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9 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1919–2000 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Marksgreen1 sentence2000See State v. Marks, 464 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Kirkendoll v. Stategreen2 sentences1965The Greenlease case and any discussion of it had nothing to do with the facts of the instant case — the facts are entirely different.” (Emphasis added) 198 Tenn. at 512, 513 , 281 S.W.2d at 250 . 1965The Greenlease case and any discussion of it had nothing to do with the facts of the instant case — the facts are entirely different.” (Emphasis added) 198 Tenn. at 512, 513 , 281 S.W.2d at 250 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Thomas v. Million
neutral
2 sentences1997We recognize the salutary principle that sharp practice must not be allowed to defeat the commission of a broker who has brought a seller-buyer together pursuant to contract.2 See, Robinson v. Kemmons Wilson Realty Co., 293 S.W.2d 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956); Thomas v. Million, 250 S.W.2d 111 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1952). 1997We recognize the salutary principle that sharp practice must not be allowed to defeat the commission of a broker who has brought a seller-buyer together pursuant to contract.2 See, Robinson v. Kemmons Wilson Realty Co., 293 S.W.2d 754 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956); Thomas v. Million, 250 S.W.2d 111 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1952). | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Tenpenny v. State
neutral
1 sentence1963This was long ago decided in Tennpenny v. State, 151 Tenn. 669 , 270 S.W. 989 , and most text writers on the subject agree with this proposition. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Davis v. Combined Insurance Co. of America
neutral
2 sentences1958Co. of America, 137 W.Va. 196 , 70 S.E.2d 814, 821 , it was said: “This salutary principle, however, does not apply when the language of the policy of insurance is unequivocal and unambiguous and is sufficiently clear in expressing the intention of the parties, or when the language has acquired by judicial construction on a clear and definite meaning.” (Citing authority.) We are of opinion that there is no ambiguity about the ordinary meaning of the expression “public highway.” We think there can be no doubt that the common understanding of a public highway is such a passageway as any and all 1958Co. of America, 137 W.Va. 196 , 70 S.E.2d 814, 821 , it was said: “This salutary principle, however, does not apply when the language of the policy of insurance is unequivocal and unambiguous and is sufficiently clear in expressing the intention of the parties, or when the language has acquired by judicial construction on a clear and definite meaning.” (Citing authority.) We are of opinion that there is no ambiguity about the ordinary meaning of the expression “public highway.” We think there can be no doubt that the common understanding of a public highway is such a passageway as any and all | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell
green
2 sentences1957Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 , 55 S.Ct. 538, 540 , 79 L.Ed. 1070 said: “It is a salutary principle of judicial decision, long emphasized and followed by this Court, that the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute rests on him who assails it, and that courts may not declare a legislative discrimination invalid unless, *8 viewed in the light of facts made known or generally assumed, it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that the classification rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators. 1957Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 , 55 S.Ct. 538, 540 , 79 L.Ed. 1070 said: “It is a salutary principle of judicial decision, long emphasized and followed by this Court, that the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute rests on him who assails it, and that courts may not declare a legislative discrimination invalid unless, *8 viewed in the light of facts made known or generally assumed, it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that the classification rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Bennett v. Mass. Mutual Life Ins.
green
2 sentences1926We have examined the cases of Bennett v. Massachusetts, etc., Insurance Co., 107 Tenn., 371 , 64 S. W., 758 , St. 1926We have examined the cases of Bennett v. Massachusetts, etc., Insurance Co., 107 Tenn., 371 , 64 S. W., 758 , St. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Johnson v. Continental Insurance Co. of New York
neutral
1 sentence1926The doctrine carried to the extent for which the assured contends in this ease would subvert the salutary rule, that the written contract must prevail over previous verbal arrangements, and open the door to all the evils which that rule was intended to prevent.” The opinion in the case of Insurance Company v. Mowry, supra, was cited, approved and followed in the case of Johnson v. Insurance Co., 119 Tenn., 598, 606 , 107 S. W., 688 , where a fire insurance policy and the premium notes given therefor provided that the insurer should not be liable for any loss or damage occurring while any premi | 1 | 1926–1926 |
State ex rel. Pitts v. Nashville Baseball Club
green
1 sentence1919State ex rel. v. Nashville Baseball Club, 127 Tenn., 292 -308, 154 S. W., 1151 , Ann. | 1 | 1919–1919 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.