a form of immunity in exchange for Griego’s testimony, but urge this court to characterize it as a “limited form of transactional immunity,” analogous to use immunity.

1983(Daly v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 132, 146 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 560 P.2d 1193 ].) The decision to initiate the request for immunity is vested exclusively in the district attorney (People v. Sutter (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 806, 814 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 829 ]; People v. Label (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 766, 774 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 522 ]; People v. Pineda (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 860, 866-868 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 743 ]; see also In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 720 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 429 , 523 P.2d 229 ]; the prosecution alone controls the invocation of the immunity statute.

1983(Daly v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 132, 146 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 560 P.2d 1193 ].) The decision to initiate the request for immunity is vested exclusively in the district attorney (People v. Sutter (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 806, 814 [ 184 Cal.Rptr. 829 ]; People v. Label (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 766, 774 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 522 ]; People v. Pineda (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 860, 866-868 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 743 ]; see also In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 720 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 429 , 523 P.2d 229 ]; the prosecution alone controls the invocation of the immunity statute.

2018As the Supreme Court has put it: "Allowing a witness to be put on the stand to have the witness exercise the privilege before the jury would only invite the jury to make an improper inference" from the invocation of the privilege. ( People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730 , 743, 280 Cal.Rptr. 440 , 808 P.2d 1197 ; People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96 , 130, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 212 , 91 P.3d 164 ["having the witness exercise her privilege in the jury's *571 presence would be 'in direct violation of Evidence Code section 913 ' " 16 ]; People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959 , 1011, 77 Cal.Rptr.

2018As the Supreme Court has put it: "Allowing a witness to be put on the stand to have the witness exercise the privilege before the jury would only invite the jury to make an improper inference" from the invocation of the privilege. ( People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730 , 743, 280 Cal.Rptr. 440 , 808 P.2d 1197 ; People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96 , 130, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 212 , 91 P.3d 164 ["having the witness exercise her privilege in the jury's *571 presence would be 'in direct violation of Evidence Code section 913 ' " 16 ]; People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959 , 1011, 77 Cal.Rptr.

1985The specific objection that the request to contact his father constituted an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination ( People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375 [ 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 491 P.2d 793 ]) was not made in the trial court, but was raised for the first time on appeal.

1985The specific objection that the request to contact his father constituted an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination ( People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375 [ 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 491 P.2d 793 ]) was not made in the trial court, but was raised for the first time on appeal.

2022“To avoid the potentially prejudicial impact of having a witness assert the privilege against self-incrimination before the jury, [it is] recommended that, in determining the propriety of the witness’s invocation of the privilege, the trial court hold a pretestimonial hearing outside the jury’s presence.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 441 .) When there is a dispute about 16 whether a witness may legitimately rely on the privilege, “[s]uch a procedure makes sense under the appropriate circumstances.” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 442 .) “[I]t is the better practice for the

2021“To avoid the potentially prejudicial impact of having a witness assert the privilege against self-incrimination before the jury, [it is] recommended that, in determining the propriety of the witness’s invocation of the privilege, the trial court hold a pretestimonial hearing outside the jury’s presence.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 441 .) When there is a dispute about whether a witness may legitimately rely on the privilege, “[s]uch a procedure makes sense under the appropriate circumstances.” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 442 .) “[I]t is the better practice for the cou

1985(Accord People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 246-252 [ 145 Cal. Rptr. 861 , 578 P.2d 108 ].) And, as we recently explained in Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802 [ 210 Cal. Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ], evidence obtained in violation of the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is inadmissible under Evidence Code section 940.

1985(Accord People v. Pettingill (1978) 21 Cal.3d 231, 246-252 [ 145 Cal. Rptr. 861 , 578 P.2d 108 ].) And, as we recently explained in Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802 [ 210 Cal. Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ], evidence obtained in violation of the state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is inadmissible under Evidence Code section 940.

1976(People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 382 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 491 P.2d 793 ]; People v. Randall (1970) 1 Cal.3d 948, 956 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 658 , 464 P.2d 114 ].) Burton held that a minor’s request to see his parents is such an invocation of the privilege.

1976(People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 382 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 491 P.2d 793 ]; People v. Randall (1970) 1 Cal.3d 948, 956 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 658 , 464 P.2d 114 ].) Burton held that a minor’s request to see his parents is such an invocation of the privilege.

1948To justify the invocation of the rule res ipsa loquitur the instrumentality which caused the injury must have been under the exclusive management of the defendant” and quotes from Biddlecomb v. Haydon, 4 Cal.App.2d 361, 364 [ 40 P.2d 873 ], as follows: “Neither does it apply where the cause of the accident is unexplained and might have been due to one of several causes for some of which the defendant is not responsible.” See, also, Hilson v. Pacific G. & E.

1948To justify the invocation of the rule res ipsa loquitur the instrumentality which caused the injury must have been under the exclusive management of the defendant” and quotes from Biddlecomb v. Haydon, 4 Cal.App.2d 361, 364 [ 40 P.2d 873 ], as follows: “Neither does it apply where the cause of the accident is unexplained and might have been due to one of several causes for some of which the defendant is not responsible.” See, also, Hilson v. Pacific G. & E.

1985(See, e.g., In re Michael C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 471, 475-476 [ 146 Cal. Rptr. 358 , 579 P.2d 7 ], revd. on other grounds, Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 197 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 ]; People v. Soto (1984) 157 Cal. App.3d 694, 705 [ 204 Cal. Rptr. 204 ]; In re Abdul V. (1982) 130 Cal. App.3d 847, 862 [ 182 Cal. Rptr. 146 ]; In re Roland K. (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 295, 300-301 [ 147 Cal. Rptr. 96 ].) (5) Although Fare v. Michael C., supra , suggests that the Burton rule — equating a juvenile's request to speak to a parent with the invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination

1985(See, e.g., In re Michael C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 471, 475-476 [ 146 Cal. Rptr. 358 , 579 P.2d 7 ], revd. on other grounds, Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 197 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 ]; People v. Soto (1984) 157 Cal. App.3d 694, 705 [ 204 Cal. Rptr. 204 ]; In re Abdul V. (1982) 130 Cal. App.3d 847, 862 [ 182 Cal. Rptr. 146 ]; In re Roland K. (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 295, 300-301 [ 147 Cal. Rptr. 96 ].) (5) Although Fare v. Michael C., supra , suggests that the Burton rule — equating a juvenile's request to speak to a parent with the invocation of his privilege against self-incrimination

2021Code, § 913.) In the context of the right not to testify against yourself, the California Supreme Court has held that “permitting the jury to learn that a witness has invoked the privilege 25 against self-incrimination serves no legitimate purpose and may cause the jury to draw an improper inference of the witness’s guilt or complicity in the charged offense.” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 619 .) For that reason, “it is the better practice for the court to require the exercise of [that] privilege out of the presence of the jury.” (People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 743 .) Though

2016The California Supreme Court has stated: “No inference may properly be drawn from the invocation of a privilege. [Citation.] Allowing a witness to be put on the stand to have the witness exercise the privilege before the jury would only invite the jury to make an improper inference. [Citations.]” (People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 743 ; accord, People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483 , 516517.) In the present case, Negrete sought to assert his privilege against self-incrimination so as completely to avoid testifying at trial.