salutary rule in Alabama

2016Indeed, to put such a power in the hands of the prosecuting attorney would be to render the salutary doctrine of prior jeopardy in many in stances practically nugatory.”’ [ 86 Ala. at 607 ,] 6 So. at 121 (citations omitted.) “The Hurst rule was rejected in McKinney v. State, 511 So.2d 220 (Ala. 1987), insofar as it would disallow multiple prosecutions when there are multiple victims.

1988Indeed, to put such a power in the hands of the prosecuting attorney would be to render the salutary doctrine of prior jeopardy in many instances practically nugatory.' " 6 So. at 121 (citations omitted.) The Hurst rule was rejected in McKinney v. State , 511 So.2d 220 (Ala. 1987), insofar as it would disallow multiple prosecutions when there are multiple victims.

1995There is simply ‘no principle of law or equity which sanctions the rejection ... of the salutary principle of res judicata.’ ” Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 400 , 101 S.Ct. 2424, 2429 , 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981).

1995There is simply ‘no principle of law or equity which sanctions the rejection ... of the salutary principle of res judicata.’ ” Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 400 , 101 S.Ct. 2424, 2429 , 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981).

1932When this is clearly established by satisfactory proof, it is honorable to our system of equity jurisprudence, that such infection of fraud is made to vitiate every transaction, and the solemn *616 judgments of courts are no exception to the salutary rule. [Italics supplied.] * * * Munn v. Worrall, 16 Barb. [N. Y.] 221; Ogden v. Larrabee, 57 Ill. 389 ; Kerr on Fraud & Mistake, pp. 352-353; Galatian v. Erwin, Hopk.

1880Freeman on Judgments, §§ 489-490; M unn v. Worrell, 16 Barb. 221 ; Ogden v. Larrabee, 57 Ill. 389 ; Kerr on Fraud & Mistake, pp. 352-8 ; Gelatian v. Erwin, 1 Hopk. 48; Barnesly v. Powell, 1 Ves. 120, 285.

1900As was said in Calloway v. Gilmer, supra: “To this eminently wise and conservative principle, the previous decisions of this court require .us to recognize a single exception — that is, that such executors and administrators as have an interest in the property sold, may purchase at a sale of the goods of the estate, provided there is no unfairness, and the property is exposed to sale in the ordinary mode, and under such circumstances as will comand the 'best price;” citing Brannon v. Oliver, 2 Stewart, 47 ; Saltmarsh v. Beene, 4 Port. 283 ; McLane v. Spence, 6 Ala. 894 ; Julian v. Reynolds, 8

1850The general rule of law is, that a trustee cannot become the purchaser of the trust estate at his own sale, and we regret that an exception to it has ever been permitted to grow up in this State; for it is a salutary principle that forbids the character of both seller and buyer to be united in the same individual, as the interest of others must be involved in the act ■ of sale. ^But at an early day this court held that an executor : might become a purchaser at his own sale, which if fairly made could not be set aside, (Brannon v. Oliver, 2 Stew. 47 ); and although this case has been frequently

1900As was said in Calloway v. Gilmer, supra: “To this eminently wise and conservative principle, the previous decisions of this court require .us to recognize a single exception — that is, that such executors and administrators as have an interest in the property sold, may purchase at a sale of the goods of the estate, provided there is no unfairness, and the property is exposed to sale in the ordinary mode, and under such circumstances as will comand the 'best price;” citing Brannon v. Oliver, 2 Stewart, 47 ; Saltmarsh v. Beene, 4 Port. 283 ; McLane v. Spence, 6 Ala. 894 ; Julian v. Reynolds, 8

1850The general rule of law is, that a trustee cannot become the purchaser of the trust estate at his own sale, and we regret that an exception to it has ever been permitted to grow up in this State; for it is a salutary principle that forbids the character of both seller and buyer to be united in the same individual, as the interest of others must be involved in the act ■ of sale. ^But at an early day this court held that an executor : might become a purchaser at his own sale, which if fairly made could not be set aside, (Brannon v. Oliver, 2 Stew. 47 ); and although this case has been frequently

