7 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Parkgreen2 sentences2020"A contemporaneous search incidental to a lawful arrest may be made for the fruits of the crime, implements used to commit the crime and for weapons." State v. Park, 50 Haw. 275, 276 , 439 P.2d 212, 213 (1968) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 2020"A contemporaneous search incidental to a lawful arrest may be made for the fruits of the crime, implements used to commit the crime and for weapons." State v. Park, 50 Haw. 275, 276 , 439 P.2d 212, 213 (1968) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2016Thus, as to the police officers’ entry, it is not appropriate to evaluate the applicability of a warrant exception. 3.The dissent’s approach is a relabeling of the emergency exception to the warrant requirement The “consent” search that the dissent proffers, allowing police called to a place to search for victims or perpetrators, originates from Mincey, which held that in instances where someone is in need of immediate aid or in homicide crime scenes, “the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches” and allows the police to “make a prompt warrant 2016Thus, as to the police officers’ entry, it is not appropriate to evaluate the applicability of a warrant exception. 3.The dissent’s approach is a relabeling of the emergency exception to the warrant requirement The “consent” search that the dissent proffers, allowing police called to a place to search for victims or perpetrators, originates from Mincey, which held that in instances where someone is in need of immediate aid or in homicide crime scenes, “the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches” and allows the police to “make a prompt warrant | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kalunagreen2 sentences1981The defendant answers with axioms we have endorsed, i.e., “each case of search and seizure without a warrant must turn on its own facts,” State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 371-72, 520 P.2d 51, 60 (1974), a warrantless search is “per se unreasonable unless shown to fall within a specific exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,” State v. Patterson, 58 Haw. 462, 467 , 571 P.2d 745, 748 (1977), and “the mere fact that the officer may . . . [possess] probable cause sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant . . . [does] not authorize him to engage in a warrantless sear 1981The defendant answers with axioms we have endorsed, i.e., “each case of search and seizure without a warrant must turn on its own facts,” State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 371-72, 520 P.2d 51, 60 (1974), a warrantless search is “per se unreasonable unless shown to fall within a specific exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,” State v. Patterson, 58 Haw. 462, 467 , 571 P.2d 745, 748 (1977), and “the mere fact that the officer may . . . [possess] probable cause sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant . . . [does] not authorize him to engage in a warrantless sear | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kaaheenagreen2 sentences1981The defendant answers with axioms we have endorsed, i.e., “each case of search and seizure without a warrant must turn on its own facts,” State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 371-72, 520 P.2d 51, 60 (1974), a warrantless search is “per se unreasonable unless shown to fall within a specific exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,” State v. Patterson, 58 Haw. 462, 467 , 571 P.2d 745, 748 (1977), and “the mere fact that the officer may . . . [possess] probable cause sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant . . . [does] not authorize him to engage in a warrantless sear 1981The defendant answers with axioms we have endorsed, i.e., “each case of search and seizure without a warrant must turn on its own facts,” State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 371-72, 520 P.2d 51, 60 (1974), a warrantless search is “per se unreasonable unless shown to fall within a specific exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,” State v. Patterson, 58 Haw. 462, 467 , 571 P.2d 745, 748 (1977), and “the mere fact that the officer may . . . [possess] probable cause sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant . . . [does] not authorize him to engage in a warrantless sear | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pattersongreen2 sentences1981The defendant answers with axioms we have endorsed, i.e., “each case of search and seizure without a warrant must turn on its own facts,” State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 371-72, 520 P.2d 51, 60 (1974), a warrantless search is “per se unreasonable unless shown to fall within a specific exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,” State v. Patterson, 58 Haw. 462, 467 , 571 P.2d 745, 748 (1977), and “the mere fact that the officer may . . . [possess] probable cause sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant . . . [does] not authorize him to engage in a warrantless sear 1981The defendant answers with axioms we have endorsed, i.e., “each case of search and seizure without a warrant must turn on its own facts,” State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 371-72, 520 P.2d 51, 60 (1974), a warrantless search is “per se unreasonable unless shown to fall within a specific exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,” State v. Patterson, 58 Haw. 462, 467 , 571 P.2d 745, 748 (1977), and “the mere fact that the officer may . . . [possess] probable cause sufficient to support the issuance of a search warrant . . . [does] not authorize him to engage in a warrantless sear | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Arizona v. Gant
