16 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carroll v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “[g]iven the nature of an automobile in transit, * * * an immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit substance.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806-07 , 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 , 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925); State v. Maldonado, 322 N.W.2d 349, 352-53 (Minn. 1982). 2016The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “[g]iven the nature of an automobile in transit, * * * an immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit substance.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806-07 , 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 , 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925); State v. Maldonado, 322 N.W.2d 349, 352-53 (Minn. 1982). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Maldonadogreen2 sentences2016The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “[g]iven the nature of an automobile in transit, * * * an immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit substance.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806-07 , 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 , 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925); State v. Maldonado, 322 N.W.2d 349, 352-53 (Minn. 1982). 1999The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “[gjiven the nature of an automobile in transit, * * * an immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit substance.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806-07 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982); see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,149 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); State v. Maldonado, 322 N.W.2d 349, 352-53 (Minn.1982). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Rossgreen2 sentences2016The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “[g]iven the nature of an automobile in transit, * * * an immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit substance.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806-07 , 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 , 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925); State v. Maldonado, 322 N.W.2d 349, 352-53 (Minn. 1982). 2016The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “[g]iven the nature of an automobile in transit, * * * an immediate intrusion is necessary if police officers are to secure the illicit substance.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806-07 , 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 , 45 S. Ct. 280 (1925); State v. Maldonado, 322 N.W.2d 349, 352-53 (Minn. 1982). | 1 | 3 |
State of Minnesota v. Ryan Mark Thompsongreen1 sentence2024For example, in the driving-while-impaired context, blood and urine tests “may be conducted only pursuant to a search warrant . . . or a judicially recognized exception to the search warrant requirement.” Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 3 (2020); see also State v. Thompson, 886 N.W.2d 224, 233 (Minn. 2016) (concluding that “conducting 5 Two recent Minnesota Supreme Court cases have recognized circumstances in which obtaining a defendant’s DNA was not a search. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Miltongreen1 sentence2016The plain-view exception permits a police officer to seize an object believed to be the fruit or instrumentality of a crime without a warrant if “(1) the police are legitimately in the position from which they view the object; (2) they have a lawful right 4 of access to the object; and (3) the object’s incriminating nature is immediately apparent.” State v. Milton, 821 N.W.2d 789, 799 (Minn. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
State of Minnesota v. Todd Eugene Trahangreen1 sentence2016Trahan, 870 N.W.2d at 404 (stating that “other viable options” to address impaired driving include offering a breath test and charging the driver if that test is refused, prosecuting the driver for DWI without a chemical test, and securing a search warrant for a test); see also Thompson, 873 N.W.2d at 880 . | 1 | 1 |
State of Minnesota v. Ryan Mark Thompsongreen1 sentence2016Trahan, 870 N.W.2d at 404 (stating that “other viable options” to address impaired driving include offering a breath test and charging the driver if that test is refused, prosecuting the driver for DWI without a chemical test, and securing a search warrant for a test); see also Thompson, 873 N.W.2d at 880 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Burbachgreen1 sentence2015“Due to the exigent circumstances presented by automobiles, there is a well-established exception to the search warrant requirement for cases involving transportation of contraband goods in motor vehicles.” State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 488 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cartergreen1 sentence2011See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 , 100 S.Ct. 338 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (holding that the frisk of the defendant, conducted when the police executed a search warrant for a bar where he was present, was unconstitutional because the police did not have a reasonable belief that he was armed and dangerous, and stating that "a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person”); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 48-52 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (holding that police officers who s | 1 | 1 |
Ybarra v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2011See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 , 100 S.Ct. 338 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (holding that the frisk of the defendant, conducted when the police executed a search warrant for a bar where he was present, was unconstitutional because the police did not have a reasonable belief that he was armed and dangerous, and stating that "a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person”); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 48-52 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (holding that police officers who s 2011See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 , 100 S.Ct. 338 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (holding that the frisk of the defendant, conducted when the police executed a search warrant for a bar where he was present, was unconstitutional because the police did not have a reasonable belief that he was armed and dangerous, and stating that "a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person”); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 48-52 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (holding that police officers who s | 1 | 1 |
