10 Virginia opinions name it 3 courts 1992–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Garrity v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2024The second exception to the invocation requirement applies when the government coerces the defendant to give up the privilege against self-incrimination by threatening to impose a penalty, like “withdraw[ing] a governmental benefit such as public employment.” Salinas, 570 U.S. at 185 (citing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 (1967); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 802-04 (1977); and Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84-85 (1973)). 2024The second exception to the invocation requirement applies when the government coerces the defendant to give up the privilege against self-incrimination by threatening to impose a penalty, like “withdraw[ing] a governmental benefit such as public employment.” Salinas, 570 U.S. at 185 (citing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 (1967); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 802-04 (1977); and Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84-85 (1973)). | 3 | 3 |
Lefkowitz v. Cunninghamgreen2 sentences2024The second exception to the invocation requirement applies when the government coerces the defendant to give up the privilege against self-incrimination by threatening to impose a penalty, like “withdraw[ing] a governmental benefit such as public employment.” Salinas, 570 U.S. at 185 (citing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 (1967); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 802-04 (1977); and Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84-85 (1973)). 2024The second exception to the invocation requirement applies when the government coerces the defendant to give up the privilege against self-incrimination by threatening to impose a penalty, like “withdraw[ing] a governmental benefit such as public employment.” Salinas, 570 U.S. at 185 (citing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 (1967); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 802-04 (1977); and Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84-85 (1973)). | 3 | 3 |
Lefkowitz v. Turleygreen2 sentences2024The second exception to the invocation requirement applies when the government coerces the defendant to give up the privilege against self-incrimination by threatening to impose a penalty, like “withdraw[ing] a governmental benefit such as public employment.” Salinas, 570 U.S. at 185 (citing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 (1967); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 802-04 (1977); and Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84-85 (1973)). 2024The second exception to the invocation requirement applies when the government coerces the defendant to give up the privilege against self-incrimination by threatening to impose a penalty, like “withdraw[ing] a governmental benefit such as public employment.” Salinas, 570 U.S. at 185 (citing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 (1967); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 802-04 (1977); and Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84-85 (1973)). | 3 | 3 |
Husske v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 217 (1996) (“[N]o one required Husske ‘to choose between making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining silent.’” (quoting Murphy, 465 U.S. at 436 )); Rivera-Padilla v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 304, 311 (2009) (“[T]he issue is not whether [the defendant] was compelled to attend the meeting with DSS and answer questions in order to claim benefits, but whether she was coerced to surrender her privilege to claim benefits.”). - 36 - The United States Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to the invocation req 2024See, e.g., Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 217 (1996) (“[N]o one required Husske ‘to choose between making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining silent.’” (quoting Murphy, 465 U.S. at 436 )); Rivera-Padilla v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 304, 311 (2009) (“[T]he issue is not whether [the defendant] was compelled to attend the meeting with DSS and answer questions in order to claim benefits, but whether she was coerced to surrender her privilege to claim benefits.”). - 36 - The United States Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to the invocation req | 3 | 3 |
Rivera-Padilla v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 217 (1996) (“[N]o one required Husske ‘to choose between making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining silent.’” (quoting Murphy, 465 U.S. at 436 )); Rivera-Padilla v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 304, 311 (2009) (“[T]he issue is not whether [the defendant] was compelled to attend the meeting with DSS and answer questions in order to claim benefits, but whether she was coerced to surrender her privilege to claim benefits.”). - 36 - The United States Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to the invocation req 2024See, e.g., Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 217 (1996) (“[N]o one required Husske ‘to choose between making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining silent.’” (quoting Murphy, 465 U.S. at 436 )); Rivera-Padilla v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 304, 311 (2009) (“[T]he issue is not whether [the defendant] was compelled to attend the meeting with DSS and answer questions in order to claim benefits, but whether she was coerced to surrender her privilege to claim benefits.”). - 36 - The United States Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to the invocation req | 3 | 3 |
