44 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1891–2010 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Whittemoregreen2 sentences1989“But this salutary rule, preventing a defendant who does not rely on time as a defense from using a discrepancy between the time named in the bill and the time shown by the evidence for the State, cannot be used to ensnare a defendant and thereby deprive him of an opportunity to adequately present his defense.” State v. Whittemore, 255 N.C. 583, 592 , 122 S.E. 2d 396, 403 (1961). 1989“But this salutary rule, preventing a defendant who does not rely on time as a defense from using a discrepancy between the time named in the bill and the time shown by the evidence for the State, cannot be used to ensnare a defendant and thereby deprive him of an opportunity to adequately present his defense.” State v. Whittemore, 255 N.C. 583, 592 , 122 S.E. 2d 396, 403 (1961). | 4 | 4 |
Mullen v. Sawyergreen2 sentences2007See also Mullen v. Sawyer, 277 N.C. 623, 633 , 178 S.E.2d 425, 431 (1971) (“It is a salutary rule of law that one who prevents the performance of a condition, or makes it impossible by his own act, will not be permitted to take advantage of the nonperformance.”) In this case, counsel for petitioner conceded that bureaucratic tangles might have hampered payment. 2007See also Mullen v. Sawyer, 277 N.C. 623, 633 , 178 S.E.2d 425, 431 (1971) (“It is a salutary rule of law that one who prevents the performance of a condition, or makes it impossible by his own act, will not be permitted to take advantage of the nonperformance.”) In this case, counsel for petitioner conceded that bureaucratic tangles might have hampered payment. | 1 | 2 |
State v. . Williamsgreen2 sentences2004The Court explained that “[t]his law was enacted to enforce a well-recognized and salutary principle, both of the moral law and of public policy, that he who is entrusted -with the business of others can not be allowed to make such business an object of pecuniary profit to himself.” Id. at 254 , 90 S.E.2d at 498 (quoting State v. Williams, 153 N.C. 595, 599 , 68 S.E. 900, 902 (1910)). 2004The Court explained that “[t]his law was enacted to enforce a well-recognized and salutary principle, both of the moral law and of public policy, that he who is entrusted -with the business of others can not be allowed to make such business an object of pecuniary profit to himself.” Id. at 254 , 90 S.E.2d at 498 (quoting State v. Williams, 153 N.C. 595, 599 , 68 S.E. 900, 902 (1910)). | 1 | 2 |
Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Waughgreen1 sentence2010All parts and clauses must be considered together that it may be seen if and how far one clause is explained, modified, limited, or controlled by the others.” Waugh, 188 A.2d at 891-92 (internal citations omitted); see also Tinker v. Continental Ins. | 1 | 1 |
City of Raleigh v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences2005Indeed, to permit JUMC to bring forth its claims in such a manner would subject Batten and our courts to “ ‘the unnecessary delay and expense of repeated fragmentary’ ” litigation, Hicks v. Koutro, 249 N.C. 61, 64 , 105 S.E.2d 196, 200 (1958) (quoting City of Raleigh v. Edwards, 234 N.C. 528, 529 , 67 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1951)), and undermine the salutary principle of judicial economy upon which Rule 13(a) is premised. 2005Indeed, to permit JUMC to bring forth its claims in such a manner would subject Batten and our courts to “ ‘the unnecessary delay and expense of repeated fragmentary’ ” litigation, Hicks v. Koutro, 249 N.C. 61, 64 , 105 S.E.2d 196, 200 (1958) (quoting City of Raleigh v. Edwards, 234 N.C. 528, 529 , 67 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1951)), and undermine the salutary principle of judicial economy upon which Rule 13(a) is premised. | 1 | 1 |
