salutary rule in California

1964Especially where, as here, there is a total lack of corroboration, a belated complaint by the child to her mother, and a marked inconsistency in her testimony, the courts must heed the admonition of our Supreme Court in People v. Adams (1939) 14 Cal.2d 154, 167 [ 93 P.2d 146 ] : “As a matter of practical observation to many judges who have presided over trials of this nature, it is plainly recognized that, notwithstanding the salutary rule that an accused is presumed to be innocent until his guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, nevertheless, to the mind of the average citizen

1964Especially where, as here, there is a total lack of corroboration, a belated complaint by the child to her mother, and a marked inconsistency in her testimony, the courts must heed the admonition of our Supreme Court in People v. Adams (1939) 14 Cal.2d 154, 167 [ 93 P.2d 146 ] : “As a matter of practical observation to many judges who have presided over trials of this nature, it is plainly recognized that, notwithstanding the salutary rule that an accused is presumed to be innocent until his guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, nevertheless, to the mind of the average citizen

1972The facts show a clear violation of rule 9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides in part that “[a] member of the State Bar shall not commingle the money or other property of a client with his own . . . .” In Peck v. State Bar (1932) 217 Cal. 47, 51 [ 17 P.2d 112 ], the court explained the rationale of this rule: “This salutary rule was adopted to provide against the probability in some cases, the possibility in many cases, and the danger in all cases that such commingling will result in the loss of clients’ money.

1972The facts show a clear violation of rule 9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides in part that “[a] member of the State Bar shall not commingle the money or other property of a client with his own . . . .” In Peck v. State Bar (1932) 217 Cal. 47, 51 [ 17 P.2d 112 ], the court explained the rationale of this rule: “This salutary rule was adopted to provide against the probability in some cases, the possibility in many cases, and the danger in all cases that such commingling will result in the loss of clients’ money.

1958(New Method Laundry Co. v. MacCann, 174 Cal. 26, 33 [ 161 P. 990 , Ann.Cas. 1918C 1022].) “Under this salutary rule, the question then is whether defendants were guilty of unfair competition in soliciting the customers of plaintiff for business in competition with the latter.

1958(New Method Laundry Co. v. MacCann, 174 Cal. 26, 33 [ 161 P. 990 , Ann.Cas. 1918C 1022].) “Under this salutary rule, the question then is whether defendants were guilty of unfair competition in soliciting the customers of plaintiff for business in competition with the latter.

1949See Borden’s Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 211-213 [ 55 S.Ct. 187 , 79 L.Ed. 281 ], and cases cited.

1949See Borden’s Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 211-213 [ 55 S.Ct. 187 , 79 L.Ed. 281 ], and cases cited.

1980Those who thoughtlessly over-apply the plain view doctrine to every situation where there is a visual open view have not yet learned the simple lesson long since mastered by old hands at the burlesque houses, `You can't touch everything you can see'." (Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great `Search Incident' Geography Battle (1975) 26 Mercer L.Rev. 1047, 1096, fn.2.) [2] When the court in Lorenzana spoke of "the salutary rule of law that observations of things in plain sight made from a place where a police officer has a right to be do not amount to a search in the cons

1980Those who thoughtlessly over-apply the plain view doctrine to every situation where there is a visual open view have not yet learned the simple lesson long since mastered by old hands at the burlesque houses, ‘You can’t touch everything you can see’.” (Moyian, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great ‘Search Incident’ Geography Battle (1975) 26 Mercer L.Rev. 1047, 1096, fn.2.) When the court in Lorenzana spoke of “the salutary rule of law that observations of things in plain sight made from a place where a police officer has a right to be do not amount to a search in the constitu

2017(Personal Watercraft Coalition v. Marin County Bd. of Supervisors (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 129, 138-139 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 ].) Further, “[i]t is the salutary rule that a person to whom a statute is constitutionally applied in conformity with its obvious purpose may not be heard to challenge its constitutionality on the ground that, conceivably, it might be applied in an unreasonable and absurd manner as to others.” (Findley v. Justice Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 566, 573 [ 133 Cal.Rptr. 241 ].) This rule precludes Diehl’s reliance on the “one dandelion” argument here.

2017(Personal Watercraft Coalition v. Marin County Bd. of Supervisors (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 129, 138-139 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 ].) Further, “[i]t is the salutary rule that a person to whom a statute is constitutionally applied in conformity with its obvious purpose may not be heard to challenge its constitutionality on the ground that, conceivably, it might be applied in an unreasonable and absurd manner as to others.” (Findley v. Justice Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 566, 573 [ 133 Cal.Rptr. 241 ].) This rule precludes Diehl’s reliance on the “one dandelion” argument here.

2017(Personal Watercraft Coalition v. Marin County Bd. of Supervisors (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 129, 138-139 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 ].) Further, “[i]t is the salutary rule that a person to whom a statute is constitutionally applied in conformity with its obvious purpose may not be heard to challenge its constitutionality on the ground that, conceivably, it might be applied in an unreasonable and absurd manner as to others.” (Findley v. Justice Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 566, 573 [ 133 Cal.Rptr. 241 ].) This rule precludes Diehl’s reliance on the “one dandelion” argument here.