1900As was said in Calloway v. Gilmer, supra: “To this eminently wise and conservative principle, the previous decisions of this court require .us to recognize a single exception — that is, that such executors and administrators as have an interest in the property sold, may purchase at a sale of the goods of the estate, provided there is no unfairness, and the property is exposed to sale in the ordinary mode, and under such circumstances as will comand the 'best price;” citing Brannon v. Oliver, 2 Stewart, 47 ; Saltmarsh v. Beene, 4 Port. 283 ; McLane v. Spence, 6 Ala. 894 ; Julian v. Reynolds, 8

1850The general rule of law is, that a trustee cannot become the purchaser of the trust estate at his own sale, and we regret that an exception to it has ever been permitted to grow up in this State; for it is a salutary principle that forbids the character of both seller and buyer to be united in the same individual, as the interest of others must be involved in the act ■ of sale. ^But at an early day this court held that an executor : might become a purchaser at his own sale, which if fairly made could not be set aside, (Brannon v. Oliver, 2 Stew. 47 ); and although this case has been frequently

2016Indeed, to put such a power in the hands of the prosecuting attorney would be to render the salutary doctrine of prior jeopardy in many in stances practically nugatory.”’ [ 86 Ala. at 607 ,] 6 So. at 121 (citations omitted.) “The Hurst rule was rejected in McKinney v. State, 511 So.2d 220 (Ala. 1987), insofar as it would disallow multiple prosecutions when there are multiple victims.

2000We agree that a blanket rule limiting discovery to the issue of venue, once a motion to transfer has been filed, is not generally desirable and that the principle that trial judges may limit discovery to a threshold matter like venue is “a salutary principle if it is applied sparingly and with real discretion rather than as an absolute rule.” We believe the particular facts of this case present an instance in which the trial judge should have limited discovery to the venue issue and, as this Court implied in its February 11, 2000, opinion, “the statements made in Windom’s affidavit, which was

1986The facts of this case are somewhat similar to those in the case of Rosenbush Feed Co. v. Garrison, 251 Ala. 245 , 37 So.2d 106 (1948): "This case was tried in the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Tuscaloosa County being the only county in that circuit.

1986The facts of this case are somewhat similar to those in the case of Rosenbush Feed Co. v. Garrison, 251 Ala. 245 , 37 So.2d 106 (1948): "This case was tried in the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Tuscaloosa County being the only county in that circuit.

1976Mullinax v. Mullinax , 56 Ala. App. 676 , 325 So.2d 185 ; Dorminy v. Dorminy , 51 Ala. App. 70 , 282 So.2d 686 .

1976Mullinax v. Mullinax , 56 Ala. App. 676 , 325 So.2d 185 ; Dorminy v. Dorminy , 51 Ala. App. 70 , 282 So.2d 686 .

1976Mullinax v. Mullinax , 56 Ala. App. 676 , 325 So.2d 185 ; Dorminy v. Dorminy , 51 Ala. App. 70 , 282 So.2d 686 .

1976Mullinax v. Mullinax , 56 Ala. App. 676 , 325 So.2d 185 ; Dorminy v. Dorminy , 51 Ala. App. 70 , 282 So.2d 686 .

1970We answered a similar request involving the validity of an Act of the Legislature, on which we find no action of the Governor was required, in Opinion of the Justices, 249 Ala. 88 , 30 So.2d 14 (1947), and we would adopt the same view here.

1970We answered a similar request involving the validity of an Act of the Legislature, on which we find no action of the Governor was required, in Opinion of the Justices, 249 Ala. 88 , 30 So.2d 14 (1947), and we would adopt the same view here.

1948Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Engel Realty Co., 241 Ala. 236 , 2 So.2d 425 ; authorities cited under Title 9, § 59, Code 1940.

1948Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Engel Realty Co., 241 Ala. 236 , 2 So.2d 425 ; authorities cited under Title 9, § 59, Code 1940.

1947The appointment of counsel to represent defendant and the arraignment occurred on the same day and the contention for error is that to thus refuse permission to later file the plea was a violation of due process provided under the Fourteenth Amendment of our federal Constitution in that accused was “denied the right of counsel, with the accustomed incidents of consultation and opportunity of preparation for trial.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 50 , 53 S.Ct. 55, 57 , 77 L.Ed. 158 , 84 A.L.R. 527 .