Hicks v. Koutrogreen2 sentences2005Indeed, to permit JUMC to bring forth its claims in such a manner would subject Batten and our courts to “ ‘the unnecessary delay and expense of repeated fragmentary’ ” litigation, Hicks v. Koutro, 249 N.C. 61, 64 , 105 S.E.2d 196, 200 (1958) (quoting City of Raleigh v. Edwards, 234 N.C. 528, 529 , 67 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1951)), and undermine the salutary principle of judicial economy upon which Rule 13(a) is premised. 2005Indeed, to permit JUMC to bring forth its claims in such a manner would subject Batten and our courts to “ ‘the unnecessary delay and expense of repeated fragmentary’ ” litigation, Hicks v. Koutro, 249 N.C. 61, 64 , 105 S.E.2d 196, 200 (1958) (quoting City of Raleigh v. Edwards, 234 N.C. 528, 529 , 67 S.E.2d 669, 671 (1951)), and undermine the salutary principle of judicial economy upon which Rule 13(a) is premised. | 1 | 1 |
| McNamara v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Fowler v. Gowinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Moffitt v. . Maness
neutral
2 sentences1913In Moffitt v. Maness , 102 N.C. 457 , we are admonished that the salutary rule against the admissibility of parol testimony to vary the terms of a written instrument has, perhaps, been relaxed too much, the farthest limit having been reached, beyond which it is not safe to go. 1913In Moffit v. Maness, 102 N. C., 457 , we are admonished that the salutary rule against the admissibility of parol testimony to vary the terms of a written instrument has, perhaps, been relaxed too much, the farthest limit having been reached, beyond which it is not safe to go. | 3 | 1891–1913 |
State v. . Dixon
green
2 sentences1949S. v. Dixon , 215 N.C. 161 , 1 S.E. (2) 521; Spitzer v. Comrs. , 188 N.C. 30 , 123 S.E. 636 ; Williamson v. Rabon , 177 N.C. 302 , 98 S.E. 830 ; Hill v. R. 1949S. v. Dixon, 215 N. C. 161 , 1 S. E. (2) 521; Spitzer v. Comrs., 188 N. C. 30 , 123 S. E. 636 ; Williamson v. Rabon, 177 N. C. 302 , 98 S. E. 830 ; Hill v. R. | 2 | 1949–1949 |
Williamson v. . Rabon
green
2 sentences1949S. v. Dixon , 215 N.C. 161 , 1 S.E. (2) 521; Spitzer v. Comrs. , 188 N.C. 30 , 123 S.E. 636 ; Williamson v. Rabon , 177 N.C. 302 , 98 S.E. 830 ; Hill v. R. 1949S. v. Dixon, 215 N. C. 161 , 1 S. E. (2) 521; Spitzer v. Comrs., 188 N. C. 30 , 123 S. E. 636 ; Williamson v. Rabon, 177 N. C. 302 , 98 S. E. 830 ; Hill v. R. | 2 | 1949–1949 |
Spitzer v. . Comrs.
green
2 sentences1949S. v. Dixon, 215 N. C. 161 , 1 S. E. (2) 521; Spitzer v. Comrs., 188 N. C. 30 , 123 S. E. 636 ; Williamson v. Rabon, 177 N. C. 302 , 98 S. E. 830 ; Hill v. R. 1949S. v. Dixon, 215 N. C. 161 , 1 S. E. (2) 521; Spitzer v. Comrs., 188 N. C. 30 , 123 S. E. 636 ; Williamson v. Rabon, 177 N. C. 302 , 98 S. E. 830 ; Hill v. R. | 2 | 1949–1949 |
Williamson v. Rabon
green
2 sentences1949S. v. Dixon , 215 N.C. 161 , 1 S.E. (2) 521; Spitzer v. Comrs. , 188 N.C. 30 , 123 S.E. 636 ; Williamson v. Rabon , 177 N.C. 302 , 98 S.E. 830 ; Hill v. R. 1949S. v. Dixon, 215 N. C. 161 , 1 S. E. (2) 521; Spitzer v. Comrs., 188 N. C. 30 , 123 S. E. 636 ; Williamson v. Rabon, 177 N. C. 302 , 98 S. E. 830 ; Hill v. R. | 2 | 1949–1949 |
Strider v. . Lewey
neutral
