salutary rule in Kansas

1980In Seute v. American Oil Co., 225 Kan. 640 , 594 P.2d 156 (1979), the court stated at 642: “We held in Taber v. Taber, 213 Kan. 453 -454, 516 P.2d 987 (1973): ‘The doctrine of res judicata is plain and intelligible, and amounts simply to this — that a cause of action once finally determined, without appeal, between the parties, on the merits, by a competent tribunal cannot afterwards be litigated by a new proceeding, either before the same or any other tribunal.’ ” In Wells v. Davis, 226 Kan. 586 , 603 P.2d 180 (1979), we stated at 589: “In Hutchinson Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. English, 209 Kan

1980In Seute v. American Oil Co., 225 Kan. 640 , 594 P.2d 156 (1979), the court stated at 642: “We held in Taber v. Taber, 213 Kan. 453 -454, 516 P.2d 987 (1973): ‘The doctrine of res judicata is plain and intelligible, and amounts simply to this — that a cause of action once finally determined, without appeal, between the parties, on the merits, by a competent tribunal cannot afterwards be litigated by a new proceeding, either before the same or any other tribunal.’ ” In Wells v. Davis, 226 Kan. 586 , 603 P.2d 180 (1979), we stated at 589: “In Hutchinson Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. English, 209 Kan

1976(State v. Majors, 182 Kan. 644 , 323 P. 2d 917 ; State v. Wilson, 188, Kan. 67, 360 P. 2d 1092 .) “It is a salutary rule.

1974(State v. Majors, 182 Kan. 644 , 323 P. 2d 917 ; State v. Wilson, 188 Kan. 67 , 360 P. 2d 1092 .) It is a salutary rule.

1976(State v. Majors, 182 Kan. 644 , 323 P. 2d 917 ; State v. Wilson, 188, Kan. 67, 360 P. 2d 1092 .) “It is a salutary rule.

1976(State v. Majors, 182 Kan. 644 , 323 P. 2d 917 ; State v. Wilson, 188, Kan. 67, 360 P. 2d 1092 .) “It is a salutary rule.

1956It is a salutary rule that, in suits involving the validity of a will, the heirs who would inherit the property, if the will be invalid, are not only proper but necessary parties.’ (Citing authorities.) (pp. 800 and 801.) “To the same effect see Ayers v. Graff, 153 Kan. 209 , 109 P. 2d 202 , where it was said: “ ‘It is well settled that in a suit to constare a will, all persons who are interested in the subject matter and whose interests will necessarily be affected by the construction of the will and the decree rendered are not only proper, but necessary and indispensable parties.’ (Citing au

1956It is a salutary rule that, in suits involving the validity of a will, the heirs who would inherit the property, if the will be invalid, are not only proper but necessary parties.’ (Citing authorities.) (pp. 800 and 801.) “To the same effect see Ayers v. Graff, 153 Kan. 209 , 109 P. 2d 202 , where it was said: “ ‘It is well settled that in a suit to constare a will, all persons who are interested in the subject matter and whose interests will necessarily be affected by the construction of the will and the decree rendered are not only proper, but necessary and indispensable parties.’ (Citing au

1943A., n. s., 730 and note; Zinn v. Updegraff, 113 Kan. 25 , 213 Pac. 816 ; Reeser v. Hammond, 122 Kan. 695 , 253 Pac. 233 .) It is a salutary rule of trial practice that when a party is a witness in his own behalf, and where the issues of fact must largely turn on the credence which the triers of fact will give to his testimony, the fullest inquiry should be permitted on cross-examination to discover not only the accuracy of his understanding, but his memory and his credibility as well.

1943A., n. s., 730 and note; Zinn v. Updegraff, 113 Kan. 25 , 213 Pac. 816 ; Reeser v. Hammond, 122 Kan. 695 , 253 Pac. 233 .) It is a salutary rule of trial practice that when a party is a witness in his own behalf, and where the issues of fact must largely turn on the credence which the triers of fact will give to his testimony, the fullest inquiry should be permitted on cross-examination to discover not only the accuracy of his understanding, but his memory and his credibility as well.

1943A., n. s., 730 and note; Zinn v. Updegraff, 113 Kan. 25 , 213 Pac. 816 ; Reeser v. Hammond, 122 Kan. 695 , 253 Pac. 233 .) It is a salutary rule of trial practice that when a party is a witness in his own behalf, and where the issues of fact must largely turn on the credence which the triers of fact will give to his testimony, the fullest inquiry should be permitted on cross-examination to discover not only the accuracy of his understanding, but his memory and his credibility as well.

