14 Virginia opinions name it 3 courts 1910–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Young v. . Huntergreen2 sentences2017Rather than answering whether appellee refused to discuss the financial resources, appellant responded that “[h]e didn’t discuss them at all.” Even assuming that these provisions were conditions precedent, as appellant argues they were, “[i]t is a well settled and salutary rule that a party cannot insist upon a condition precedent, when its non-performance has been caused by himself.” Parrish v. Wightman, 184 Va. 86, 92 , 34 S.E.2d 229, 232 (1945) (quoting Young v. Hunter, 6 N.Y. 203, 207 (1852)). 1945Williston on Contracts, Vol. 2, section 677; Dolan v. Rodgers, 149 N. Y. 489 , 44 N. E. 167 ; In re Casualty Co., 250 N. Y. 410, 419 , 165 N. E. 829 . ‘It is a well settled and salutary rule that a party cannot insist upon a condition precedent, when its non-performance has been caused by himself.’ Young v. Hunter, 6 N. Y. 203, 207 . ‘It is as effective an" excuse of performance of a condition that the promisor has hindered performance as that he has actually prevented it.’ Williston on Contracts, Vol. 2, section 677. | 1 | 2 |
Allen v. Brooksgreen2 sentences1983He said that as the John Doe car approached the point where the two ramps merged, “it was sliding ... it slid over to the emergency lane that we have there,” that it continued right across the safety zone and forced the James car out of its lane, that the car was “leaning” while “in the slide.” Brock further testified that the Doe car was just about ready to cross the safety zone when James “started applying his brakes” and that when this happened, the James car “skidded sideways” and hit the median strip and “went into the air completely.” The principles which control our decision here are we 1983He said that as the John Doe car approached the point where the two ramps merged, “it was sliding ... it slid over to the emergency lane that we have there,” that it continued right across the safety zone and forced the James car out of its lane, that the car was “leaning” while “in the slide.” Brock further testified that the Doe car was just about ready to cross the safety zone when James “started applying his brakes” and that when this happened, the James car “skidded sideways” and hit the median strip and “went into the air completely.” The principles which control our decision here are we | 1 | 2 |
Parrish v. Wightmangreen2 sentences2017Rather than answering whether appellee refused to discuss the financial resources, appellant responded that “[h]e didn’t discuss them at all.” Even assuming that these provisions were conditions precedent, as appellant argues they were, “[i]t is a well settled and salutary rule that a party cannot insist upon a condition precedent, when its non-performance has been caused by himself.” Parrish v. Wightman, 184 Va. 86, 92 , 34 S.E.2d 229, 232 (1945) (quoting Young v. Hunter, 6 N.Y. 203, 207 (1852)). 2017Rather than answering whether appellee refused to discuss the financial resources, appellant responded that “[h]e didn’t discuss them at all.” Even assuming that these provisions were conditions precedent, as appellant argues they were, “[i]t is a well settled and salutary rule that a party cannot insist upon a condition precedent, when its non-performance has been caused by himself.” Parrish v. Wightman, 184 Va. 86, 92 , 34 S.E.2d 229, 232 (1945) (quoting Young v. Hunter, 6 N.Y. 203, 207 (1852)). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Morris Plan Bankgreen2 sentences2013Instead, the doctrine of merger “is a salutary principle,” is “a rule of justice, not to be classed among technicalities, and is not altogether a rule of original legal right, but is rather an equitable interposition of the courts to prevent a multiplicity of suits through reasons of public policy.” Jones, 168 Va. at 292 , 191 S.E. at 610 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). 2013Instead, the doctrine of merger “is a salutary principle,” is “a rule of justice, not to be classed among technicalities, and is not altogether a rule of original legal right, but is rather an equitable interposition of the courts to prevent a multiplicity of suits through reasons of public policy.” Jones, 168 Va. at 292 , 191 S.E. at 610 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Bollinggreen1 sentence1969See the opinion of the late Judge William A. Moncure, the elder, adopted as part of the opinion of our Supreme Court of Appeals in Williams v. Bolling, supra, at pp. 249 to 266, to which Sims, J., added In part, as follows (at p. 270): The authority of the court for this allowance is found in the settled rule which is thus stated in 1 Mechem on Agency, sec. 1224, pp. 894-5: "The well settled and salutary principle that a person who undertakes to act for another shall not, in the same matter act for himself, results also in the other rule, that all profits made and advantage gained by the agent | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Amies v. Wesnofske