2 sentences1948Brown v. Brown, 213 N. C., 347 , 196 S. E., 333 ; Wheeler v. Bank. 209 N. C., 258 , 183 S. E., 269 ; Bean v. Detective Co., 206 N. C., 125 , 173 S. E., 5 ; Strider v. Lewey, 176 N. C., 448 , 97 S. E., 398 ; Lloyd v. R. 1948Brown v. Brown, 213 N. C., 347 , 196 S. E., 333 ; Wheeler v. Bank. 209 N. C., 258 , 183 S. E., 269 ; Bean v. Detective Co., 206 N. C., 125 , 173 S. E., 5 ; Strider v. Lewey, 176 N. C., 448 , 97 S. E., 398 ; Lloyd v. R. | 2 | 1948–1948 |
Brown v. . Brown
green
2 sentences1948Brown v. Brown, 213 N. C., 347 , 196 S. E., 333 ; Wheeler v. Bank. 209 N. C., 258 , 183 S. E., 269 ; Bean v. Detective Co., 206 N. C., 125 , 173 S. E., 5 ; Strider v. Lewey, 176 N. C., 448 , 97 S. E., 398 ; Lloyd v. R. 1948Brown v. Brown, 213 N. C., 347 , 196 S. E., 333 ; Wheeler v. Bank. 209 N. C., 258 , 183 S. E., 269 ; Bean v. Detective Co., 206 N. C., 125 , 173 S. E., 5 ; Strider v. Lewey, 176 N. C., 448 , 97 S. E., 398 ; Lloyd v. R. | 2 | 1948–1948 |
Wheeler v. Bank of Edenton
neutral
2 sentences1948Brown v. Brown, 213 N. C., 347 , 196 S. E., 333 ; Wheeler v. Bank. 209 N. C., 258 , 183 S. E., 269 ; Bean v. Detective Co., 206 N. C., 125 , 173 S. E., 5 ; Strider v. Lewey, 176 N. C., 448 , 97 S. E., 398 ; Lloyd v. R. 1948Brown v. Brown, 213 N. C., 347 , 196 S. E., 333 ; Wheeler v. Bank. 209 N. C., 258 , 183 S. E., 269 ; Bean v. Detective Co., 206 N. C., 125 , 173 S. E., 5 ; Strider v. Lewey, 176 N. C., 448 , 97 S. E., 398 ; Lloyd v. R. | 2 | 1948–1948 |
Bean v. Home Detective Co.
green
2 sentences1948Brown v. Brown, 213 N. C., 347 , 196 S. E., 333 ; Wheeler v. Bank. 209 N. C., 258 , 183 S. E., 269 ; Bean v. Detective Co., 206 N. C., 125 , 173 S. E., 5 ; Strider v. Lewey, 176 N. C., 448 , 97 S. E., 398 ; Lloyd v. R. 1948Brown v. Brown, 213 N. C., 347 , 196 S. E., 333 ; Wheeler v. Bank. 209 N. C., 258 , 183 S. E., 269 ; Bean v. Detective Co., 206 N. C., 125 , 173 S. E., 5 ; Strider v. Lewey, 176 N. C., 448 , 97 S. E., 398 ; Lloyd v. R. | 2 | 1948–1948 |
In Re Will of Hardee
neutral
2 sentences1937To the same effect is the holding in Ledford v. Lumber Co. , 183 N.C. 614 ; In re Hardee , 187 N.C. 381 ; Brown v. Tel. 1937To the same effect is the holding in Ledford v. Lumber Co., 183 N. C., 614 ; In re Hardee, 187 N. C., 381 ; Brown v. Tel. | 2 | 1937–1937 |
Ledford v. Valley River Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences1937To the same effect is the holding in Ledford v. Lumber Co. , 183 N.C. 614 ; In re Hardee , 187 N.C. 381 ; Brown v. Tel. 1937To the same effect is the holding in Ledford v. Lumber Co., 183 N. C., 614 ; In re Hardee, 187 N. C., 381 ; Brown v. Tel. | 2 | 1937–1937 |
Schas v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States
neutral
2 sentences1925If we could perceive tbis error to be harmless we would apply the salutary doctrine, so ably set forth in Brewer v. Ring, 177 N. C., 484; S. v. Smith, 164 N. C., 476 ; Schas v. Assurance Society, 170 N. C., 420, 424 ; and in Graham & Waterman on New Trials, 1235, as does plaintiff’s counsel. 1925In these cited cases, the same rule was invoked and the Court said that the jury could not be expected to determine which rule to follow. *Page 493 If we could perceive this error to be harmless we would apply the salutary doctrine, so ably set forth in Brewer v. Ring , 177 N.C. 484 ; S. v. Smith , 164 N.C. 476 ; Schas v. Assurance Society , 170 N.C. 420 , 424 ; and in Graham Waterman on New Trials, 1235, as does plaintiff's counsel. | 2 | 1925–1925 |
Duran v. Standard Life & Accident Ins.
neutral
2 sentences1924Durand v. Insurance Co., 63 Vt., 437 ; Vance on Insurance, p. 593.” We find no error in the judgment of the court below and the same is Affirmed. 1907Bray v. Insurance Co., 139 N. C., 393 ; Durand v. Insurance Co., 63 Vt., 437 (25 Am. | 2 | 1907–1924 |
Cobb v. Clegg.