1947The appointment of counsel to represent defendant and the arraignment occurred on the same day and the contention for error is that to thus refuse permission to later file the plea was a violation of due process provided under the Fourteenth Amendment of our federal Constitution in that accused was “denied the right of counsel, with the accustomed incidents of consultation and opportunity of preparation for trial.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 50 , 53 S.Ct. 55, 57 , 77 L.Ed. 158 , 84 A.L.R. 527 .

1946Gilmer v. Gilmer, 245 Ala. 450, 453 (3), 17 So.2d 529 ; Hawkins v. Tanner, 243 Ala. 641 , 11 So.2d 351 ; Reid et al. v. Armistead, 224 Ala. 43 (2), 138 So. 537 ; Ashurst v. Ashurst, supra; Carroll v. Richardson, 87 Ala. 605 , 6 So. 342 ; Sellers v. Sellers, 35 Ala. 235 .

1946Gilmer v. Gilmer, 245 Ala. 450, 453 (3), 17 So.2d 529 ; Hawkins v. Tanner, 243 Ala. 641 , 11 So.2d 351 ; Reid et al. v. Armistead, 224 Ala. 43 (2), 138 So. 537 ; Ashurst v. Ashurst, supra; Carroll v. Richardson, 87 Ala. 605 , 6 So. 342 ; Sellers v. Sellers, 35 Ala. 235 .

1946Gilmer v. Gilmer, 245 Ala. 450, 453 (3), 17 So.2d 529 ; Hawkins v. Tanner, 243 Ala. 641 , 11 So.2d 351 ; Reid et al. v. Armistead, 224 Ala. 43 (2), 138 So. 537 ; Ashurst v. Ashurst, supra; Carroll v. Richardson, 87 Ala. 605 , 6 So. 342 ; Sellers v. Sellers, 35 Ala. 235 .

1946Gilmer v. Gilmer, 245 Ala. 450, 453 (3), 17 So.2d 529 ; Hawkins v. Tanner, 243 Ala. 641 , 11 So.2d 351 ; Reid et al. v. Armistead, 224 Ala. 43 (2), 138 So. 537 ; Ashurst v. Ashurst, supra; Carroll v. Richardson, 87 Ala. 605 , 6 So. 342 ; Sellers v. Sellers, 35 Ala. 235 .

1946Gilmer v. Gilmer, 245 Ala. 450, 453 (3), 17 So.2d 529 ; Hawkins v. Tanner, 243 Ala. 641 , 11 So.2d 351 ; Reid et al. v. Armistead, 224 Ala. 43 (2), 138 So. 537 ; Ashurst v. Ashurst, supra; Carroll v. Richardson, 87 Ala. 605 , 6 So. 342 ; Sellers v. Sellers, 35 Ala. 235 .

1946Gilmer v. Gilmer, 245 Ala. 450, 453 (3), 17 So.2d 529 ; Hawkins v. Tanner, 243 Ala. 641 , 11 So.2d 351 ; Reid et al. v. Armistead, 224 Ala. 43 (2), 138 So. 537 ; Ashurst v. Ashurst, supra; Carroll v. Richardson, 87 Ala. 605 , 6 So. 342 ; Sellers v. Sellers, 35 Ala. 235 .

1945Nothing" in Garrett v. Cunninghame, supra, is contrary to this salutary principle, so necessary to safeguard the purity of an election, but to the contrary that case clearly affirms the principle of interpreting as mandatory a provision of an election statute that affects an essential element of the election or is expressly declared by the statute to be essential to the validity thereof. 211 Ala. at page 438 , 100 So. at page 853 .

1941Hackett v. Cash, 196 Ala. 403 , 72 So. 52 ; Johnstone v. O’Rear, 220 Ala. 219 , 124 So. 743 ; Vandergrift v. Florida, 25 Ala.App. 241 , 144 So. 120 .

1941Hackett v. Cash, 196 Ala. 403 , 72 So. 52 ; Johnstone v. O’Rear, 220 Ala. 219 , 124 So. 743 ; Vandergrift v. Florida, 25 Ala.App. 241 , 144 So. 120 .

1941Ward v. Jossen [ 218 Ala. 530 , 119 So. 220 ].” Each count shows on its face that the acts of the guardian Clay Holman were in violation of this salutary rule.

1941Ward v. Jossen [ 218 Ala. 530 , 119 So. 220 ].” Each count shows on its face that the acts of the guardian Clay Holman were in violation of this salutary rule.