green
2 sentences2017Under this standard, the prevention doctrine applies when a promisor is at "fault" and "is the cause of the failure of performance of a condition upon which his own liability depends" because "[i]t is a well settled and salutary rule that a party cannot insist upon a condition precedent, when its non-performance has been caused by himself." Id. (quoting Amies , 174 N.E. at 438 ). 2017Under this standard, the prevention doctrine applies when a promisor is at "fault" and "is the cause of the failure of performance of a condition upon which his own liability depends" because "[i]t is a well settled and salutary rule that a party cannot insist upon a condition precedent, when its non-performance has been caused by himself." Id. (quoting Amies , 174 N.E. at 438 ). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Gardner v. Warden of Virginia State Penitentiary
green
1 sentence1990Our Supreme Court, in Gardner v. Warden, 222 Va. 491 , 281 S.E.2d 876 (1981), recognized this salutary principle, stating, A guilty plea is a waiver of constitutional rights;. . . . such a waiver is constitutionally sufficient only when it is voluntary and intelligent; the waiver is to be accepted only after the trial judge has made a determination that it is [voluntary and intelligent]. *140 Id. at 494, 281 S.E.2d at 878 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Gardner v. WARDEN OF VIRGINIA ST. PENITENTIARY
green
2 sentences1990Our Supreme Court, in Gardner v. Warden, 222 Va. 491 , 281 S.E.2d 876 (1981), recognized this salutary principle, stating, A guilty plea is a waiver of constitutional rights;. . . . such a waiver is constitutionally sufficient only when it is voluntary and intelligent; the waiver is to be accepted only after the trial judge has made a determination that it is [voluntary and intelligent]. *140 Id. at 494, 281 S.E.2d at 878 . 1990Our Supreme Court, in Gardner v. Warden, 222 Va. 491 , 281 S.E.2d 876 (1981), recognized this salutary principle, stating, A guilty plea is a waiver of constitutional rights;. . . . such a waiver is constitutionally sufficient only when it is voluntary and intelligent; the waiver is to be accepted only after the trial judge has made a determination that it is [voluntary and intelligent]. *140 Id. at 494, 281 S.E.2d at 878 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Bell v. Routh Robbins Real Estate Corp.
green
1 sentence1969And it matters not whether such profit or advantage be the result of the performance or the violation of the duty of the agent if it be the fruit of the agency." On behalf of the plaintiff the case of Bell v. Real Estate Corp, 206 Va. 853 (1966), is cited. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Waddy v. Grimes
green
2 sentences1955In Rowland Kable, 174 Va. 343, 368 , 6 S.E.(2d) 633, Mr. Justice Spratley, speaking for the court, said: "In Waddy Grimes, 154 Va. 615, 647 , 153 S.E. 807, 817 , the majority rule is stated thus: 'There is a distinction to be made between transactions occurring directly between a trustee and his cestui que trust, and those transactions in which the trustee deals with himself in respect to the trust estate. 1955In Rowland Kable, 174 Va. 343, 368 , 6 S.E.(2d) 633, Mr. Justice Spratley, speaking for the court, said: "In Waddy Grimes, 154 Va. 615, 647 , 153 S.E. 807, 817 , the majority rule is stated thus: 'There is a distinction to be made between transactions occurring directly between a trustee and his cestui que trust, and those transactions in which the trustee deals with himself in respect to the trust estate. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Swineford v. Virginia Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1955The most usual way in which evasions of this salutary rule are attempted is in purchases of the trust estate by or in the interest of the trustee. * * *.'" Swineford Virginia Trust Co., 154 Va. 751, 759 , 152 S.E. 350, 353 , quoting from 26 R.C.L., at page 1325. 1955The most usual way in which evasions of this salutary rule are attempted is in purchases of the trust estate by or in the interest of the trustee. * * *.'" Swineford Virginia Trust Co., 154 Va. 751, 759 , 152 S.E. 350, 353 , quoting from 26 R.C.L., at page 1325. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Rowland v. Kable
green
