salutary principle in Colorado

1991Moschetti v. Liquor Licensing Authority of Boulder, 176 Colo. 281, 285 , 490 P.2d 299, 301 (1971).

1991Moschetti v. Liquor Licensing Authority of Boulder, 176 Colo. 281, 285 , 490 P.2d 299, 301 (1971).

1914R. etc. v. Ryan, 17 Colo., 98 -104, 28 Pac., 79 -81, our supreme court said: “From time immemorial it lias been a well-recognized and most salutary rule of the common law, that if counsel neglect to object or to point out errors occurring’ at the trial in such time and manner as will give opportunity for their correction, they will not, in general, be heard to complain of such errors in a court of review.

1914R. etc. v. Ryan, 17 Colo., 98 -104, 28 Pac., 79 -81, our supreme court said: “From time immemorial it lias been a well-recognized and most salutary rule of the common law, that if counsel neglect to object or to point out errors occurring’ at the trial in such time and manner as will give opportunity for their correction, they will not, in general, be heard to complain of such errors in a court of review.

1990E.g., Godfrey v. People, 168 Colo. 299 , 451 P.2d 291 (1969); Cokley v. People, 168 Colo. 52 , 449 P.2d 824 (1969); Neighbors v. People, 161 Colo. 587 , 423 P.2d 838 (1967); Balltrip v. People, 157 Colo. 108 , 401 P.2d 259 (1965); Mitchell v. People, 24 Colo. 532 , 52 P. 671 (1898).

1990E.g., Godfrey v. People, 168 Colo. 299 , 451 P.2d 291 (1969); Cokley v. People, 168 Colo. 52 , 449 P.2d 824 (1969); Neighbors v. People, 161 Colo. 587 , 423 P.2d 838 (1967); Balltrip v. People, 157 Colo. 108 , 401 P.2d 259 (1965); Mitchell v. People, 24 Colo. 532 , 52 P. 671 (1898).

1990E.g., Godfrey v. People, 168 Colo. 299 , 451 P.2d 291 (1969); Cokley v. People, 168 Colo. 52 , 449 P.2d 824 (1969); Neighbors v. People, 161 Colo. 587 , 423 P.2d 838 (1967); Balltrip v. People, 157 Colo. 108 , 401 P.2d 259 (1965); Mitchell v. People, 24 Colo. 532 , 52 P. 671 (1898).

1990E.g., Godfrey v. People, 168 Colo. 299 , 451 P.2d 291 (1969); Cokley v. People, 168 Colo. 52 , 449 P.2d 824 (1969); Neighbors v. People, 161 Colo. 587 , 423 P.2d 838 (1967); Balltrip v. People, 157 Colo. 108 , 401 P.2d 259 (1965); Mitchell v. People, 24 Colo. 532 , 52 P. 671 (1898).

1990E.g., Godfrey v. People, 168 Colo. 299 , 451 P.2d 291 (1969); Cokley v. People, 168 Colo. 52 , 449 P.2d 824 (1969); Neighbors v. People, 161 Colo. 587 , 423 P.2d 838 (1967); Balltrip v. People, 157 Colo. 108 , 401 P.2d 259 (1965); Mitchell v. People, 24 Colo. 532 , 52 P. 671 (1898).

1990E.g., Godfrey v. People, 168 Colo. 299 , 451 P.2d 291 (1969); Cokley v. People, 168 Colo. 52 , 449 P.2d 824 (1969); Neighbors v. People, 161 Colo. 587 , 423 P.2d 838 (1967); Balltrip v. People, 157 Colo. 108 , 401 P.2d 259 (1965); Mitchell v. People, 24 Colo. 532 , 52 P. 671 (1898).

1990E.g., Godfrey v. People, 168 Colo. 299 , 451 P.2d 291 (1969); Cokley v. People, 168 Colo. 52 , 449 P.2d 824 (1969); Neighbors v. People, 161 Colo. 587 , 423 P.2d 838 (1967); Balltrip v. People, 157 Colo. 108 , 401 P.2d 259 (1965); Mitchell v. People, 24 Colo. 532 , 52 P. 671 (1898).

1990E.g., Godfrey v. People, 168 Colo. 299 , 451 P.2d 291 (1969); Cokley v. People, 168 Colo. 52 , 449 P.2d 824 (1969); Neighbors v. People, 161 Colo. 587 , 423 P.2d 838 (1967); Balltrip v. People, 157 Colo. 108 , 401 P.2d 259 (1965); Mitchell v. People, 24 Colo. 532 , 52 P. 671 (1898).