1943A., n. s., 730 and note; Zinn v. Updegraff, 113 Kan. 25 , 213 Pac. 816 ; Reeser v. Hammond, 122 Kan. 695 , 253 Pac. 233 .) It is a salutary rule of trial practice that when a party is a witness in his own behalf, and where the issues of fact must largely turn on the credence which the triers of fact will give to his testimony, the fullest inquiry should be permitted on cross-examination to discover not only the accuracy of his understanding, but his memory and his credibility as well.

1999And the mischief which would follow die establishment of a precedent for so disregarding this salutary doctrine against prolonging strife would be greater than the benefit which would result from relieving some case of individual hardship. [Citation omitted.]” Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 198-99 , 76 L.

1999And the mischief which would follow die establishment of a precedent for so disregarding this salutary doctrine against prolonging strife would be greater than the benefit which would result from relieving some case of individual hardship. [Citation omitted.]” Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 198-99 , 76 L.

1994Applying this ‘test’ it is plain that Mound Park Hospital was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of medicine.” 205 So. 2d at 14 .

1994“In Watson v. Centro Español De Tampa, 1947, 158 Fla. 796 , 30 So. 2d 288 , a case involving alleged unauthorized practice of medicine by an intern in a hospital, we find the following: ‘The test of whether or not one is practicing medicine within the meaning of Section 458.13, is whether or not he holds himself out as being able to “diagnose, treat, operate or prescribe for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity or physical condition or who shall offer or undertake by any means or method to diagnose, treat, operate or prescribe for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity or physical co

1994“In Watson v. Centro Español De Tampa, 1947, 158 Fla. 796 , 30 So. 2d 288 , a case involving alleged unauthorized practice of medicine by an intern in a hospital, we find the following: ‘The test of whether or not one is practicing medicine within the meaning of Section 458.13, is whether or not he holds himself out as being able to “diagnose, treat, operate or prescribe for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity or physical condition or who shall offer or undertake by any means or method to diagnose, treat, operate or prescribe for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity or physical co

1980Co., 207 Kan. at 80-81 , the Supreme Court stated: “This salutary principle pertains to the exclusionary provisions as well as to the other terms of the insurance contract.

1980In Seute v. American Oil Co., 225 Kan. 640 , 594 P.2d 156 (1979), the court stated at 642: “We held in Taber v. Taber, 213 Kan. 453 -454, 516 P.2d 987 (1973): ‘The doctrine of res judicata is plain and intelligible, and amounts simply to this — that a cause of action once finally determined, without appeal, between the parties, on the merits, by a competent tribunal cannot afterwards be litigated by a new proceeding, either before the same or any other tribunal.’ ” In Wells v. Davis, 226 Kan. 586 , 603 P.2d 180 (1979), we stated at 589: “In Hutchinson Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. English, 209 Kan

1980In Seute v. American Oil Co., 225 Kan. 640 , 594 P.2d 156 (1979), the court stated at 642: “We held in Taber v. Taber, 213 Kan. 453 -454, 516 P.2d 987 (1973): ‘The doctrine of res judicata is plain and intelligible, and amounts simply to this — that a cause of action once finally determined, without appeal, between the parties, on the merits, by a competent tribunal cannot afterwards be litigated by a new proceeding, either before the same or any other tribunal.’ ” In Wells v. Davis, 226 Kan. 586 , 603 P.2d 180 (1979), we stated at 589: “In Hutchinson Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. English, 209 Kan

1980In Seute v. American Oil Co., 225 Kan. 640 , 594 P.2d 156 (1979), the court stated at 642: “We held in Taber v. Taber, 213 Kan. 453 -454, 516 P.2d 987 (1973): ‘The doctrine of res judicata is plain and intelligible, and amounts simply to this — that a cause of action once finally determined, without appeal, between the parties, on the merits, by a competent tribunal cannot afterwards be litigated by a new proceeding, either before the same or any other tribunal.’ ” In Wells v. Davis, 226 Kan. 586 , 603 P.2d 180 (1979), we stated at 589: “In Hutchinson Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. English, 209 Kan

1980In Seute v. American Oil Co., 225 Kan. 640 , 594 P.2d 156 (1979), the court stated at 642: “We held in Taber v. Taber, 213 Kan. 453 -454, 516 P.2d 987 (1973): ‘The doctrine of res judicata is plain and intelligible, and amounts simply to this — that a cause of action once finally determined, without appeal, between the parties, on the merits, by a competent tribunal cannot afterwards be litigated by a new proceeding, either before the same or any other tribunal.’ ” In Wells v. Davis, 226 Kan. 586 , 603 P.2d 180 (1979), we stated at 589: “In Hutchinson Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. English, 209 Kan