green
2 sentences2011Whether the ICA's decision regarding exceptions to the search warrant requirement is inconsistent with Arizona v. Gant, [___ U.S. ___,] 129 S.Ct. 1710 [ 173 L.Ed.2d 485 ] (2009)[,] and whether the ICA gravely erred by determining that other exceptions to the warrant requirement applied[. [11] ] (Emphasis added.) III. 2011Whether the ICA's decision regarding exceptions to the search warrant requirement is inconsistent with Arizona v. Gant, [___ U.S. ___,] 129 S.Ct. 1710 [ 173 L.Ed.2d 485 ] (2009)[,] and whether the ICA gravely erred by determining that other exceptions to the warrant requirement applied[. [11] ] (Emphasis added.) III. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Torres
green
2 sentences2011The ICA also concluded that (1) there was substantial independent evidence to corroborate Petitioner's incriminating statements, and, therefore, the admission of such statements was correct, id. at 12, 222 P.3d at 419 ; (2) federal law, as *1235 opposed to Hawai`i law, applied to Petitioner's motion to suppress, id. at 17, 222 P.3d at 424 ; and (3) under federal law, the search of Petitioner's vehicle was lawful inasmuch as the search met federal exceptions to the search warrant requirement, id. at 20-26, 222 P.3d at 427-33 . 2011The ICA also concluded that (1) there was substantial independent evidence to corroborate Petitioner's incriminating statements, and, therefore, the admission of such statements was correct, id. at 12, 222 P.3d at 419 ; (2) federal law, as *1235 opposed to Hawai`i law, applied to Petitioner's motion to suppress, id. at 17, 222 P.3d at 424 ; and (3) under federal law, the search of Petitioner's vehicle was lawful inasmuch as the search met federal exceptions to the search warrant requirement, id. at 20-26, 222 P.3d at 427-33 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Mincey v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2016Thus, as to the police officers’ entry, it is not appropriate to evaluate the applicability of a warrant exception. 3.The dissent’s approach is a relabeling of the emergency exception to the warrant requirement The “consent” search that the dissent proffers, allowing police called to a place to search for victims or perpetrators, originates from Mincey, which held that in instances where someone is in need of immediate aid or in homicide crime scenes, “the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches” and allows the police to “make a prompt warrant 2016Thus, as to the police officers’ entry, it is not appropriate to evaluate the applicability of a warrant exception. 3.The dissent’s approach is a relabeling of the emergency exception to the warrant requirement The “consent” search that the dissent proffers, allowing police called to a place to search for victims or perpetrators, originates from Mincey, which held that in instances where someone is in need of immediate aid or in homicide crime scenes, “the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches” and allows the police to “make a prompt warrant | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Bridges
red
1 sentence2011Whether the ICA gravely erred by determining that federal law rather than Hawai'i law should apply to [Petitioner’s] suppression motion and also whether its decision is inconsistent with State v. Bridges, 83 Hawai'i 187 , 925 P.2d [357] (1996) [. 11 ] III.Whether the ICA’s decision regarding exceptions to the search warrant requirement is inconsistent with Arizona v. Gant, [ 556 U.S. 332 ,] 129 S.Ct. 1710 [ 173 L.Ed.2d 485 ] (2009)[,] and whether the ICA gravely erred by determining that other exceptions to the warrant requirement applied[. 12 ] (Emphasis added.) III. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
New Jersey v. T. L. O.
green
2 sentences1994Second, the Court dispensed with the search warrant requirement in the school setting because “requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.” Id. at 340 , 105 S.Ct. at 742 . 1994Second, the Court dispensed with the search warrant requirement in the school setting because “requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.” Id. at 340 , 105 S.Ct. at 742 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Carroll v. United States
green
2 sentences1981The State views the pertinent seizure in terms of the so-called "automobile exception" to the search warrant requirement whose genesis may be traced to Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), and maintains the seizure was valid. 1981The State views the pertinent seizure in terms of the so-called “automobile exception” to the search warrant requirement whose genesis may be traced to Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), and maintains the seizure was valid. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
United States v. Thomas Griffin and Catherine Tucker
green
1 sentence1980In affirming the trial court’s invalidation of the subsequent search and seizure, the federal appellate court held that “absent any of the narrowly limited exceptions to the search warrant requirement, police who believe they have probable cause to search cannot enter a home without a warrant merely because they plan subsequently to get one.” 502 F.2d at 961 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.