salutary rule in Kentucky

1977Gen. v. Withers, 266 Ky. 29 , 98 S.W.2d 24 (1936) defined the perimeters of self-interest in situations of this type as follows: It is a salutary doctrine that he who is intrusted with the business of others cannot be allowed to make such business an object of profit to himself.

1977Gen. v. Withers, 266 Ky. 29 , 98 S.W.2d 24 (1936) defined the perimeters of self-interest in situations of this type as follows: It is a salutary doctrine that he who is intrusted with the business of others cannot be allowed to make such business an object of profit to himself.

1977As Chief Justice Burger stated in Estelle v. Williams, supra: “The reason for this rule is clear: if the defendant has an objection, there is an obligation to call the matter to the court’s attention so that the trial judge will have an opportunity to remedy the situation.” 425 U.S. 501 , 508 n.3, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1695 .

1977As Chief Justice Burger stated in Estelle v. Williams, supra: “The reason for this rule is clear: if the defendant has an objection, there is an obligation to call the matter to the court’s attention so that the trial judge will have an opportunity to remedy the situation.” 425 U.S. 501 , 508 n.3, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 1695 .

1965Appellant relies upon United States v. Dardi, *359 330 F.2d 316 (2 C.C.A.) in which the salutary rule is announced: "It is improper to utilize a Grand Jury for the sole or dominating purpose of preparing an already pending indictment for trial." We are in accord with the principle.

1965Appellant relies upon United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316 (2 C.C.A.) in which the salutary rule is announced: “It is improper to utilize a Grand Jury for the sole or dominating purpose of preparing an already pending indictment for trial.” We are in accord with the principle.

1956Cf. Kinmon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 383 S.W.2d 338 .

1950The principal reason is in part: “It is of the highest importance that municipal and other bodies of public servants should be free from every kind of personal influence in making appointments that carry with them services to which the public are entitled and compensation that the public must pay.” [ 140 Ky. 353 , 131 S. W. 41 ] In the present case, Smith, the appointee, had helped to create the vacancy and to keep it open for nearly eight months.

1949Petrey v. Holliday, 178 Ky. 410 , 199 S. W. 67 ; Bradley v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 675 , 291 S. W. 1047 ; Allen v. Bach, 233 Ky. 501 , 26 S. W. 2d 43 ; Commonwealth by Cooper v. Howard, 267 Ky. 287 , 102 S. W. 2d 18 .

1949Petrey v. Holliday, 178 Ky. 410 , 199 S. W. 67 ; Bradley v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 675 , 291 S. W. 1047 ; Allen v. Bach, 233 Ky. 501 , 26 S. W. 2d 43 ; Commonwealth by Cooper v. Howard, 267 Ky. 287 , 102 S. W. 2d 18 .

1949Petrey v. Holliday, 178 Ky. 410 , 199 S. W. 67 ; Bradley v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 675 , 291 S. W. 1047 ; Allen v. Bach, 233 Ky. 501 , 26 S. W. 2d 43 ; Commonwealth by Cooper v. Howard, 267 Ky. 287 , 102 S. W. 2d 18 .

1949Petrey v. Holliday, 178 Ky. 410 , 199 S. W. 67 ; Bradley v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 675 , 291 S. W. 1047 ; Allen v. Bach, 233 Ky. 501 , 26 S. W. 2d 43 ; Commonwealth by Cooper v. Howard, 267 Ky. 287 , 102 S. W. 2d 18 .

1949Petrey v. Holliday, 178 Ky. 410 , 199 S. W. 67 ; Bradley v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 675 , 291 S. W. 1047 ; Allen v. Bach, 233 Ky. 501 , 26 S. W. 2d 43 ; Commonwealth by Cooper v. Howard, 267 Ky. 287 , 102 S. W. 2d 18 .

1949Petrey v. Holliday, 178 Ky. 410 , 199 S. W. 67 ; Bradley v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 675 , 291 S. W. 1047 ; Allen v. Bach, 233 Ky. 501 , 26 S. W. 2d 43 ; Commonwealth by Cooper v. Howard, 267 Ky. 287 , 102 S. W. 2d 18 .