1980In Seute v. American Oil Co., 225 Kan. 640 , 594 P.2d 156 (1979), the court stated at 642: “We held in Taber v. Taber, 213 Kan. 453 -454, 516 P.2d 987 (1973): ‘The doctrine of res judicata is plain and intelligible, and amounts simply to this — that a cause of action once finally determined, without appeal, between the parties, on the merits, by a competent tribunal cannot afterwards be litigated by a new proceeding, either before the same or any other tribunal.’ ” In Wells v. Davis, 226 Kan. 586 , 603 P.2d 180 (1979), we stated at 589: “In Hutchinson Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. English, 209 Kan

1980In Seute v. American Oil Co., 225 Kan. 640 , 594 P.2d 156 (1979), the court stated at 642: “We held in Taber v. Taber, 213 Kan. 453 -454, 516 P.2d 987 (1973): ‘The doctrine of res judicata is plain and intelligible, and amounts simply to this — that a cause of action once finally determined, without appeal, between the parties, on the merits, by a competent tribunal cannot afterwards be litigated by a new proceeding, either before the same or any other tribunal.’ ” In Wells v. Davis, 226 Kan. 586 , 603 P.2d 180 (1979), we stated at 589: “In Hutchinson Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. English, 209 Kan

1973Agreement with this general proposition was clearly indicated by this court in Cities Service Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 201 Kan. 223 , 440 P. 2d 660 .

1973Agreement with this general proposition was clearly indicated by this court in Cities Service Gas Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 201 Kan. 223 , 440 P. 2d 660 .

1972In Board of Education v. Towers, 142 Kan. 664 , 51 P. 2d 421 , Henson v. School District, 150 Kan. 610 , 95 P. 2d 346 , Heller v. Rounkles, 171 Kan. 323 , 232 P. 2d 225 , and Unified School District v. Hedrick, 203 Kan. 478 , 454 P. 2d 536 , various bond proposals were held to be defective where they failed to apprise the voters of the total cost of the contemplated improvements and of the fact that funds derived from other sources — notably federal grants— would be added to the proceeds from the bonds to assist in financing the entire cost of the building program.

1972In Board of Education v. Towers, 142 Kan. 664 , 51 P. 2d 421 , Henson v. School District, 150 Kan. 610 , 95 P. 2d 346 , Heller v. Rounkles, 171 Kan. 323 , 232 P. 2d 225 , and Unified School District v. Hedrick, 203 Kan. 478 , 454 P. 2d 536 , various bond proposals were held to be defective where they failed to apprise the voters of the total cost of the contemplated improvements and of the fact that funds derived from other sources — notably federal grants— would be added to the proceeds from the bonds to assist in financing the entire cost of the building program.

1972(Kansas Electric Power Co. v. City of Eureka, 142 Kan. 117 , 45 P. 2d 877 ; Wycoff v. Board of County Commissioners, 189 Kan. 557 , 370 P. 2d 138 .) This salutary rule has been applied in a number of cases involving school bond elections.

1972(Kansas Electric Power Co. v. City of Eureka, 142 Kan. 117 , 45 P. 2d 877 ; Wycoff v. Board of County Commissioners, 189 Kan. 557 , 370 P. 2d 138 .) This salutary rule has been applied in a number of cases involving school bond elections.

1972In Board of Education v. Towers, 142 Kan. 664 , 51 P. 2d 421 , Henson v. School District, 150 Kan. 610 , 95 P. 2d 346 , Heller v. Rounkles, 171 Kan. 323 , 232 P. 2d 225 , and Unified School District v. Hedrick, 203 Kan. 478 , 454 P. 2d 536 , various bond proposals were held to be defective where they failed to apprise the voters of the total cost of the contemplated improvements and of the fact that funds derived from other sources — notably federal grants— would be added to the proceeds from the bonds to assist in financing the entire cost of the building program.

1972In Board of Education v. Towers, 142 Kan. 664 , 51 P. 2d 421 , Henson v. School District, 150 Kan. 610 , 95 P. 2d 346 , Heller v. Rounkles, 171 Kan. 323 , 232 P. 2d 225 , and Unified School District v. Hedrick, 203 Kan. 478 , 454 P. 2d 536 , various bond proposals were held to be defective where they failed to apprise the voters of the total cost of the contemplated improvements and of the fact that funds derived from other sources — notably federal grants— would be added to the proceeds from the bonds to assist in financing the entire cost of the building program.