1941Burt v. Stewart, 235 Ala. 330 , 179 So. 232 .

1941Burt v. Stewart, 235 Ala. 330 , 179 So. 232 .

1941Hackett v. Cash, 196 Ala. 403 , 72 So. 52 ; Johnstone v. O’Rear, 220 Ala. 219 , 124 So. 743 ; Vandergrift v. Florida, 25 Ala.App. 241 , 144 So. 120 .

1941Hackett v. Cash, 196 Ala. 403 , 72 So. 52 ; Johnstone v. O’Rear, 220 Ala. 219 , 124 So. 743 ; Vandergrift v. Florida, 25 Ala.App. 241 , 144 So. 120 .

1941Hackett v. Cash, 196 Ala. 403 , 72 So. 52 ; Johnstone v. O’Rear, 220 Ala. 219 , 124 So. 743 ; Vandergrift v. Florida, 25 Ala.App. 241 , 144 So. 120 .

1941Hackett v. Cash, 196 Ala. 403 , 72 So. 52 ; Johnstone v. O’Rear, 220 Ala. 219 , 124 So. 743 ; Vandergrift v. Florida, 25 Ala.App. 241 , 144 So. 120 .

1937He looked to the bond for some protection, and it may be observed that the salutary principle still prevails that the contract of suretyship is-not that the obligee will see that the principál performs its conditions, but that the surety will see that he performs them (Alabama Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co., 190 Ala. 397 , 67 So. 318 ), though, of course, whatever is required of the obligee as a condition precedent to recovery must be made to appear.

1937He looked to the bond for some protection, and it may be observed that the salutary principle still prevails that the contract of suretyship is-not that the obligee will see that the principál performs its conditions, but that the surety will see that he performs them (Alabama Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co., 190 Ala. 397 , 67 So. 318 ), though, of course, whatever is required of the obligee as a condition precedent to recovery must be made to appear.

1933In the case of Miller v. Marx, 55 Ala. 322 , Judge Stone gave expression to a most salutary rule, in discussing the weight and effect that should be given to testimony of interested persons, when impeaching acknowledgments to conveyances.

1928C.) 31 F. 710 . * * « But it is a salutary principle of law, and one in keeping with humanity, that, to afford warrant for resort to such measures, 'the attendant circumstances must be such as would justify a jury in the conclusion that they were necessary in order to prevent the felon from escaping — not that such measures were only reasonably necessary.

1926The following quotations here pertinent were noted with approval in Ala. Coal Co. v. Gulf Coal Co., 54 So. 685 , 171 Ala. 544 : “As a. party is generally charged with thp laches of his privies, * * * it, follows that knowledge of an ancestor will be imputed to an heir. * * * The knowledge of others who might have sued, but did not, may raise the presumption of invalidity against plaintiff in spite of his own ignorance of the transaction. * * * A party, himself diligent, may be precluded from relief by the negligence of others, as a grantor, a personal representative by that of the decedent.” A

1926The following quotations here pertinent were noted with approval in Ala. Coal Co. v. Gulf Coal Co., 54 So. 685 , 171 Ala. 544 : “As a. party is generally charged with thp laches of his privies, * * * it, follows that knowledge of an ancestor will be imputed to an heir. * * * The knowledge of others who might have sued, but did not, may raise the presumption of invalidity against plaintiff in spite of his own ignorance of the transaction. * * * A party, himself diligent, may be precluded from relief by the negligence of others, as a grantor, a personal representative by that of the decedent.” A

1923Co. v. Jones, 202 Ala. 222 , 80 South. 44 , it was declared that when a traveler “can do so” (stop, look, and listen), “it is his absolute duty to observe this salutary rule of self-preservation, regardless of the time or place of crossing or of the schedule or infrequency of passing trains.” Thus a question was made in the Jones Case of the absoluteness of the negligence peí- se rule, and this decision is in line with G.

1923Co. v. Jones, 202 Ala. 222 , 80 South. 44 , it was declared that when a traveler “can do so” (stop, look, and listen), “it is his absolute duty to observe this salutary rule of self-preservation, regardless of the time or place of crossing or of the schedule or infrequency of passing trains.” Thus a question was made in the Jones Case of the absoluteness of the negligence peí- se rule, and this decision is in line with G.