search warrant requirement in Montana

2025In State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 54 , 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 , “this Court largely abandoned the automobile exception to search warrants under the Montana Constitution,” however, “the Elison Court specifically reserved a limited number of instances in which 12 warrantless searches of vehicles would remain permissible, one of which was plain view.” Tenold, ¶ 11; see also State v. Logan, 2002 MT 206, ¶ 14 , 311 Mont. 239 , 53 P.3d 1285 (“there is no ‘automobile exception’ to the search warrant requirement under the Montana Constitution . . . a warrantless search of an automobile requires

2025In State v. Elison, 2000 MT 288, ¶ 54 , 302 Mont. 228 , 14 P.3d 456 , “this Court largely abandoned the automobile exception to search warrants under the Montana Constitution,” however, “the Elison Court specifically reserved a limited number of instances in which 12 warrantless searches of vehicles would remain permissible, one of which was plain view.” Tenold, ¶ 11; see also State v. Logan, 2002 MT 206, ¶ 14 , 311 Mont. 239 , 53 P.3d 1285 (“there is no ‘automobile exception’ to the search warrant requirement under the Montana Constitution . . . a warrantless search of an automobile requires

2008The State countered that, under State v. Brown, 232 Mont. 1 , 755 P.2d 1364 (1988), the electronic monitoring of a conversation between two people, with the consent of one of them, does not constitute a search subject to the search warrant requirement. ¶12 The District Court recognized the conflict between Solis and Brown , and noted our own observation, in State v. Hardaway, 2001MT 252, ¶ 51, 307 Mont. 139, ¶ 51 , 36 P.3d 900, ¶ 51 , of jurisprudential inconsistencies in privacy law cases from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s.

2008The State countered that, under State v. Brown, 232 Mont. 1 , 755 P.2d 1364 (1988), the electronic monitoring of a conversation between two people, with the consent of one of them, does not constitute a search subject to the search warrant requirement. ¶12 The District Court recognized the conflict between Solis and Brown , and noted our own observation, in State v. Hardaway, 2001MT 252, ¶ 51, 307 Mont. 139, ¶ 51 , 36 P.3d 900, ¶ 51 , of jurisprudential inconsistencies in privacy law cases from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s.

2008The State countered that, under State v. Brown, 232 Mont. 1 , 755 P.2d 1364 (1988), the electronic monitoring of a conversation between two people, with the consent of one of them, does not constitute a search subject to the search warrant requirement. ¶12 The District Court recognized the conflict between Solis and Brown , and noted our own observation, in State v. Hardaway, 2001MT 252, ¶ 51, 307 Mont. 139, ¶ 51 , 36 P.3d 900, ¶ 51 , of jurisprudential inconsistencies in privacy law cases from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s.

2008The State countered that, under State v. Brown, 232 Mont. 1 , 755 P.2d 1364 (1988), the electronic monitoring of a conversation between two people, with the consent of one of them, does not constitute a search subject to the search warrant requirement. ¶12 The District Court recognized the conflict between Solis and Brown , and noted our own observation, in State v. Hardaway, 2001MT 252, ¶ 51, 307 Mont. 139, ¶ 51 , 36 P.3d 900, ¶ 51 , of jurisprudential inconsistencies in privacy law cases from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s.

1998These well-established exceptions to the search warrant requirement include voluntary and knowing consent to a search (State v. Rushton (1994), 264 Mont. 248, 257-58 , 870 P.2d 1355, 1361 ) and exigent circumstances (State v. Dawson (1988), 233 Mont. 345, 353 , 761 P.2d 352, 357 ). ¶27 Here, it is undisputed that Ames and Caraway did not have a search warrant authorizing their entry into Dorwart’s home.

1998These well-established exceptions to the search warrant requirement include voluntary and knowing consent to a search (State v. Rushton (1994), 264 Mont. 248, 257-58 , 870 P.2d 1355, 1361 ) and exigent circumstances (State v. Dawson (1988), 233 Mont. 345, 353 , 761 P.2d 352, 357 ). ¶27 Here, it is undisputed that Ames and Caraway did not have a search warrant authorizing their entry into Dorwart’s home.

