search warrant requirement in Massachusetts

2025See Hall, 366 Mass. at 799-800 .

2025In such an instance, "[t]he -5- Commonwealth bears the burden of proving that consent was freely and voluntarily given." Commonwealth v. Colon, 482 Mass. 162, 185 (2019) (citation omitted).

2020Therefore, the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement applied, "[b]ecause the observation g[a]ve[] rise to probable cause to conduct a search, [and] the subsequent entry into the vehicle and seizure of the [contraband was] permissible." Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Bostock, 450 Mass. 616 , 624 - 625 (2008) (search of truck permissible under the automobile exception because there was probable cause to believe that the truck contained evidence of a break-in of a vehicle, including observations by police of potentially stolen items).[8] --------------------------- [7]Unlike the e

2020Therefore, the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement applied, "[b]ecause the observation g[a]ve[] rise to probable cause to conduct a search, [and] the subsequent entry into the vehicle and seizure of the [contraband was] permissible." Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Bostock, 450 Mass. 616 , 624 - 625 (2008) (search of truck permissible under the automobile exception because there was probable cause to believe that the truck contained evidence of a break-in of a vehicle, including observations by police of potentially stolen items).[8] --------------------------- [7]Unlike the e

2020Therefore, the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement applied, "[b]ecause the observation g[a]ve[] rise to probable cause to conduct a search, [and] the subsequent entry into the vehicle and seizure of the [contraband was] permissible." Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Bostock, 450 Mass. 616 , 624 - 625 (2008) (search of truck permissible under the automobile exception because there was probable cause to believe that the truck contained evidence of a break-in of a vehicle, including observations by police of potentially stolen items).[8] --------------------------- [7]Unlike the e

2020Therefore, the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement applied, "[b]ecause the observation g[a]ve[] rise to probable cause to conduct a search, [and] the subsequent entry into the vehicle and seizure of the [contraband was] permissible." Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Bostock, 450 Mass. 616 , 624 - 625 (2008) (search of truck permissible under the automobile exception because there was probable cause to believe that the truck contained evidence of a break-in of a vehicle, including observations by police of potentially stolen items).[8] --------------------------- [7]Unlike the e

2019See Commonwealth v. Tyree , 455 Mass. 676 , 690-691, 919 N.E.2d 660 (2010) ("In evaluating whether exigent circumstances existed, we also have placed particular emphasis on whether police consider[ed] how long it would take to obtain a warrant before acting" [quotation and citation omitted] ); Commonwealth v. Forde , 367 Mass. 798 , 801-803, 329 N.E.2d 717 (1975).

2019See Commonwealth v. Tyree , 455 Mass. 676 , 690-691, 919 N.E.2d 660 (2010) ("In evaluating whether exigent circumstances existed, we also have placed particular emphasis on whether police consider[ed] how long it would take to obtain a warrant before acting" [quotation and citation omitted] ); Commonwealth v. Forde , 367 Mass. 798 , 801-803, 329 N.E.2d 717 (1975).

2019That is because "[t]he inventory search exception to the search warrant requirement is strictly limited to the purposes underlying that exception." Commonwealth v. Murphy, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 11, 17 (2005), citing Vuthy Seng, 436 Mass. at 554 n.16.

2017See Commonwealth v. Straw, 422 Mass. 18 Because we conclude that the voluntariness of the defendant's statements "appear[s] from the record with unmistakable clarity," Commonwealth v. Jackson, 432 Mass. 82, 85 (2000) (quotation omitted), we need not address the defendant's request to remand this case for findings and rulings on the voluntariness of the defendant's statements.

2017See Commonwealth v. Straw, 422 Mass. 18 Because we conclude that the voluntariness of the defendant's statements "appear[s] from the record with unmistakable clarity," Commonwealth v. Jackson, 432 Mass. 82, 85 (2000) (quotation omitted), we need not address the defendant's request to remand this case for findings and rulings on the voluntariness of the defendant's statements.

2016See Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 402 Mass. 789, 792-794 (1988).

2016See Commonwealth v. LaFrance, 402 Mass. 789 , 792- 794 (1988).

2016Our inquiry as to whether an affidavit supports a finding of probable cause “always begins and ends with the ‘four corners of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).

2016Our inquiry as to whether an affidavit supports a finding of probable cause “always begins and ends with the ‘four corners of the affidavit.’ ” Commonwealth v. O’Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003), quoting from Commonwealth v. Villella, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 428 (1995).

2016There is no dispute that the warrant requirement announced in Augustine I applies to the Commonwealth’s efforts to obtain Doxsey’s CSLI in this case. 13 We therefore consider whether the Commonwealth is able to meet the search warrant requirement through a demonstration of probable cause in the affidavit originally submitted to support the § 2703(d) order. 14 “Because a determination of probable cause is a conclusion of law, we review a search warrant affidavit de novo.” Commonwealth v. Foster, 471 Mass. 236, 242 (2015).

2012See Commonwealth v. Mercado, supra at 369-370 .

2012The Commonwealth has done so because the judge’s factual findings establish that DeLeo’s discovery of the firearm inside the glove box was justified under the motor vehicle exception to the search warrant requirement, see Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 124 (1997), and alternatively because of reasonable concerns for officer safety.

2010See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222-223 (1973) (warrantless search permissible where undertaken with free and voluntary consent of person possessing ability and apparent authority to give or withhold consent); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 444 Mass. 234, 236-237 (2005).

2010See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222-223 (1973) (warrantless search permissible where undertaken with free and voluntary consent of person possessing ability and apparent authority to give or withhold consent); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 444 Mass. 234, 236-237 (2005).

2006Thus, as the Appeals Court has recently reaffirmed, “[a] police officer may stop and frisk an individual for the officer’s own safety and the safety of others if the circumstances reasonably suggest that the person is armed and potentially dangerous.” Commonwealth v. Nester N., 67 Mass.App.Ct. 225, 229-30 (2006).

2006See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94 (1979) (holding that police executing a search warrant in a bar could not permissibly pat-frisk patrons when they did not have a reasonable belief that their safety was in danger).

1997Commonwealth v. Perrot, supra at 547.

1995Commonwealth v. Phillips, 413 Mass. 50, 55 (1992); Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 410 Mass. 611, 614 (1992); Commonwealth v. Franklin, 376 Mass. 885, 898 (1978).

1995Commonwealth v. Phillips, 413 Mass. 50, 55 (1992); Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 410 Mass. 611, 614 (1992); Commonwealth v. Franklin, 376 Mass. 885, 898 (1978).