1949Petrey v. Holliday, 178 Ky. 410 , 199 S. W. 67 ; Bradley v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 675 , 291 S. W. 1047 ; Allen v. Bach, 233 Ky. 501 , 26 S. W. 2d 43 ; Commonwealth by Cooper v. Howard, 267 Ky. 287 , 102 S. W. 2d 18 .

1949Petrey v. Holliday, 178 Ky. 410 , 199 S. W. 67 ; Bradley v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 675 , 291 S. W. 1047 ; Allen v. Bach, 233 Ky. 501 , 26 S. W. 2d 43 ; Commonwealth by Cooper v. Howard, 267 Ky. 287 , 102 S. W. 2d 18 .

1947City of Lexington v. Thompson, 250 Ky. 96 , 61 S. W. 2d 1092 ; Reeves v. Adam Hat Stores, 303 Ky. 633 , 198 S. W. 2d 789 ; Roeske v. Lamb, 39 N. M. 111, 41 P. 2d 522 ; Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583 , 46 S. Ct. 605 , 70 L.

1947City of Lexington v. Thompson, 250 Ky. 96 , 61 S. W. 2d 1092 ; Reeves v. Adam Hat Stores, 303 Ky. 633 , 198 S. W. 2d 789 ; Roeske v. Lamb, 39 N. M. 111, 41 P. 2d 522 ; Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583 , 46 S. Ct. 605 , 70 L.

1947City of Lexington v. Thompson, 250 Ky. 96 , 61 S. W. 2d 1092 ; Reeves v. Adam Hat Stores, 303 Ky. 633 , 198 S. W. 2d 789 ; Roeske v. Lamb, 39 N. M. 111, 41 P. 2d 522 ; Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583 , 46 S. Ct. 605 , 70 L.

1947City of Lexington v. Thompson, 250 Ky. 96 , 61 S. W. 2d 1092 ; Reeves v. Adam Hat Stores, 303 Ky. 633 , 198 S. W. 2d 789 ; Roeske v. Lamb, 39 N. M. 111, 41 P. 2d 522 ; Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583 , 46 S. Ct. 605 , 70 L.

1947City of Lexington v. Thompson, 250 Ky. 96 , 61 S. W. 2d 1092 ; Reeves v. Adam Hat Stores, 303 Ky. 633 , 198 S. W. 2d 789 ; Roeske v. Lamb, 39 N. M. 111, 41 P. 2d 522 ; Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583 , 46 S. Ct. 605 , 70 L.

1947City of Lexington v. Thompson, 250 Ky. 96 , 61 S. W. 2d 1092 ; Reeves v. Adam Hat Stores, 303 Ky. 633 , 198 S. W. 2d 789 ; Roeske v. Lamb, 39 N. M. 111, 41 P. 2d 522 ; Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583 , 46 S. Ct. 605 , 70 L.

1947City of Lexington v. Thompson, 250 Ky. 96 , 61 S. W. 2d 1092 ; Reeves v. Adam Hat Stores, 303 Ky. 633 , 198 S. W. 2d 789 ; Roeske v. Lamb, 39 N. M. 111, 41 P. 2d 522 ; Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583 , 46 S. Ct. 605 , 70 L.

1942In the recent opinion of Stark’s Adm’x v. Herndon’s Adm’r, 292 Ky. 469 , 166 S. W. (2d) 828 , delivered November 10, 1942, it is pointed out: “Presumptive evidence is the proof of one fact, which when shown, has a legitimate tendency to lead the mind, to the conclusion that another fact to be proven is in existence. * * * Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts which have a legitimate tendency from the laws of nature, the usual connection of things, and ordinary transactions of business, etc., to show the reasonable mind that the disputed fact was or was not in existence.” Because the sa

1942In the recent opinion of Stark’s Adm’x v. Herndon’s Adm’r, 292 Ky. 469 , 166 S. W. (2d) 828 , delivered November 10, 1942, it is pointed out: “Presumptive evidence is the proof of one fact, which when shown, has a legitimate tendency to lead the mind, to the conclusion that another fact to be proven is in existence. * * * Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts which have a legitimate tendency from the laws of nature, the usual connection of things, and ordinary transactions of business, etc., to show the reasonable mind that the disputed fact was or was not in existence.” Because the sa

1940Cook’s Adm’r v. Franklin Fire Insurance Company, 224 Ky. 360 , 6 S. W. (2d) 477 .