1972In Board of Education v. Towers, 142 Kan. 664 , 51 P. 2d 421 , Henson v. School District, 150 Kan. 610 , 95 P. 2d 346 , Heller v. Rounkles, 171 Kan. 323 , 232 P. 2d 225 , and Unified School District v. Hedrick, 203 Kan. 478 , 454 P. 2d 536 , various bond proposals were held to be defective where they failed to apprise the voters of the total cost of the contemplated improvements and of the fact that funds derived from other sources — notably federal grants— would be added to the proceeds from the bonds to assist in financing the entire cost of the building program.

1972In Board of Education v. Towers, 142 Kan. 664 , 51 P. 2d 421 , Henson v. School District, 150 Kan. 610 , 95 P. 2d 346 , Heller v. Rounkles, 171 Kan. 323 , 232 P. 2d 225 , and Unified School District v. Hedrick, 203 Kan. 478 , 454 P. 2d 536 , various bond proposals were held to be defective where they failed to apprise the voters of the total cost of the contemplated improvements and of the fact that funds derived from other sources — notably federal grants— would be added to the proceeds from the bonds to assist in financing the entire cost of the building program.

1972In Board of Education v. Towers, 142 Kan. 664 , 51 P. 2d 421 , Henson v. School District, 150 Kan. 610 , 95 P. 2d 346 , Heller v. Rounkles, 171 Kan. 323 , 232 P. 2d 225 , and Unified School District v. Hedrick, 203 Kan. 478 , 454 P. 2d 536 , various bond proposals were held to be defective where they failed to apprise the voters of the total cost of the contemplated improvements and of the fact that funds derived from other sources — notably federal grants— would be added to the proceeds from the bonds to assist in financing the entire cost of the building program.

1972(Kansas Electric Power Co. v. City of Eureka, 142 Kan. 117 , 45 P. 2d 877 ; Wycoff v. Board of County Commissioners, 189 Kan. 557 , 370 P. 2d 138 .) This salutary rule has been applied in a number of cases involving school bond elections.

1972(Kansas Electric Power Co. v. City of Eureka, 142 Kan. 117 , 45 P. 2d 877 ; Wycoff v. Board of County Commissioners, 189 Kan. 557 , 370 P. 2d 138 .) This salutary rule has been applied in a number of cases involving school bond elections.

1971We have always followed this salutary rule (City of Leavenworth v. Rankin, 2 Kan. 357 ; Roberts v. St.

1971Marys, 78 Kan. 707 , 98 Pac. 211 ; State, ex rel., v. City of Coffeyville, 127 Kan. 663 , 274 Pac. 258 ). *417 Finally, plaintiff complains the trial court’s ruling was prematurely rendered prior to completion of discovery thereby depriving it of that right.

1971Marys, 78 Kan. 707 , 98 Pac. 211 ; State, ex rel., v. City of Coffeyville, 127 Kan. 663 , 274 Pac. 258 ). *417 Finally, plaintiff complains the trial court’s ruling was prematurely rendered prior to completion of discovery thereby depriving it of that right.

1971Marys, 78 Kan. 707 , 98 Pac. 211 ; State, ex rel., v. City of Coffeyville, 127 Kan. 663 , 274 Pac. 258 ). *417 Finally, plaintiff complains the trial court’s ruling was prematurely rendered prior to completion of discovery thereby depriving it of that right.

1971Marys, 78 Kan. 707 , 98 Pac. 211 ; State, ex rel., v. City of Coffeyville, 127 Kan. 663 , 274 Pac. 258 ). *417 Finally, plaintiff complains the trial court’s ruling was prematurely rendered prior to completion of discovery thereby depriving it of that right.

1971Ed.] Insurance, § 42.) The premise on which this rule is based was given expression in Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co., 65 C. 2d 263; 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 , 419 P. 2d 168 , where the facts were identical to those in this case, with the single exception that the action filed there against the insured had resulted in a judgment against him: “Although courts have long followed the basic precept that they would look to the words of the contract to find the meaning which the parties expected from them, they have also applied the doctrine of tire adhesion contract to insurance policies, holding that in vi

1971Ed.] Insurance, § 42.) The premise on which this rule is based was given expression in Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co., 65 C. 2d 263; 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 , 419 P. 2d 168 , where the facts were identical to those in this case, with the single exception that the action filed there against the insured had resulted in a judgment against him: “Although courts have long followed the basic precept that they would look to the words of the contract to find the meaning which the parties expected from them, they have also applied the doctrine of tire adhesion contract to insurance policies, holding that in vi

1970S. A. 60-441: “Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict or an indictment no evidence shall be received to show the effect of any statement, conduct, event or condition upon the mind of a juror as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined.” See, also, Kincaid v. Wade, 196 Kan. 174 , 410 P. 2d 333 ; Brown v. Hardin, 197 Kan. 517, 523 , 419 P. 2d 912 .