1990E.g., Godfrey v. People, 168 Colo. 299 , 451 P.2d 291 (1969); Cokley v. People, 168 Colo. 52 , 449 P.2d 824 (1969); Neighbors v. People, 161 Colo. 587 , 423 P.2d 838 (1967); Balltrip v. People, 157 Colo. 108 , 401 P.2d 259 (1965); Mitchell v. People, 24 Colo. 532 , 52 P. 671 (1898).

1990E.g., Godfrey v. People, 168 Colo. 299 , 451 P.2d 291 (1969); Cokley v. People, 168 Colo. 52 , 449 P.2d 824 (1969); Neighbors v. People, 161 Colo. 587 , 423 P.2d 838 (1967); Balltrip v. People, 157 Colo. 108 , 401 P.2d 259 (1965); Mitchell v. People, 24 Colo. 532 , 52 P. 671 (1898).

1987We followed this salutary rule in Barnes, 735 P.2d 869 , and construed the statutory presumptions of intoxication applicable to the offense of drunk driving, § 42-4-1202(2), 17 C.R.S. (1984), as authorizing “only a permissive inference that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol.” 735 P.2d at 873 .

1987We followed this salutary rule in Barnes, 735 P.2d 869 , and construed the statutory presumptions of intoxication applicable to the offense of drunk driving, § 42-4-1202(2), 17 C.R.S. (1984), as authorizing “only a permissive inference that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol.” 735 P.2d at 873 .

1964Colorado recognized this to be the general rule in Benham v. Willmer, 71 Colo. 451 , 207 Pac. 592 , where it is stated: “Ordinarily, of course, in civil actions, costs enter into the final judgment rendered on the merits, and any order touching costs made before the entry of the final judgment is merely an interlocutory order and not a reviewable final judgment.” We are aware that Benham v. Willmer, supra, antedates the Colo. R.C.P., but there is nothing in Colo. R.C.P. which necessitates or requires a departure from this most salutary rule which precludes piecemeal review of the type here sou

1964Colorado recognized this to be the general rule in Benham v. Willmer, 71 Colo. 451 , 207 Pac. 592 , where it is stated: “Ordinarily, of course, in civil actions, costs enter into the final judgment rendered on the merits, and any order touching costs made before the entry of the final judgment is merely an interlocutory order and not a reviewable final judgment.” We are aware that Benham v. Willmer, supra, antedates the Colo. R.C.P., but there is nothing in Colo. R.C.P. which necessitates or requires a departure from this most salutary rule which precludes piecemeal review of the type here sou

1961To argue that one or more independent but similar instances, possibly tending to establish negligence, imply negligence in a pending case would violate a salutary principle of proof. * * * ” See also Griffith v. Denver, 55 Colo. 37 , 132 Pac. 57 .

1961To argue that one or more independent but similar instances, possibly tending to establish negligence, imply negligence in a pending case would violate a salutary principle of proof. * * * ” See also Griffith v. Denver, 55 Colo. 37 , 132 Pac. 57 .

1939Co. v. Nestor , 10 Colo. 403 , 409 , 15 Pac. 714 , where, after a discussion of the purposes of this provision (section 24 of article V), we said, "We also indorse the salutary rule that the argument ab inconvenienti is not to be permitted to influence the courts to defeat by construction a constitutional mandate." It also may be added that in the opinion in the principal Colorado case relied upon by the city on this point (People v. Friederich , 67 Colo. 69 , 74 , 185 Pac. 657 ), we quoted from Callahan v. Jennings , 16 Colo. 471 , 27 Pac. 1055 , as follows: "The intent and wisdom of this pro

1939Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 409 , 15 Pac. 714 , where, after a discussion of the purposes of this provision (section 24 of article V), we said, “We also indorse the salutary rule that the argument ab inconvenienti is not to be permitted to influence the courts to defeat by construction a constitutional mandate.” It also may be added that in the opinion in the principal Colorado case relied upon by the city on this point (People v. Friederich, 67 Colo. 69, 74 , 185 Pac. 657 ), we quoted from Callahan v. Jennings, 16 Colo. 471 , 27 Pac. 1055 , as follows: “The intent and wisdom of this provisio

1939Co. v. Nestor , 10 Colo. 403 , 409 , 15 Pac. 714 , where, after a discussion of the purposes of this provision (section 24 of article V), we said, "We also indorse the salutary rule that the argument ab inconvenienti is not to be permitted to influence the courts to defeat by construction a constitutional mandate." It also may be added that in the opinion in the principal Colorado case relied upon by the city on this point (People v. Friederich , 67 Colo. 69 , 74 , 185 Pac. 657 ), we quoted from Callahan v. Jennings , 16 Colo. 471 , 27 Pac. 1055 , as follows: "The intent and wisdom of this pro

