search warrant requirement in New York

2020Footnote 4: The People's reliance upon the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's search warrant requirement to justify the search of the hidden compartment is misplaced, as the search of the vehicle here occurred prior to the arrest of defendant or Bocio, who were only arrested after the contraband was found in the hidden compartment ( see People v Galak , 81 NY2d 463, 466-467 [1993]; People v Raghnal , 135 AD3d 1168, 1169 [2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1137 [2016]).

2008Defendant does not challenge the stop of the vehicle and, contrary to his contention, the search of the vehicle was permissible under “the so-called ‘automobile exception’ [to the search warrant requirement], under which State actors may search a vehicle without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe that evidence or contraband will be found there” (People v Galak, 81 NY2d 463, 467 [1993]; see People v Whittle, 48 AD3d 714 [2008]; People v Delarosa, 28 AD3d 1186, 1187 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 811 [2006]).

2012The burden of proving the existence of an exception to the search warrant requirement is strictly on the prosecution, and that burden is even greater when there is ample opportunity to obtain a warrant (People v Knapp, 52 NY2d 689, 697 [1981]; People v Mojica-Sanchez, 90 AD3d 488 , 489 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 18 NY3d 960 [2012]).

2012The burden of proving the exception to the search warrant requirement is strictly on the People; that burden is even greater when the police had an opportunity to obtain a warrant (People v Knapp, 52 NY2d 689, 694 [1981]; People v Mojica-Sanchez, 90 AD3d 488 , 489 [1st Dept 2011], Iv denied 18 NY3d 960 [2012]).

2012One exception to the warrant requirement applies “when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable” (Kentucky v King, 563 US —, —, 131 S Ct 1849, 1856 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Mincey v Arizona, 437 US 385, 394 [1978]). “[A] warrantless intrusion may be justified by the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling” (Minnesota v Olson, 495 US 91, 100 [1990] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2001Memorandum: Supreme Court properly determined that the warrantless entry into defendant’s apartment by the police in response to a foul odor emanating from it was justified under the emergency exception to the search warrant requirement (see, People v Mitchell, 39 NY2d 173, 177-178 , cert denied 426 US 953 ; see also, Mincey v Arizona, 437 US 385, 392-393 ).

2001An inventory search of a vehicle, which is an exception to the search warrant requirement, must be both reasonable and conducted pursuant to a “single familiar standard” or established police agency procedure (People v Galak, 80 NY2d 715, 716 ; see, Colorado v Bertine, 479 US 367, 375 ; Florida v Wells, 495 US 1 ).

1996An inventory search of a vehicle, which is an exception to the search warrant requirement, must be both reasonable and conducted pursuant to a "single familiar standard’’ or established police agency procedure (People v Galak, 80 NY2d 715, 716 , quoting Colorado v Bertine, 479 US 367, 375 ; Florida v Wells, 495 US 1 ).

2001An inventory search of a vehicle, which is an exception to the search warrant requirement, must be both reasonable and conducted pursuant to a “single familiar standard” or established police agency procedure (People v Galak, 80 NY2d 715, 716 ; see, Colorado v Bertine, 479 US 367, 375 ; Florida v Wells, 495 US 1 ).

1996An inventory search of a vehicle, which is an exception to the search warrant requirement, must be both reasonable and conducted pursuant to a "single familiar standard’’ or established police agency procedure (People v Galak, 80 NY2d 715, 716 , quoting Colorado v Bertine, 479 US 367, 375 ; Florida v Wells, 495 US 1 ).

2025Accordingly, we conclude that the serious "intrusion on personal privacy, security, and dignity" that accompanies a canine sniff of the body can only be justified at DeBour level 4 — namely, upon probable cause to believe that the target of the sniff search has committed a crime ( id. at 196). [FN1] In light of the foregoing, and given the fact that County Court only evaluated the evidence under the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, we are constrained to remit this case to that court for a determination of whether the police had probable cause to perform the canine sniff search of defen

2025Accordingly, we conclude that the serious "intrusion on personal privacy, security, and dignity" that accompanies a canine sniff of the body can only be justified at DeBour level 4 — namely, upon probable cause to believe that the target of the sniff search has committed a crime ( id. at 196). [FN1] In light of the foregoing, and given the fact that County Court only evaluated the evidence under the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, we are constrained to remit this case to that court for a determination of whether the police had probable cause to perform the canine sniff search of defen