green
2 sentences1913The Court sounds the alarm and warns us against the dangers ahead, which warning we should carefully heed, as we said in Cobb v. Clegg , supra. It is best to trust to the words of the writing, which the parties have chosen to protect and preserve the integrity of their treaty, than to rely on human memory for he exact reproduction of their words, for Judge Taylor said in Smith v. Williams , 5 N.C. 426 : "The writers on the law of evidence have accordingly, in arranging the degrees of proof, placed written evidence of every kind higher in the scale of probability than unwritten; and notwithstan 1913The Court sounds the alarm and warns us against the dangers ahead, which warning we should carefully heed, as we said in Cobb v. Clegg, supra. It is best to trust to the words of the writing, which the parties have chosen to protect and preserve the integrity of their treaty, than to rely on human memory for the exact reproduction of their words, for Judge Taylor said in Smith v. Williams, 5 N. C., 426 : “The writers On the law of evidence have accordingly, in arranging the degrees of proof, placed written evidence of every kind higher in the scale of probability than unwritten; and notwithsta | 2 | 1913–1913 |
Smith v. . Williams
green
2 sentences1913The Court sounds the alarm and warns us against the dangers ahead, which warning we should carefully heed, as we said in Cobb v. Clegg , supra. It is best to trust to the words of the writing, which the parties have chosen to protect and preserve the integrity of their treaty, than to rely on human memory for he exact reproduction of their words, for Judge Taylor said in Smith v. Williams , 5 N.C. 426 : "The writers on the law of evidence have accordingly, in arranging the degrees of proof, placed written evidence of every kind higher in the scale of probability than unwritten; and notwithstan 1913The Court sounds the alarm and warns us against the dangers ahead, which warning we should carefully heed, as we said in Cobb v. Clegg, supra. It is best to trust to the words of the writing, which the parties have chosen to protect and preserve the integrity of their treaty, than to rely on human memory for the exact reproduction of their words, for Judge Taylor said in Smith v. Williams, 5 N. C., 426 : “The writers On the law of evidence have accordingly, in arranging the degrees of proof, placed written evidence of every kind higher in the scale of probability than unwritten; and notwithsta | 2 | 1913–1913 |
Lexington Insulation Company v. Davidson County
green
2 sentences2004The Court explained that “[t]his law was enacted to enforce a well-recognized and salutary principle, both of the moral law and of public policy, that he who is entrusted -with the business of others can not be allowed to make such business an object of pecuniary profit to himself.” Id. at 254 , 90 S.E.2d at 498 (quoting State v. Williams, 153 N.C. 595, 599 , 68 S.E. 900, 902 (1910)). 2004The Court explained that “[t]his law was enacted to enforce a well-recognized and salutary principle, both of the moral law and of public policy, that he who is entrusted -with the business of others can not be allowed to make such business an object of pecuniary profit to himself.” Id. at 254 , 90 S.E.2d at 498 (quoting State v. Williams, 153 N.C. 595, 599 , 68 S.E. 900, 902 (1910)). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Jewell v. Price
green
2 sentences1984In many cases since this wrong turn was made, including Jewell v. Price, 264 N.C. 459 , 142 S.E.2d 1 (1965) and Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363 , 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957), followed by the majority, the salutary principle, universally approved, that wrongdoers are not to profit by their own wrongs, was ignored and defendants were given the benefit of statutes of limitation running against plaintiffs even though the defendants' negligence was secret, had caused no discernible injury, and the plaintiffs had absolutely no knowledge of it. 1984In many cases since this wrong turn was made, including Jewell v. Price, 264 N.C. 459 , 142 S.E.2d 1 (1965) and Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363 , 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957), followed by the majority, the salutary principle, universally approved, that wrongdoers are not to profit by their own wrongs, was ignored and defendants were given the benefit of statutes of limitation running against plaintiffs even though the defendants' negligence was secret, had caused no discernible injury, and the plaintiffs had absolutely no knowledge of it. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Shearin v. Lloyd
red
