search warrant requirement in Virginia

2023Henthorne v. Commonwealth, 76 Va. App. 60 , 67 (2022); see Kim v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 304, 317 (2017).

2022See Bailey v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 130, 131 (1974) (noting that the defendant’s attorney had advised him “not to take the test”); Davis v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 291, 296 (1989) (“[B]lood alcohol concentration, as measured by a chemical test, is a function of many factors including, . . . the length of time between drinking and measurement.”). -9- affirmative obligation to inform him that in the event of his refusal, he would be subject to a separate charge and a blood test if Officer Ciarrocchi could obtain a search warrant for the test.

2022Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)); see also White v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 535 , 553 (2021).

2022Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)); see also White v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 535 , 553 (2021).

2022The fact that subsection (B) contains language requiring the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of subsection (B) and subsection (A) contains no similar language regarding violations of subsection (A) inexorably leads to the conclusion that the General Assembly did not create a suppression remedy for violations of Code § 19.2-56(A). - 26 - A “defect in the validity of the warrant under state law does not, of itself, invalidate the warrant under the United States Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Campbell, 294 Va. 486, 495 (2017).

2022See Bailey v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 130, 131 (1974) (noting that the defendant’s attorney had advised him “not to take the test”); Davis v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 291, 296 (1989) (“[B]lood alcohol concentration, as measured by a chemical test, is a function of many factors including, . . . the length of time between drinking and measurement.”). -9- affirmative obligation to inform him that in the event of his refusal, he would be subject to a separate charge and a blood test if Officer Ciarrocchi could obtain a search warrant for the test.

2019See id. at 18 (citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972)).

2019See id. at 18 (citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972)).

2017Appellant contends that the “plain view” exception to the search warrant requirement does not apply because probable cause cannot be established “solely on the observation of material which can be used for legitimate purposes, even though the experience of an officer indicates that such material is often used for illegitimate purposes.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 414, 420-21 , 620 S.E.2d 760, 763 (2005).

2017Appellant contends that the “plain view” exception to the search warrant requirement does not apply because probable cause cannot be established “solely on the observation of material which can be used for legitimate purposes, even though the experience of an officer indicates that such material is often used for illegitimate purposes.” Brown v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 414, 420-21 , 620 S.E.2d 760, 763 (2005).

2014Our inquiry is whether the plain view exception to the search warrant requirement applies here.5 The plain view doctrine “provides grounds for seizure of an item when an officer’s access to an object has some prior justification under the Fourth Amendment.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 (1983).

2004See, e.g., Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).

2003In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, "[t]his Court is 'bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact unless "plainly wrong" or without evidence to support them and we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.'" Davis v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 421, 429 , 559 S.E.2d 374, 378 (2002) (quoting Neal v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 233, 237 , 498 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1998)).

2003In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, "[t]his Court is 'bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact unless "plainly wrong" or without evidence to support them and we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.'" Davis v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 421, 429 , 559 S.E.2d 374, 378 (2002) (quoting Neal v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 233, 237 , 498 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1998)).

2003In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, "[t]his Court is 'bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact unless "plainly wrong" or without evidence to support them and we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.'" Davis v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 421, 429 , 559 S.E.2d 374, 378 (2002) (quoting Neal v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 233, 237 , 498 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1998)).

2003In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, "[t]his Court is 'bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact unless "plainly wrong" or without evidence to support them and we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.'" Davis v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 421, 429 , 559 S.E.2d 374, 378 (2002) (quoting Neal v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 233, 237 , 498 S.E.2d 422, 424 (1998)).

1993Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 ).