25 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Moongreen2 sentences2005See State v. Moon, 841 S.W.2d 336, 337 (Tenn. Crim. 2005See State v. Moon, 841 S.W.2d 336, 337 (Tenn. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Watkinsgreen2 sentences2019See State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tenn. 1992). 2001State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tenn. 1992). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Abernathygreen2 sentences2008State v. Abernathy, 159 S.W.3d 601, 603 (Tenn. Crim. 2008State v. Abernathy, 159 S.W.3d 601, 603 (Tenn. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Chimel v. Californiared2 sentences2008See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 -2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (establishing an exception to the search warrant requirement for searches incidental to lawful arrests.) The State postulates that the Chimel exception applies even though the actual arrest occurred after Officer Kilpa-trick searched the defendant. 2008See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 -2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969) (establishing an exception to the search warrant requirement for searches incidental to lawful arrests.) The State postulates that the Chimel exception applies even though the actual arrest occurred after Officer Kilpa-trick searched the defendant. | 2 | 2 |
Talley v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Rule 41 “imposes specific procedural safeguards” that “are intended ‘to secure the citizen against carelessness and abuse in the issuance and execution of search warrants.’” Coffee, 54 S.W.3d at 233 (quoting Talley v. State, 208 Tenn. 275 , 345 S.W.2d 867, 869 (1961)). 2016Rule 41 “imposes specific procedural safeguards” that “are intended ‘to secure the citizen against carelessness and abuse in the issuance and execution of search warrants.’” Coffee, 54 S.W.3d at 233 (quoting Talley v. State, 208 Tenn. 275 , 345 S.W.2d 867, 869 (1961)). | 1 | 1 |
Armour v. Tottygreen1 sentence2009See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968); Armour v. Totty, 486 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Tenn. 1972). | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2009See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968); Armour v. Totty, 486 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Tenn. 1972). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Robinsongreen1 sentence2009See State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 490 (Tenn. 2004); State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 270 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Edison, 9 S.W.3d 75, 77 (Tenn. 1999). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Edisongreen1 sentence2009See State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 490 (Tenn. 2004); State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 270 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Edison, 9 S.W.3d 75, 77 (Tenn. 1999). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gillilandgreen1 sentence2009See State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 490 (Tenn. 2004); State v. Gilliland, 22 S.W.3d 266, 270 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Edison, 9 S.W.3d 75, 77 (Tenn. 1999). | 1 | 1 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2008See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 , 88 S. Ct. at 1880 ; State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tenn. 1998). 2008See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 , 88 S. Ct. at 1880 ; State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tenn. 1998). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Keithgreen1 sentence2008See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 , 88 S. Ct. at 1880 ; State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tenn. 1998). | 1 | 1 |
Rawlings v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2008See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 , 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2564 , 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980) (“Where the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner’s person, we do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.”). 2008See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 , 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2564 , 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980) (“Where the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner’s person, we do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Parkergreen1 sentence2002One exception to the search warrant requirement is “caused by the need for immediate action under the circumstances.” State v. Parker, 525 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tenn. 1975). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nolangreen1 sentence1992See State v. Nolan, 617 S.W.2d 174 (Tenn.Crim. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lakingreen2 sentences1986When a warrantless search is challenged, an exception to the search warrant requirement must be shown." 588 S.W.2d at 549 . 1986When a warrantless search is challenged, an exception to the search warrant requirement must be shown." 588 S.W.2d at 549 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
City of Decatur v. Kushmergreen1 sentence1980See also City of Decatur v. Kushmer, 43 Ill.2d 334 , 253 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1969). 2 . | 1 | 1 |
Rippy v. Stategreen1 sentence1980The trial judge held that the arresting officers' failure to secure a search warrant was in violation of the “exigent circumstances rule” of Rippy v. State, 550 S.W.2d 636, 640-41 (Tenn.1977). | 1 | 1 |
Klein v. Snidergreen1 sentence1980See also City of Decatur v. Kushmer, 43 Ill.2d 334 , 253 N.W.2d 425, 428 (1969). 2 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Jacumin
green
2 sentences2002SEARCH WARRANT The defendant argues Detective Norrod’s affidavit did not establish sufficient probable cause for the search warrant to issue because: (1) the information was stale; (2) the facts in the affidavit did not provide a nexus between the crime and the interior of the defendant’s home; (3) the affidavit did not establish the confidential informant’s veracity as required by State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989); and (4) the affidavit contained false statements. 1992State v. Jacumin, supra, 778 S.W.2d at 432 ; Harvey v. State, supra. Also, central to the obtaining of a search warrant is the requirement that the issuing magistrate make a judicial determination, that is, a neutral and detached judgment, that probable cause is shown. | 4 | 1992–2004 |
United States v. Ventresca
green
2 sentences2004Also, essential to the process of obtaining a search warrant is the requirement that the affidavit recite sufficient underlying facts and circumstances to enable the issuing magistrate to “perform his detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police.” United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965). 2004Also, essential to the process of obtaining a search warrant is the requirement that the affidavit recite sufficient underlying facts and circumstances to enable the issuing magistrate to “perform his detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police.” United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 , 85 S.Ct. 741 , 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965). | 3 | 2003–2004 |
Illinois v. Gates
green
2 sentences2004In State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn.1989), the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected the totality of the circumstances approach adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), for determining probable cause in affidavits based on informant allegations. 2004In State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn.1989), the Tennessee Supreme Court rejected the totality of the circumstances approach adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), for determining probable cause in affidavits based on informant allegations. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Carpenter v. United States
green
1 sentence2024The Petitioner argues that the records were obtained by a court order rather than a search warrant in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights set forth in Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), and Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Riley v. Cal. United States
green
1 sentence2016He relies upon Riley v. California, --- U.S. ---, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), to support his argument that the data was unlawfully obtained without a search warrant in violation of his right against unlawful searches and seizures. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Coffee
green
1 sentence2016Rule 41 “imposes specific procedural safeguards” that “are intended ‘to secure the citizen against carelessness and abuse in the issuance and execution of search warrants.’” Coffee, 54 S.W.3d at 233 (quoting Talley v. State, 208 Tenn. 275 , 345 S.W.2d 867, 869 (1961)). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Bartram
green
1 sentence2009Bartram, 925 S.W.2d at 230 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.218 (1973)). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Randolph
green
1 sentence2005“According to both the Fourth Amendment and [A]rticle I, § 7 of the Tennessee Constitution, ‘a warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.’” Randolph, 74 S.W.3d at 334 ; see also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 , 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040 (1969) (establishing an exception to the search warrant requirement for searches incidental to arrests). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
green
2 sentences1980These objectives of the search warrant requirement and the constitutional protection it serves are made clear in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971): First, the magistrate’s scrutiny is intended to eliminate altogether searches not made on probable cause. 1980These objectives of the search warrant requirement and the constitutional protection it serves are made clear in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971): First, the magistrate’s scrutiny is intended to eliminate altogether searches not made on probable cause. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Carroll v. United States
green
2 sentences1975Another exception, caused by the need for immediate action under the circumstances, was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). 1975Another exception, caused by the need for immediate action under the circumstances, was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.