2017(Personal Watercraft Coalition v. Marin County Bd. of Supervisors (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 129, 138-139 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 425 ].) Further, “[i]t is the salutary rule that a person to whom a statute is constitutionally applied in conformity with its obvious purpose may not be heard to challenge its constitutionality on the ground that, conceivably, it might be applied in an unreasonable and absurd manner as to others.” (Findley v. Justice Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 566, 573 [ 133 Cal.Rptr. 241 ].) This rule precludes Diehl’s reliance on the “one dandelion” argument here.

2016Co. v. Aguirre (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1010 .) In keeping with this principle, we do not consider these issues on their merits. 14 Even were we to do so, these claims fail.

1987Co. v. Aguirre (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1010 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 250 ].) Husband has made no attempt to make the requisite showing of good cause and therefore we will not address his additional points.

1988Co. v. United States (1879) 99 U.S. 700, 718 .)" (Id., at p. 399.) In Hilton v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 7 Cal.App.3d 708 , the court rejected the argument that it could compel the rescission of a zoning ordinance: "Provision for the writ here sought is found in section 1085, Code of Civil Procedure, which declares that it 'may be issued . . . to any . . . board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station . . . .' By the statute's very terms it is thus limited to the enforcement of purely minister

1986Co. v. United States (1879) 99 U.S. 700, 718 [ 25 L.Ed. 496, 501 ].) The judgment (order of dismissal) is affirmed.

2001S. F. Bay etc. Com. v. Town of Emeryville (1968) 69 Cal.2d 533, 543 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 790 , 446 P.2d 790 ]), and a statute must therefore be read “in light of the evils which prompted its enactment and the method of control which the Legislature chose. [Citation.]” (People v. Vega (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 706, 709-710 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 479 ].) The four unregistered assault weapons petitioner admits *1349 he acquired, possessed and sold—H&K (Heckler & Koch) Model 91 and Colt Model AR-15 semiautomatic weapons—are among the assault weapons enumerated in section 12276 which, because they “are particularl

2001S. F. Bay etc. Com. v. Town of Emeryville (1968) 69 Cal.2d 533, 543 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 790 , 446 P.2d 790 ]), and a statute must therefore be read “in light of the evils which prompted its enactment and the method of control which the Legislature chose. [Citation.]” (People v. Vega (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 706, 709-710 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 479 ].) The four unregistered assault weapons petitioner admits *1349 he acquired, possessed and sold—H&K (Heckler & Koch) Model 91 and Colt Model AR-15 semiautomatic weapons—are among the assault weapons enumerated in section 12276 which, because they “are particularl

2001S. F. Bay etc. Com. v. Town of Emeryville (1968) 69 Cal.2d 533, 543 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 790 , 446 P.2d 790 ]), and a statute must therefore be read “in light of the evils which prompted its enactment and the method of control which the Legislature chose. [Citation.]” (People v. Vega (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 706, 709-710 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 479 ].) The four unregistered assault weapons petitioner admits *1349 he acquired, possessed and sold—H&K (Heckler & Koch) Model 91 and Colt Model AR-15 semiautomatic weapons—are among the assault weapons enumerated in section 12276 which, because they “are particularl

2001S. F. Bay etc. Com. v. Town of Emeryville (1968) 69 Cal.2d 533, 543 [ 72 Cal.Rptr. 790 , 446 P.2d 790 ]), and a statute must therefore be read “in light of the evils which prompted its enactment and the method of control which the Legislature chose. [Citation.]” (People v. Vega (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 706, 709-710 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 479 ].) The four unregistered assault weapons petitioner admits *1349 he acquired, possessed and sold—H&K (Heckler & Koch) Model 91 and Colt Model AR-15 semiautomatic weapons—are among the assault weapons enumerated in section 12276 which, because they “are particularl

1999But for this salutary rule, litigation might go on indefinitely^]” (Sharon v. Sharon (1889) 79 Cal. 633, 654 [ 22 P. 26, 131 ].) But in many cases, as here, the facts are not the same, and if the point is not tendered, nobody has acted upon the supposed “law” of the case at the subsequent trial.

1995In Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie (1981) 452 U.S. 394, 401 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 103, 110-111 , 101 S.Ct. 2424 ], the United States Supreme Court stated: "There is simply `no principle of law or equity which sanctions the rejection by a federal court of the salutary principle of res judicata. ' [Citation.] The Court of Appeals' reliance on `public policy' is similarly misplaced.

1995In Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie (1981) 452 U.S. 394, 401 [ 69 L.Ed.2d 103, 110-111 , 101 S.Ct. 2424 ], the United States Supreme Court stated: "There is simply `no principle of law or equity which sanctions the rejection by a federal court of the salutary principle of res judicata. ' [Citation.] The Court of Appeals' reliance on `public policy' is similarly misplaced.