1940Cook’s Adm’r v. Franklin Fire Insurance Company, 224 Ky. 360 , 6 S. W. (2d) 477 .

1929Mon.) 71 : ‘ ‘ The salutary principle of equity, now urged in bar of Cook’s right to relief, should not be extended beyond the reason and policy which dictated it; and it does not, therefore, necessarily apply to a case in which the defending party had himself first conceived the fraud for his own benefit, and either by his artifice or influence induced the complaining party to concur with him in the attempted collusion. ’ ’ This case has its analogue in Harper v. Harper, 85 Ky. 160 , 3 S. W. 5, 6 , 8 Ky. Law Rep. 820 , 7 Am.

1929Mon.) 71 : ‘ ‘ The salutary principle of equity, now urged in bar of Cook’s right to relief, should not be extended beyond the reason and policy which dictated it; and it does not, therefore, necessarily apply to a case in which the defending party had himself first conceived the fraud for his own benefit, and either by his artifice or influence induced the complaining party to concur with him in the attempted collusion. ’ ’ This case has its analogue in Harper v. Harper, 85 Ky. 160 , 3 S. W. 5, 6 , 8 Ky. Law Rep. 820 , 7 Am.

1927In Perciful v. Com., 212 Ky. 673 , 279 S. W. 1062 , the court so instructed the jury; approving the instruction, this court said: “'The instruction simply gives effect to the salutary rule that temporary insanity, caused solely by voluntary drunkenness at the time of the homicide, does not exempt one from responsibility for his act.” In larceny an attempt to steal must exist.

1927In Perciful v. Com., 212 Ky. 673 , 279 S. W. 1062 , the court so instructed the jury; approving the instruction, this court said: “'The instruction simply gives effect to the salutary rule that temporary insanity, caused solely by voluntary drunkenness at the time of the homicide, does not exempt one from responsibility for his act.” In larceny an attempt to steal must exist.

1917See Singers-Bigger v. Young, 166 Fed. 82 ; Hampton v. Buchanan, 51 Wash. 155 ; Morel v. Hoge, 130 Ga. 625 ; Cone’s Exor. v. Russell, 48 N. J.

1917The defendant and the Standard Oil Company, for whose benefit’ it is alleged the contract was made, were not all the stockholders, and it seems to us that it was certainly the right of those other stockholders to have the defendant’s .judgment, as • an officer of the company, exercised with a sole regard to the interests of the company.” West v. Camden, supra, stands at the head of a long line of cases laying down the same salutary rule.

1917See Singers-Bigger v. Young, 166 Fed. 82 ; Hampton v. Buchanan, 51 Wash. 155 ; Morel v. Hoge, 130 Ga. 625 ; Cone’s Exor. v. Russell, 48 N. J.

1917This rule is well stated in Byassee v. Evans, 143 Ky. 418 , where it is said: “While in an equity case we will give judgment according to the weight of the evidence, and the truth as it shall appear from the whole record, when we find the evidence, as in this case, conflicting, and the questions of fact by reason thereof difficult of solution, some reliance should be placed in the circuit judge’s acquaintance with the parties and witnesses and his consideration of the evidence; and if unconvinced by careful consideration of the record that he has erred to the prejudice of the substantial right

1916Under similar circumstances the Supreme Court of Arkansas, in the case of Farmers’ and Merchants’ Savings Company v. Bazore, et al., 54 S. W. 339 , said: “In a quit claim deed for his interest in the property in controversy made by Bazore to Wilson, there was a provision that Wilson should pay all accounts of the firm in which they were partners; and,, if this includes the note to the Farmers’ and Merchants’ Company, Wilson could not be heard to plead usury as to Bazore’s half interest.” To hold as indicated fully recognizes the salutary doctrine of the courts that usury may not be' collected

1907Parsons v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky., 102 ; Campbell v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky., 402 , 11 S. W., 290 , 10 Ky. Law Rep., 975 , 21 Am.

1907Parsons v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky., 102 ; Campbell v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky., 402 , 11 S. W., 290 , 10 Ky. Law Rep., 975 , 21 Am.

1907Parsons v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky., 102 ; Campbell v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky., 402 , 11 S. W., 290 , 10 Ky. Law Rep., 975 , 21 Am.