1998These well-established exceptions to the search warrant requirement include voluntary and knowing consent to a search (State v. Rushton (1994), 264 Mont. 248, 257-58 , 870 P.2d 1355, 1361 ) and exigent circumstances (State v. Dawson (1988), 233 Mont. 345, 353 , 761 P.2d 352, 357 ). ¶27 Here, it is undisputed that Ames and Caraway did not have a search warrant authorizing their entry into Dorwart’s home.

1998These well-established exceptions to the search warrant requirement include voluntary and knowing consent to a search (State v. Rushton (1994), 264 Mont. 248, 257-58 , 870 P.2d 1355, 1361 ) and exigent circumstances (State v. Dawson (1988), 233 Mont. 345, 353 , 761 P.2d 352, 357 ). ¶27 Here, it is undisputed that Ames and Caraway did not have a search warrant authorizing their entry into Dorwart’s home.

1998Camara, 387 U.S. at 534 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 . ¶ 42 This Court also has long recognized that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures provision in Montana's Constitution applies to all people and their homes and effects, without regard to whether criminal conduct is involved.

1998Camara, 387 U.S. at 534 , 87 S.Ct. 1729 . ¶42 This Court also has long recognized that the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures provision in Montana’s Constitution applies to all people and their homes and effects, without regard to whether criminal conduct is involved.

1980Recognition of this fundamental problem is one of the reasons the court in Latta v. Fitzharris (9th Cir. 1975), 521 F.2d 246 , imposed a search warrant requirement.

1980Recognition of this fundamental problem is one of the reasons the court in Latta v. Fitzharris (9th Cir.1975), 521 F.2d 246 , imposed a search warrant requirement.

1980United States v. Bradley, supra; United States v. Workman, supra. In relating a search warrant requirement to a probationer, the court in Workman stated: “. . . the special relationship between a parolee and his parole officer and society’s interest in close supervision of the parolee serve to lower the standard for determining probable cause to obtain a search warrant but that they do not eliminate the warrant requirement.” 585 F.2d at 1207 .

1980United States v. Bradley, supra; United States v. Workman, supra. In relating a search warrant requirement to a probationer, the court in Workman stated: "... the special relationship between a parolee and his parole officer and society's interest in close supervision of the parolee serve to lower the standard for determining probable cause to obtain a search warrant but that they do not eliminate the warrant requirement." 585 F.2d at 1207 .

2025See Giacomini, ¶ 10 (citing Collins v. Dep’t of Just., Div. of Highway Patrol, 232 Mont. 73, 78 , 755 P.2d 1373, 1376 (1988); State v. Thompson, 207 Mont. 433, 435 , 674 P.2d 1096 -97 (1984)). ¶9 The relevant legislative history and the resultant conclusions were explored thoroughly in City of Missoula v. Williams, 2017 MT 282 , 389 Mont. 303 , 406 P.3d 8 .

2025See Giacomini, ¶ 10 (citing Collins v. Dep’t of Just., Div. of Highway Patrol, 232 Mont. 73, 78 , 755 P.2d 1373, 1376 (1988); State v. Thompson, 207 Mont. 433, 435 , 674 P.2d 1096 -97 (1984)). ¶9 The relevant legislative history and the resultant conclusions were explored thoroughly in City of Missoula v. Williams, 2017 MT 282 , 389 Mont. 303 , 406 P.3d 8 .

2025See Giacomini, ¶ 10 (citing Collins v. Dep’t of Just., Div. of Highway Patrol, 232 Mont. 73, 78 , 755 P.2d 1373, 1376 (1988); State v. Thompson, 207 Mont. 433, 435 , 674 P.2d 1096 -97 (1984)). ¶9 The relevant legislative history and the resultant conclusions were explored thoroughly in City of Missoula v. Williams, 2017 MT 282 , 389 Mont. 303 , 406 P.3d 8 .