1970S. A. 60-441: “Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict or an indictment no evidence shall be received to show the effect of any statement, conduct, event or condition upon the mind of a juror as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined.” See, also, Kincaid v. Wade, 196 Kan. 174 , 410 P. 2d 333 ; Brown v. Hardin, 197 Kan. 517, 523 , 419 P. 2d 912 .

1970S. A. 60-441: “Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict or an indictment no evidence shall be received to show the effect of any statement, conduct, event or condition upon the mind of a juror as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined.” See, also, Kincaid v. Wade, 196 Kan. 174 , 410 P. 2d 333 ; Brown v. Hardin, 197 Kan. 517, 523 , 419 P. 2d 912 .

1970S. A. 60-441: “Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict or an indictment no evidence shall be received to show the effect of any statement, conduct, event or condition upon the mind of a juror as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined.” See, also, Kincaid v. Wade, 196 Kan. 174 , 410 P. 2d 333 ; Brown v. Hardin, 197 Kan. 517, 523 , 419 P. 2d 912 .

1963As early as Woods v. Nicholas, 92 Kan. 258 , 140 Pac. 862 , amendments for the purpose of correcting mistakes or defects in pleadings, that would promote justice and not substantially change the claims or defenses of parties, were recognized by the court as those which should be liberally granted.

1963As early as Woods v. Nicholas, 92 Kan. 258 , 140 Pac. 862 , amendments for the purpose of correcting mistakes or defects in pleadings, that would promote justice and not substantially change the claims or defenses of parties, were recognized by the court as those which should be liberally granted.

1956(State v. Shanahan, 114 Kan. 212 , 217 Pac. 309 .) It is the salutary rule of trial practice that when a party is a witness in his own behalf, and where the issues of fact must largely turn on the credence which the triers of fact will give to his testimony, the fullest inquiry should be permitted on cross-examination to discover not only the accuracy of his understanding but his memory and his credibility as well.

1956(State v. Shanahan, 114 Kan. 212 , 217 Pac. 309 .) It is the salutary rule of trial practice that when a party is a witness in his own behalf, and where the issues of fact must largely turn on the credence which the triers of fact will give to his testimony, the fullest inquiry should be permitted on cross-examination to discover not only the accuracy of his understanding but his memory and his credibility as well.

1954Conceding, as appellant points out, that zoning ordinances are to be strictly construed (See Babb v. Rose, 156 Kan. 587 , 134 P. 2d 655 ), does not do away with the salutary rule of equal application that in determining what an ordinance means, and how it is to be construed, you do not isolate one part and ignore the plain import and meaning of others but instead give force and effect to all provisions germane to the subject involved.

1954Conceding, as appellant points out, that zoning ordinances are to be strictly construed (See Babb v. Rose, 156 Kan. 587 , 134 P. 2d 655 ), does not do away with the salutary rule of equal application that in determining what an ordinance means, and how it is to be construed, you do not isolate one part and ignore the plain import and meaning of others but instead give force and effect to all provisions germane to the subject involved.

1951Appellant recognizes the rule to be as above stated but contends the instant appeal does not come within the purview of its terms because (1) the unappealed ruling of the trial court refusing to permit the endorser to intervene on his own application has become res judicata and acts as a bar or estoppel on the motion of the defendant bank to make him an additional party and (2) this court has held (Ousley v. Osage City, 95 Kan. 254 , 147 Pac. 1110 ) the denial of an application to intervene is an appealable order.

1951Appellant recognizes the rule to be as above stated but contends the instant appeal does not come within the purview of its terms because (1) the unappealed ruling of the trial court refusing to permit the endorser to intervene on his own application has become res judicata and acts as a bar or estoppel on the motion of the defendant bank to make him an additional party and (2) this court has held (Ousley v. Osage City, 95 Kan. 254 , 147 Pac. 1110 ) the denial of an application to intervene is an appealable order.