14 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Nagelgreen2 sentences1996It further contends that, although “observing defendant’s performance of the tests may have been a search under State v. Nagel, 320 Or 24 , 880 P2d 451 (1994), it was a lawful search pursuant to the ‘voluntary consent’ exception to the search warrant requirement.” Defendant responds that the trial court did not err in granting his motion to suppress, because the state failed to meet its burden of proving valid consent by a preponderance of the evidence. 1996In Nagel , the Supreme Court held that the state had not run afoul of the prohibitions against unreasonable searches contained in the state and federal constitutions, because the officer had conducted field sobriety tests “with probable cause and under exigent circumstances,” which is one of the recognized exceptions to the search warrant requirement. 320 Or at 31-32, 36-37 . | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Vaatausili Mark Alaimalogreen1 sentence2012As noted, this court has summarized the concept in terms of circumstances that “require[ ] the police to act swiftly to prevent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall a suspect’s escape or the destruction of evidence,” Stevens, 311 Or at 126 , while the federal courts have similarly stated that exigent circumstances “are present when a reasonable person [would] believe that entry * * * was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating l | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jordangreen2 sentences2001It follows, as this court stated in Jordan , that the exception to the search warrant requirement when an officer has a valid arrest warrant does not relieve the officer of the constitutional requirement to have probable cause to search. 288 Or at 401-02 . 2001See Jordan, 288 Or at 400-01 (explaining exception). | 1 | 1 |
South Dakota v. Oppermangreen2 sentences1977South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 US 364, 367, 96 S Ct 3092 , 49 L Ed 2d 1000 (1976); Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 153-54 , 45 S Ct 280 , 69 L Ed 543 , 39 ALR 790 (1925). 2 Defendant chose to live in a bus. 1977South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 US 364, 367, 96 S Ct 3092 , 49 L Ed 2d 1000 (1976); Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 153-54 , 45 S Ct 280 , 69 L Ed 543 , 39 ALR 790 (1925). 2 Defendant chose to live in a bus. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Stevens
green
2 sentences2012As noted, this court has summarized the concept in terms of circumstances that “require[ ] the police to act swiftly to prevent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall a suspect’s escape or the destruction of evidence,” Stevens, 311 Or at 126 , while the federal courts have similarly stated that exigent circumstances “are present when a reasonable person [would] believe that entry * * * was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating l 2008Id. | 2 | 2008–2012 |
United States v. Rabinowitz
red
2 sentences1970“This inconsistency was spawned by United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 US 56 , 70 S Ct 430 , 94 L ed 653 (1950), where the court held that a search could be reasonable even though it was practicable for the police to obtain a warrant. 1970“This inconsistency was spawned by United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 US 56 , 70 S Ct 430 , 94 L ed 653 (1950), where the court held that a search could be reasonable even though it was practicable for the police to obtain a warrant. | 2 | 1968–1970 |
Murdoch v. DMV
neutral
1 sentence2022Cite as 370 Or 362 (2022) 381 813.130.” ORS 813.410(6)(e) (2017). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Beatrice v. Florida
green
1 sentence2012As noted, this court has summarized the concept in terms of circumstances that “require[ ] the police to act swiftly to prevent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall a suspect’s escape or the destruction of evidence,” Stevens, 311 Or at 126 , while the federal courts have similarly stated that exigent circumstances “are present when a reasonable person [would] believe that entry * * * was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating l | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Weaver
green
2 sentences2008State v. Weaver, 319 Or. 212, 219 , 874 P.2d 1322 (1994). 2008State v. Weaver, 319 Or. 212, 219 , 874 P.2d 1322 (1994). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Atkinson
green
2 sentences2003In State v. Atkinson, 298 Or 1, 4 , 688 P2d 832 (1984), the Supreme Court addressed inventory policies: “The overall principle repeatedly stated in this court and the Supreme Court of the United States is that except in a few carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without valid consent is unreasonable unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pursuant to the federal constitution, noninvestigatory inventories of impounded vehicles are one of the exceptions to the search warrant requirement. 2003In State v. Atkinson, 298 Or 1, 4 , 688 P2d 832 (1984), the Supreme Court addressed inventory policies: “The overall principle repeatedly stated in this court and the Supreme Court of the United States is that except in a few carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without valid consent is unreasonable unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pursuant to the federal constitution, noninvestigatory inventories of impounded vehicles are one of the exceptions to the search warrant requirement. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Hannah
green
1 sentence1983Any other view would tend in actual practice to emasculate the search warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” 502 F2d at 961. 13 *95 The same result as to discovered contraband obtained in People v. Hannah, 514 P2d 320 (Colo 1973). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Carroll v. United States
green
2 sentences1977South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 US 364, 367, 96 S Ct 3092 , 49 L Ed 2d 1000 (1976); Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 153-54 , 45 S Ct 280 , 69 L Ed 543 , 39 ALR 790 (1925). 2 Defendant chose to live in a bus. 1977South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 US 364, 367, 96 S Ct 3092 , 49 L Ed 2d 1000 (1976); Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 153-54 , 45 S Ct 280 , 69 L Ed 543 , 39 ALR 790 (1925). 2 Defendant chose to live in a bus. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
State v. Ramon
green
2 sentences1973This court approved the “plain view” doctrine as an exception to the search warrant requirement in State v. Ramon, 248 Or 96, 99 , 432 P2d 507 (1967). 1973This court approved the “plain view” doctrine as an exception to the search warrant requirement in State v. Ramon, 248 Or 96, 99 , 432 P2d 507 (1967). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Sabbath v. United States
green
2 sentences1970Defendant cites Sabbath v. United States, 391 US 585 , 88 S Ct 1755 , 20 L Ed 2d 828 (1968), which sets forth the “knock and announce” rule, as authority for suppressing the evidence procured by the search. 1970Defendant cites Sabbath v. United States, 391 US 585 , 88 S Ct 1755 , 20 L Ed 2d 828 (1968), which sets forth the “knock and announce” rule, as authority for suppressing the evidence procured by the search. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.