Minnesota v. Murphygreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 217 (1996) (“[N]o one required Husske ‘to choose between making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining silent.’” (quoting Murphy, 465 U.S. at 436 )); Rivera-Padilla v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 304, 311 (2009) (“[T]he issue is not whether [the defendant] was compelled to attend the meeting with DSS and answer questions in order to claim benefits, but whether she was coerced to surrender her privilege to claim benefits.”). - 36 - The United States Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to the invocation req 2024Salinas, for example, rejected a proposed “third exception to the invocation requirement for cases in which a witness stands mute [during a noncustodial encounter] and thereby declines to give an answer that officials suspect would be incriminating.” Id. | 3 | 3 |
Salinas v. Texasgreen2 sentences2024See, e.g., Husske v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 203, 217 (1996) (“[N]o one required Husske ‘to choose between making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his conditional liberty by remaining silent.’” (quoting Murphy, 465 U.S. at 436 )); Rivera-Padilla v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 304, 311 (2009) (“[T]he issue is not whether [the defendant] was compelled to attend the meeting with DSS and answer questions in order to claim benefits, but whether she was coerced to surrender her privilege to claim benefits.”). - 36 - The United States Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to the invocation req 2024The second exception to the invocation requirement applies when the government coerces the defendant to give up the privilege against self-incrimination by threatening to impose a penalty, like “withdraw[ing] a governmental benefit such as public employment.” Salinas, 570 U.S. at 185 (citing Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 (1967); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 802-04 (1977); and Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84-85 (1973)). | 1 | 4 |
United States v. Eugene Linvillegreen1 sentence2024See United States v. Linville, 60 F.4th 890, 898 (4th Cir. 2023) (explaining that, “under Oregon law [in Saechao], ‘an invocation of the privilege does not constitute compliance with Oregon’s probation conditions’ requiring probationers to ‘promptly and truthfully answer all reasonable inquiries’” (quoting Saechao, 418 F.3d at 1079 )). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Phata Saechaogreen1 sentence2024See United States v. Linville, 60 F.4th 890, 898 (4th Cir. 2023) (explaining that, “under Oregon law [in Saechao], ‘an invocation of the privilege does not constitute compliance with Oregon’s probation conditions’ requiring probationers to ‘promptly and truthfully answer all reasonable inquiries’” (quoting Saechao, 418 F.3d at 1079 )). | 1 | 1 |
Morris v. McClellangreen1 sentence1992See, e.g., Morris v. McClellan, 45 So. 641 (Ala. 1908). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hoffman v. United States
green
2 sentences2001Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. at _; Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486 . 1992It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, and to require him to answer if "it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken." Id. at 486 , 71 S.Ct. at 818 (citations omitted). | 2 | 1992–2001 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2025The Court held in Miranda “that a suspect who is subjected to the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ of an unwarned custodial interrogation need not invoke the privilege.” Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 , 468 n.37 (1966)). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Alexandria Gazette Corp. v. West
green
2 sentences2025Id. at 163 .15 In determining whether the privilege is invoked, we are not “concerned with the truth or falsity of the allegations in the [official proceeding or report]; but with the question whether or not the news article was published in good faith and was a substantially correct report of the [official proceeding or report].” Id. at 159 . 2025Id. at 163 .15 In determining whether the privilege is invoked, we are not “concerned with the truth or falsity of the allegations in the [official proceeding or report]; but with the question whether or not the news article was published in good faith and was a substantially correct report of the [official proceeding or report].” Id. at 159 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
United States v. United States Coin & Currency
green
1 sentence2017Writing for the Court in United States Coin & Currency , Justice Harlan made this point when he declared that "[n]o circumstances call more for the invocation of a rule of complete retroactivity" than when "the conduct being penalized is constitutionally immune from punishment." 401 U.S. at 724, 91 S.Ct. 1041 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent
green
1 sentence1998Applying this balancing test to enactments prohibiting both conduct and speech, reviewing courts should reserve the invocation of the doctrine of overbreadth to those limited situations where there exists “a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the court...Woolfolk, 18 Va. App. 852 (quoting, City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.