1939Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 409 , 15 Pac. 714 , where, after a discussion of the purposes of this provision (section 24 of article V), we said, “We also indorse the salutary rule that the argument ab inconvenienti is not to be permitted to influence the courts to defeat by construction a constitutional mandate.” It also may be added that in the opinion in the principal Colorado case relied upon by the city on this point (People v. Friederich, 67 Colo. 69, 74 , 185 Pac. 657 ), we quoted from Callahan v. Jennings, 16 Colo. 471 , 27 Pac. 1055 , as follows: “The intent and wisdom of this provisio

1939Co. v. Nestor , 10 Colo. 403 , 409 , 15 Pac. 714 , where, after a discussion of the purposes of this provision (section 24 of article V), we said, "We also indorse the salutary rule that the argument ab inconvenienti is not to be permitted to influence the courts to defeat by construction a constitutional mandate." It also may be added that in the opinion in the principal Colorado case relied upon by the city on this point (People v. Friederich , 67 Colo. 69 , 74 , 185 Pac. 657 ), we quoted from Callahan v. Jennings , 16 Colo. 471 , 27 Pac. 1055 , as follows: "The intent and wisdom of this pro

1939Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 409 , 15 Pac. 714 , where, after a discussion of the purposes of this provision (section 24 of article V), we said, “We also indorse the salutary rule that the argument ab inconvenienti is not to be permitted to influence the courts to defeat by construction a constitutional mandate.” It also may be added that in the opinion in the principal Colorado case relied upon by the city on this point (People v. Friederich, 67 Colo. 69, 74 , 185 Pac. 657 ), we quoted from Callahan v. Jennings, 16 Colo. 471 , 27 Pac. 1055 , as follows: “The intent and wisdom of this provisio

1939Co. v. Nestor , 10 Colo. 403 , 409 , 15 Pac. 714 , where, after a discussion of the purposes of this provision (section 24 of article V), we said, "We also indorse the salutary rule that the argument ab inconvenienti is not to be permitted to influence the courts to defeat by construction a constitutional mandate." It also may be added that in the opinion in the principal Colorado case relied upon by the city on this point (People v. Friederich , 67 Colo. 69 , 74 , 185 Pac. 657 ), we quoted from Callahan v. Jennings , 16 Colo. 471 , 27 Pac. 1055 , as follows: "The intent and wisdom of this pro

1939Co. v. Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 409 , 15 Pac. 714 , where, after a discussion of the purposes of this provision (section 24 of article V), we said, “We also indorse the salutary rule that the argument ab inconvenienti is not to be permitted to influence the courts to defeat by construction a constitutional mandate.” It also may be added that in the opinion in the principal Colorado case relied upon by the city on this point (People v. Friederich, 67 Colo. 69, 74 , 185 Pac. 657 ), we quoted from Callahan v. Jennings, 16 Colo. 471 , 27 Pac. 1055 , as follows: “The intent and wisdom of this provisio

1935“In this case,” as said by the Michigan court in a matter not essentially different, “the most that plaintiff’s counsel could possibly contend is that by collusion between the applicant and defendant’s agent, they made a false answer, and now seek to hold the company by making a ‘sword instead of a shield’ out of the salutary rule that the knowledge of the agent is notice to the principal.” Mudge v. Supreme Court, Independent Order Foresters, 149 Mich. 467 , 112 N. W. 1130 , 119 A. S. R. 686.

1935“In this case,” as said by the Michigan court in a matter not essentially different, “the most that plaintiff’s counsel could possibly contend is that by collusion between the applicant and defendant’s agent, they made a false answer, and now seek to hold the company by making a ‘sword instead of a shield’ out of the salutary rule that the knowledge of the agent is notice to the principal.” Mudge v. Supreme Court, Independent Order Foresters, 149 Mich. 467 , 112 N. W. 1130 , 119 A. S. R. 686.

1912In the case of Bowers v. Green, 1 Scammon (Ill.) 42, 44, (cited as authority in Harvey v. Travelers Insurance Company, 18 Colo. 354 ) it is said: “The old and salutary rule of the common law, that a writ of error is a writ of right, and cannot be denied, except in capital cases, ought not to be abolished by implication and construction, and particularly where it is evident that the legislature could not have contemplated its repeal.” We think this principle applicable here, and, that unless the language of the act points specifically to the conclusion that it was intended to take awa}r the rig

1909The duty of courts is to execute a will as made, and not to make one for the testator — Elliott v. Topp, 63 Miss. 132 (142); and in the interpretation of a will the true inquiry is, not what a testator meant to express, but what do the words used express. —Couch, v. Eastman, 29 W.

1894This we might, perhaps, decline to consider under the salutary rule announced in Knoth v. Barclay, 8 Colo. 305; but the great importance of the issue in this case leads us to examine the statute now cited by counsel for defendant in support of his challenge.