salutary rule in Georgia

1980That this is a salutary rule, see an extended discussion of the authorities in A. v. M., 180 A2d 541 (1962).

1980That this is a salutary rule, see an extended discussion of the authorities in A. v. M., 180 A2d 541 (1962).

1958Parker v. Johnson, 97 Ga. App. 261 ( 102 S. E. 2d 917 ).

1958Parker v. Johnson, 97 Ga. App. 261 ( 102 S. E. 2d 917 ).

1951The contract relied upon in the case at bar is captioned “Georgia, Richmond County,” and embraces all of the land “Known as Wilkinson Pond consisting of 25 acres, more or less; with the exception of 3 acres, more or less, to be set aside as a home place containing the Wilkinson home.” The caption and the words, “Wilkinson Pond consisting of 25 acres, more or less,” are a key by which a definite tract of land in Richmond County, Georgia, may be located and identified with .certainty by the aid of extrinsic evidence (Bruce v. Strickland, 201 Ga. 526 , 40 S. E. 2d, 386 ; Copeland v. Carpenter, 20

1951The contract relied upon in the case at bar is captioned “Georgia, Richmond County,” and embraces all of the land “Known as Wilkinson Pond consisting of 25 acres, more or less; with the exception of 3 acres, more or less, to be set aside as a home place containing the Wilkinson home.” The caption and the words, “Wilkinson Pond consisting of 25 acres, more or less,” are a key by which a definite tract of land in Richmond County, Georgia, may be located and identified with .certainty by the aid of extrinsic evidence (Bruce v. Strickland, 201 Ga. 526 , 40 S. E. 2d, 386 ; Copeland v. Carpenter, 20

1951The contract relied upon in the case at bar is captioned “Georgia, Richmond County,” and embraces all of the land “Known as Wilkinson Pond consisting of 25 acres, more or less; with the exception of 3 acres, more or less, to be set aside as a home place containing the Wilkinson home.” The caption and the words, “Wilkinson Pond consisting of 25 acres, more or less,” are a key by which a definite tract of land in Richmond County, Georgia, may be located and identified with .certainty by the aid of extrinsic evidence (Bruce v. Strickland, 201 Ga. 526 , 40 S. E. 2d, 386 ; Copeland v. Carpenter, 20

1951The contract relied upon in the case at bar is captioned “Georgia, Richmond County,” and embraces all of the land “Known as Wilkinson Pond consisting of 25 acres, more or less; with the exception of 3 acres, more or less, to be set aside as a home place containing the Wilkinson home.” The caption and the words, “Wilkinson Pond consisting of 25 acres, more or less,” are a key by which a definite tract of land in Richmond County, Georgia, may be located and identified with .certainty by the aid of extrinsic evidence (Bruce v. Strickland, 201 Ga. 526 , 40 S. E. 2d, 386 ; Copeland v. Carpenter, 20

1941The act of 1858,- supra, did not undertake to enact into one statute all of the decisions of this court in the sense that this was done by the General Assembly in adopting the Code (see Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. State, 104 Ga. 831 , 31 S. E. 531 , 42 L.

1941The act of 1858,- supra, did not undertake to enact into one statute all of the decisions of this court in the sense that this was done by the General Assembly in adopting the Code (see Central of Georgia Railway Co. v. State, 104 Ga. 831 , 31 S. E. 531 , 42 L.

1924The doctrine of election is based upon the salutary principle, “that he who accepts a benefit under a deed or will must adopt the whole contents of the instrument, conforming to all its provisions, and renouncing every right inconsistent with it.” Miller v. Cotten, 5 Ga. 341 ; McFadden v. Dale, 155 Ga. 256 ( 116 S. E. 596 ).

1924The doctrine of election is based upon the salutary principle, “that he who accepts a benefit under a deed or will must adopt the whole contents of the instrument, conforming to all its provisions, and renouncing every right inconsistent with it.” Miller v. Cotten, 5 Ga. 341 ; McFadden v. Dale, 155 Ga. 256 ( 116 S. E. 596 ).

1924The doctrine of election is based upon the salutary principle, “that he who accepts a benefit under a deed or will must adopt the whole contents of the instrument, conforming to all its provisions, and renouncing every right inconsistent with it.” Miller v. Cotten, 5 Ga. 341 ; McFadden v. Dale, 155 Ga. 256 ( 116 S. E. 596 ).

1915We do not lose sight of the well-settled and salutary principle that questions of negligence and diligence are for determination exclusively by a jury; nor would we restrict in the slightest degree the rule, frequently announced (see Evans v. Southern Railway Co., 12 Ga. App. 319 , 77 S. E. 197 ), that it is a question of fact for the jury whether, under the particular circumstances of a given case, it is negligence for a passenger to alight from a moving train.