State v. Munsongreen1 sentence2005Due to the exigent circumstances presented by automobiles, there is “a well-established exception to the search warrant requirement for cases involving transportation of contraband goods in motor vehicles.” State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128,135 (Minn.1999). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Turegreen1 sentence2004State v. Ture, 632 N.W.2d 621, 628 (Minn.2001). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Whisonantgreen1 sentence1987See, e.g., State v. Whisonant, 331 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Minn.1983) (search of trunk under automobile exception to the search warrant requirement requires probable cause). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Oquistgreen1 sentence1987The supreme court in State v. Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn.1982), has noted that “a householder may ordinarily have some expectation of privacy in the items he places in his garbage can.” Such an expectation of privacy, however, must be one that society would view as justifiable or reasonable. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Brooks
green
2 sentences2014Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 568 . 2014Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 568 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Rosenbush
green
1 sentence2024The Minnesota Supreme Court also briefly addressed this 2017 statutory change in Rosenbush, stating that, “[f]or blood and urine tests, . . . the implied-consent law now requires that such tests ‘be conducted only pursuant to a search warrant . . . or a judicially recognized exception to the search warrant requirement.’” 931 N.W.2d at 97 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 3 (2018)). 2 Nonprecedential opinions may be cited as persuasive authority. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Payton v. New York
green
2 sentences2017The Court reasoned, “If there is sufficient evidence of a citizen’s participation in a felony to persuade a judicial officer that his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require him to open his doors to the officers of the law,” even though “an arrest warrant requirement may afford less protection than a search warrant requirement.” Id. at 602-03 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 . 2017The Court reasoned, “If there is sufficient evidence of a citizen’s participation in a felony to persuade a judicial officer that his arrest is justified, it is constitutionally reasonable to require him to open his doors to the officers of the law,” even though “an arrest warrant requirement may afford less protection than a search warrant requirement.” Id. at 602-03 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Missouri v. McNeely
green
1 sentence2016In McNeely, the United States Supreme Court held that the evanescent nature of alcohol in the blood did not provide a single-factor exigency exception to the search- warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in drunk-driving cases. 133 S. Ct. at 1568 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Maryland v. Pringle
green
2 sentences2011In Pringle , the police found cocaine in a car with three occupants but had no information about which of the occupants owned the cocaine. 540 U.S. at 368-69 , 124 S.Ct. 795 . 2011In Pringle , the police found cocaine in a car with three occupants but had no information about which of the occupants owned the cocaine. 540 U.S. at 368-69 , 124 S.Ct. 795 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Sibron v. New York
green
2 sentences2011See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 , 100 S.Ct. 338 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (holding that the frisk of the defendant, conducted when the police executed a search warrant for a bar where he was present, was unconstitutional because the police did not have a reasonable belief that he was armed and dangerous, and stating that "a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person”); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 48-52 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (holding that police officers who s 2011See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 , 100 S.Ct. 338 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (holding that the frisk of the defendant, conducted when the police executed a search warrant for a bar where he was present, was unconstitutional because the police did not have a reasonable belief that he was armed and dangerous, and stating that "a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person”); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 48-52 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (holding that police officers who s | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Brown v. Texas
green
2 sentences2011See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 , 100 S.Ct. 338 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (holding that the frisk of the defendant, conducted when the police executed a search warrant for a bar where he was present, was unconstitutional because the police did not have a reasonable belief that he was armed and dangerous, and stating that "a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person”); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 48-52 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (holding that police officers who s 2011See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 , 100 S.Ct. 338 , 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979) (holding that the frisk of the defendant, conducted when the police executed a search warrant for a bar where he was present, was unconstitutional because the police did not have a reasonable belief that he was armed and dangerous, and stating that "a person’s mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person”); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 48-52 , 99 S.Ct. 2637 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (holding that police officers who s | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista
green
2 sentences2005In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the United States Supreme Court determined that “[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” 532 U.S. 318, 354 , 121 S.Ct. 1536 , 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001). 2005In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the United States Supreme Court determined that “[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” 532 U.S. 318, 354 , 121 S.Ct. 1536 , 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.