2025In accordance with federal precedent, we have outlined two conditions which must be satisfied to justify warrantless seizure under the plain view doctrine: “First, the item must be in plain view and its incriminating character be ‘immediately apparent.’ Second, not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself.” Loh, 275 Mont. at 473 , 914 P.2d at 600 (citing Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37 , 110 S. Ct. at 2307 ). ¶20 The plain view doctrine applies to law enforcement’s seizur

2025In accordance with federal precedent, we have outlined two conditions which must be satisfied to justify warrantless seizure under the plain view doctrine: “First, the item must be in plain view and its incriminating character be ‘immediately apparent.’ Second, not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself.” Loh, 275 Mont. at 473 , 914 P.2d at 600 (citing Horton, 496 U.S. at 136-37 , 110 S. Ct. at 2307 ). ¶20 The plain view doctrine applies to law enforcement’s seizur

2022State v. Zimmerman, 2018 MT 94, ¶ 17 , 391 Mont. 210 , 417 P.3d 289 . ¶19 We conclude the record does not support that Trooper DiGiovanna had particularized suspicion to extend Harning’s traffic and DUI stop into a drug investigation of the contents of Harning’s vehicle.

2022State v. Zimmerman, 2018 MT 94, ¶ 17 , 391 Mont. 210 , 417 P.3d 289 . ¶19 We conclude the record does not support that Trooper DiGiovanna had particularized suspicion to extend Harning’s traffic and DUI stop into a drug investigation of the contents of Harning’s vehicle.

2020Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741 , 103 S. Ct. 1535 , 1542 n. 6 (1983) (“While seizure of the balloon required a warrantless, physical intrusion into Brown’s automobile, this was proper, assuming that the remaining requirements of the plain-view doctrine were satisfied.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Weatherspoon, 82 F.3d 697, 699 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Horton, 496 U.S. at 130 , 110 S. Ct. at 2304 ) (finding warrantless seizure of a gun seen in plain view extending out from under a vehicle seat permissible). ¶10 An officer’s ability to seize plainly visible contraband from a

2020Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741 , 103 S. Ct. 1535 , 1542 n. 6 (1983) (“While seizure of the balloon required a warrantless, physical intrusion into Brown’s automobile, this was proper, assuming that the remaining requirements of the plain-view doctrine were satisfied.” (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Weatherspoon, 82 F.3d 697, 699 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Horton, 496 U.S. at 130 , 110 S. Ct. at 2304 ) (finding warrantless seizure of a gun seen in plain view extending out from under a vehicle seat permissible). ¶10 An officer’s ability to seize plainly visible contraband from a

1997In addition, the court concluded that the medical information available to Officer Monzon upon his arrival at the hospital, combined with the statements made to Officer Reddick at the accident scene to the effect that Dolan had smelled of alcohol, was “collectively sufficient to warrant a conclusion that probable cause existed to believe a crime had been committed and to further conclude that preservation of the evidence under the circumstances *253 warranted a warrantless seizure of [Dolan’s] blood sample under the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement.” It is well

1997The requirement of probable cause is satisfied “if the facts and circumstances within the officer’s personal knowledge, or upon information imparted to him by a reliable source, are sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe that the suspect has committed an offense.” State v. Lee (1988), 232 Mont. 105, 109 , 754 P.2d 512, 515 .

1997The requirement of probable cause is satisfied “if the facts and circumstances within the officer’s personal knowledge, or upon information imparted to him by a reliable source, are sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe that the suspect has committed an offense.” State v. Lee (1988), 232 Mont. 105, 109 , 754 P.2d 512, 515 .

1997In addition, the court concluded that the medical information available to Officer Monzon upon his arrival at the hospital, combined with the statements made to Officer Reddick at the accident scene to the effect that Dolan had smelled of alcohol, was “collectively sufficient to warrant a conclusion that probable cause existed to believe a crime had been committed and to further conclude that preservation of the evidence under the circumstances *253 warranted a warrantless seizure of [Dolan’s] blood sample under the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement.” It is well

1997In addition, the court concluded that the medical information available to Officer Monzon upon his arrival at the hospital, combined with the statements made to Officer Reddick at the accident scene to the effect that Dolan had smelled of alcohol, was “collectively sufficient to warrant a conclusion that probable cause existed to believe a crime had been committed and to further conclude that preservation of the evidence under the circumstances *253 warranted a warrantless seizure of [Dolan’s] blood sample under the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement.” It is well

1993State v. Holstine (1993), [ 260 Mont. 310 ], 860 P.2d 110, 113 , 50 St.Rep. 1063 , 1065.

1993State v. Holstine (1993), [ 260 Mont. 310 ], 860 P.2d 110, 113 , 50 St.Rep. 1063 , 1065.