1915We do not lose sight of the well-settled and salutary principle that questions of negligence and diligence are for determination exclusively by a jury; nor would we restrict in the slightest degree the rule, frequently announced (see Evans v. Southern Railway Co., 12 Ga. App. 319 , 77 S. E. 197 ), that it is a question of fact for the jury whether, under the particular circumstances of a given case, it is negligence for a passenger to alight from a moving train.

1908For, ‘while the decision of this court in Scribner’s Sons v. Mutual Building Co., 1 Ga. App. 528 ( 58 S. E. 240 ), and that of the Supreme Court in the case of Dethrage v. Rome, 125 Ga. 806 ( 54 S. E. 654 ), do not mean that the discretion of the trial court is exhausted upon a second motion for new trial, they do mean that where there is only a conflict of witnesses, and the- second verdict is the same as the first, and there is evidence sufficient to authorize the verdict, it would be an abuse of legal discretion upon the part of the trial court to grant a second new trial.

1908For, ‘while the decision of this court in Scribner’s Sons v. Mutual Building Co., 1 Ga. App. 528 ( 58 S. E. 240 ), and that of the Supreme Court in the case of Dethrage v. Rome, 125 Ga. 806 ( 54 S. E. 654 ), do not mean that the discretion of the trial court is exhausted upon a second motion for new trial, they do mean that where there is only a conflict of witnesses, and the- second verdict is the same as the first, and there is evidence sufficient to authorize the verdict, it would be an abuse of legal discretion upon the part of the trial court to grant a second new trial.

1906His honor directed counsel’s attention to the rule of court which provides that all objections to testimony must be urged and insisted upon at once, and, after a decision upon one or more grounds, no others afterwards urged shall be heard by the court (Civil Code, §5675); and after counsel had expressed the opinion that this rule applied only to motions for'a continuance, the judge declined to exclude the evidence, saying: “This being in the concluding argument, and some of the witnesses having gone, I decline tp hear the motion.” It is doubtless within the discretion of a trial judge to relax

1904In Harding v. Handy, 11 Wheat. 103 , it was-held: “Exceptions to the report of a master are to be regarded by the court only so far as they are supported by the special statements of the master, ‘or by a distinct reference to the particular portions of testimony on which the party excepting relies; the court does not investigate the items of an account, nor review the whole mass of testimony taken before the master.” Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in the opinion says: “ It may be observed generally that it is not the province of a court to investigate items of an account.

1895This is a salutary rule, and one which has been adopted in this State (see Woodruff & Co. v. Saul, 70 Ga. 271 ), and is one of such general acceptance as to be recognized by the courts of last resort in most of the States of the Union.

1895"Wharton on Evidence, vol. 1, section 314 et seq.; 9 Wis. 328 ; 1 Cowen, 103; 1 Seld. 447; 8 Minn. 13 ; 10 Ark. 169 ; 30 Ark. 469 ; 2 Colo. 596 ; 12 Ind. 102 ; 56 Ala. 299 . 2.

1895"Wharton on Evidence, vol. 1, section 314 et seq.; 9 Wis. 328 ; 1 Cowen, 103; 1 Seld. 447; 8 Minn. 13 ; 10 Ark. 169 ; 30 Ark. 469 ; 2 Colo. 596 ; 12 Ind. 102 ; 56 Ala. 299 . 2.

1895"Wharton on Evidence, vol. 1, section 314 et seq.; 9 Wis. 328 ; 1 Cowen, 103; 1 Seld. 447; 8 Minn. 13 ; 10 Ark. 169 ; 30 Ark. 469 ; 2 Colo. 596 ; 12 Ind. 102 ; 56 Ala. 299 . 2.

1895"Wharton on Evidence, vol. 1, section 314 et seq.; 9 Wis. 328 ; 1 Cowen, 103; 1 Seld. 447; 8 Minn. 13 ; 10 Ark. 169 ; 30 Ark. 469 ; 2 Colo. 596 ; 12 Ind. 102 ; 56 Ala. 299 . 2.

1895"Wharton on Evidence, vol. 1, section 314 et seq.; 9 Wis. 328 ; 1 Cowen, 103; 1 Seld. 447; 8 Minn. 13 ; 10 Ark. 169 ; 30 Ark. 469 ; 2 Colo. 596 ; 12 Ind. 102 ; 56 Ala. 299 . 2.

1895"Wharton on Evidence, vol. 1, section 314 et seq.; 9 Wis. 328 ; 1 Cowen, 103; 1 Seld. 447; 8 Minn. 13 ; 10 Ark. 169 ; 30 Ark. 469 ; 2 Colo. 596 ; 12 Ind. 102 ; 56 Ala. 299 . 2.