2 sentences1984In many cases since this wrong turn was made, including Jewell v. Price, 264 N.C. 459 , 142 S.E.2d 1 (1965) and Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363 , 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957), followed by the majority, the salutary principle, universally approved, that wrongdoers are not to profit by their own wrongs, was ignored and defendants were given the benefit of statutes of limitation running against plaintiffs even though the defendants' negligence was secret, had caused no discernible injury, and the plaintiffs had absolutely no knowledge of it. 1984In many cases since this wrong turn was made, including Jewell v. Price, 264 N.C. 459 , 142 S.E.2d 1 (1965) and Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363 , 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957), followed by the majority, the salutary principle, universally approved, that wrongdoers are not to profit by their own wrongs, was ignored and defendants were given the benefit of statutes of limitation running against plaintiffs even though the defendants' negligence was secret, had caused no discernible injury, and the plaintiffs had absolutely no knowledge of it. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Levinson v. Deupree
green
2 sentences1982Our Eastern District Federal Court pointed out in McNamara v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., 328 F. Supp. 1058, 1060-61 (E.D.N.C. 1971): The notes of the Advisory Committee on federal rules state that the amendment was intended to codify the salutary principle of Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 , 73 S.Ct. 914 , 97 L.Ed. 1319 (1953) and Link Aviation, Inc. v. Downs, 117 U.S. App. D.C. 40 , 325 F. 2d 613 (1963). 1982Our Eastern District Federal Court pointed out in McNamara v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., 328 F. Supp. 1058, 1060-61 (E.D.N.C. 1971): The notes of the Advisory Committee on federal rules state that the amendment was intended to codify the salutary principle of Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 , 73 S.Ct. 914 , 97 L.Ed. 1319 (1953) and Link Aviation, Inc. v. Downs, 117 U.S. App. D.C. 40 , 325 F. 2d 613 (1963). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Locklear
neutral
2 sentences1982“Where time is not of the essence of the offense charged . . . a discrepancy between the date alleged in the indictment and the date shown by the State’s evidence is ordinarily not fatal. [Citations omitted.] ‘But this salutary rule, preventing a defendant who does not rely on time as a defense from using a discrepancy between the time named in the bill and the time shown by the evidence for the State, cannot be used to ensnare a defendant and thereby deprive him of an opportunity to adequately present his defense.’ State v. Whittemore, 255 N.C. 583, 592 , 122 S.E. 2d 396, 403 (1961).” State v 1982App. 647, 653-54 , 236 S.E. 2d 376, 380 , discr. rev. denied, 293 N.C. 363 , 237 S.E. 2d 851 (1977). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Link Aviation, Inc. v. Downs
green
2 sentences1982Our Eastern District Federal Court pointed out in McNamara v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., 328 F. Supp. 1058, 1060-61 (E.D.N.C. 1971): The notes of the Advisory Committee on federal rules state that the amendment was intended to codify the salutary principle of Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 , 73 S.Ct. 914 , 97 L.Ed. 1319 (1953) and Link Aviation, Inc. v. Downs, 117 U.S. App. D.C. 40 , 325 F. 2d 613 (1963). 1982It is, in cases of this sort, intended to insure against forfeiture and injustice —in short, to codify in broad terms the salutary principle of Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953), and Link Aviation, Inc. v. Downs, 325 F. 2d 613 (D.C. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Frazier
neutral
1 sentence1982App. 647, 653-54 , 236 S.E. 2d 376, 380 , discr. rev. denied, 293 N.C. 363 , 237 S.E. 2d 851 (1977). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Smith
neutral
1 sentence1982App. 647, 653-54 , 236 S.E. 2d 376, 380 , discr. rev. denied, 293 N.C. 363 , 237 S.E. 2d 851 (1977). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Link Aviation, Inc. v. Downs
green
1 sentence1982Our Eastern District Federal Court pointed out in McNamara v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., 328 F. Supp. 1058, 1060-61 (E.D.N.C. 1971): The notes of the Advisory Committee on federal rules state that the amendment was intended to codify the salutary principle of Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 , 73 S.Ct. 914 , 97 L.Ed. 1319 (1953) and Link Aviation, Inc. v. Downs, 117 U.S. App. D.C. 40 , 325 F. 2d 613 (1963). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Harwood v. Shoe. green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Morrison v. . Walker neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Commercial National Bank of Charlotte v. Charlotte Supply Co. green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Whitlock v. . Lumber Co. neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| Colt v. . Kimball green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| State v. Kimrey neutral | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Lumberton Coach Co. v. Stone neutral | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Casey v. Cavaroc green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Mitchell v. . Strickland neutral | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Lockridge v. . Smith green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Bailey v. . Stokes neutral | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Oliver v. . Hecht green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Dallas v. . Wagner neutral | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Manufacturers' Oil & Grease Co. v. Averett green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.