1 sentence1955In Rowland Kable, 174 Va. 343, 368 , 6 S.E.(2d) 633, Mr. Justice Spratley, speaking for the court, said: "In Waddy Grimes, 154 Va. 615, 647 , 153 S.E. 807, 817 , the majority rule is stated thus: 'There is a distinction to be made between transactions occurring directly between a trustee and his cestui que trust, and those transactions in which the trustee deals with himself in respect to the trust estate. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Solomon v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
green
1 sentence1948Co., ante, p. 240, 46 S. E. (2d) 369 , it is said: “We have held repeatedly that this is a salutary rule and requires that the ground of objection be stated with reasonable certainty in the trial court.” This brings us to a consideration of what is the measure of damages for breach of this contract. | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Matter of Casualty Co. (Bliss Co. Claim)
green
2 sentences1945Williston on Contracts, Vol. 2, section 677; Dolan v. Rodgers, 149 N. Y. 489 , 44 N. E. 167 ; In re Casualty Co., 250 N. Y. 410, 419 , 165 N. E. 829 . ‘It is a well settled and salutary rule that a party cannot insist upon a condition precedent, when its non-performance has been caused by himself.’ Young v. Hunter, 6 N. Y. 203, 207 . ‘It is as effective an" excuse of performance of a condition that the promisor has hindered performance as that he has actually prevented it.’ Williston on Contracts, Vol. 2, section 677. 1945Williston on Contracts, Vol. 2, section 677; Dolan v. Rodgers, 149 N. Y. 489 , 44 N. E. 167 ; In re Casualty Co., 250 N. Y. 410, 419 , 165 N. E. 829 . ‘It is a well settled and salutary rule that a party cannot insist upon a condition precedent, when its non-performance has been caused by himself.’ Young v. Hunter, 6 N. Y. 203, 207 . ‘It is as effective an" excuse of performance of a condition that the promisor has hindered performance as that he has actually prevented it.’ Williston on Contracts, Vol. 2, section 677. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Dolan v. . Rodgers
green
2 sentences1945Williston on Contracts, Vol. 2, section 677; Dolan v. Rodgers, 149 N. Y. 489 , 44 N. E. 167 ; In re Casualty Co., 250 N. Y. 410, 419 , 165 N. E. 829 . ‘It is a well settled and salutary rule that a party cannot insist upon a condition precedent, when its non-performance has been caused by himself.’ Young v. Hunter, 6 N. Y. 203, 207 . ‘It is as effective an" excuse of performance of a condition that the promisor has hindered performance as that he has actually prevented it.’ Williston on Contracts, Vol. 2, section 677. 1945Williston on Contracts, Vol. 2, section 677; Dolan v. Rodgers, 149 N. Y. 489 , 44 N. E. 167 ; In re Casualty Co., 250 N. Y. 410, 419 , 165 N. E. 829 . ‘It is a well settled and salutary rule that a party cannot insist upon a condition precedent, when its non-performance has been caused by himself.’ Young v. Hunter, 6 N. Y. 203, 207 . ‘It is as effective an" excuse of performance of a condition that the promisor has hindered performance as that he has actually prevented it.’ Williston on Contracts, Vol. 2, section 677. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Johnston v. Kelley
neutral
2 sentences1942The case of Johnston v. Kelley, 171 Va. 239 , 198 S. E. 485 , is recent authority for this very salutary rule, although the circumstances in that case were quite different from those here. 1942The case of Johnston v. Kelley, 171 Va. 239 , 198 S. E. 485 , is recent authority for this very salutary rule, although the circumstances in that case were quite different from those here. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
State v. Straight
green
1 sentence1940Va. 361 , 135 S. E. 163 , a case involving a similar crime to the one in judgment, under similar circumstances, said: “It is with extreme reluctance that we have decided to reverse the judgment complained of, and do so only under constraint of a salutary rule of evidence invoked by the defendant.” We must reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case, for to do otherwise would be to do violence to a fundamental principle of the law of evidence. | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Standard Paint Co. v. E. K. Vietor & Co.
green
2 sentences1918Standard Paint Co. v. Vietor & Co., 120 Va. 595 , 91 S. E. 752 . 1918Standard Paint Co. v. Vietor & Co., 120 Va. 595 , 91 S. E. 752 . | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Tennant v. Dunlop
green
1 sentence1910We are well aware of the established and salutary principle under a long line of decisions by this court, coming down to Dunlop v. Tennant, 97 Va. 235 , 33 S. E. 620 , and some later, that trustees, partners or agents cannot by fraud, deceit or concealment of facts, make and retain profits out of their cestui que trust, associate or principal; but that is not this case. | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.