2025Accordingly, we conclude that the serious "intrusion on personal privacy, security, and dignity" that accompanies a canine sniff of the body can only be justified at DeBour level 4 — namely, upon probable cause to believe that the target of the sniff search has committed a crime ( id. at 196). [FN1] In light of the foregoing, and given the fact that County Court only evaluated the evidence under the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, we are constrained to remit this case to that court for a determination of whether the police had probable cause to perform the canine sniff search of defen

2025Accordingly, we conclude that the serious "intrusion on personal privacy, security, and dignity" that accompanies a canine sniff of the body can only be justified at DeBour level 4 — namely, upon probable cause to believe that the target of the sniff search has committed a crime ( id. at 196). [FN1] In light of the foregoing, and given the fact that County Court only evaluated the evidence under the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, we are constrained to remit this case to that court for a determination of whether the police had probable cause to perform the canine sniff search of defen

2025Accordingly, we conclude that the serious "intrusion on personal privacy, security, and dignity" that accompanies a canine sniff of the body can only be justified at DeBour level 4 — namely, upon probable cause to believe that the target of the sniff search has committed a crime ( id. at 196). [FN1] In light of the foregoing, and given the fact that County Court only evaluated the evidence under the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, we are constrained to remit this case to that court for a determination of whether the police had probable cause to perform the canine sniff search of defen

2025Accordingly, we conclude that the serious "intrusion on personal privacy, security, and dignity" that accompanies a canine sniff of the body can only be justified at DeBour level 4 — namely, upon probable cause to believe that the target of the sniff search has committed a crime ( id. at 196). [FN1] In light of the foregoing, and given the fact that County Court only evaluated the evidence under the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, we are constrained to remit this case to that court for a determination of whether the police had probable cause to perform the canine sniff search of defen

2025Accordingly, we conclude that the serious "intrusion on personal privacy, security, and dignity" that accompanies a canine sniff of the body can only be justified at DeBour level 4 — namely, upon probable cause to believe that the target of the sniff search has committed a crime ( id. at 196). [FN1] In light of the foregoing, and given the fact that County Court only evaluated the evidence under the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, we are constrained to remit this case to that court for a determination of whether the police had probable cause to perform the canine sniff search of defen

2025Accordingly, we conclude that the serious "intrusion on personal privacy, security, and dignity" that accompanies a canine sniff of the body can only be justified at DeBour level 4 — namely, upon probable cause to believe that the target of the sniff search has committed a crime ( id. at 196). [FN1] In light of the foregoing, and given the fact that County Court only evaluated the evidence under the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, we are constrained to remit this case to that court for a determination of whether the police had probable cause to perform the canine sniff search of defen

2025Accordingly, we conclude that the serious "intrusion on personal privacy, security, and dignity" that accompanies a canine sniff of the body can only be justified at DeBour level 4 — namely, upon probable cause to believe that the target of the sniff search has committed a crime ( id. at 196). [FN1] In light of the foregoing, and given the fact that County Court only evaluated the evidence under the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, we are constrained to remit this case to that court for a determination of whether the police had probable cause to perform the canine sniff search of defen

2025Accordingly, we conclude that the serious "intrusion on personal privacy, security, and dignity" that accompanies a canine sniff of the body can only be justified at DeBour level 4 — namely, upon probable cause to believe that the target of the sniff search has committed a crime ( id. at 196). [FN1] In light of the foregoing, and given the fact that County Court only evaluated the evidence under the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, we are constrained to remit this case to that court for a determination of whether the police had probable cause to perform the canine sniff search of defen

2025Accordingly, we conclude that the serious "intrusion on personal privacy, security, and dignity" that accompanies a canine sniff of the body can only be justified at DeBour level 4 — namely, upon probable cause to believe that the target of the sniff search has committed a crime ( id. at 196). [FN1] In light of the foregoing, and given the fact that County Court only evaluated the evidence under the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, we are constrained to remit this case to that court for a determination of whether the police had probable cause to perform the canine sniff search of defen

2025Accordingly, we conclude that the serious "intrusion on personal privacy, security, and dignity" that accompanies a canine sniff of the body can only be justified at DeBour level 4 — namely, upon probable cause to believe that the target of the sniff search has committed a crime ( id. at 196). [FN1] In light of the foregoing, and given the fact that County Court only evaluated the evidence under the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, we are constrained to remit this case to that court for a determination of whether the police had probable cause to perform the canine sniff search of defen

2025Accordingly, we conclude that the serious "intrusion on personal privacy, security, and dignity" that accompanies a canine sniff of the body can only be justified at DeBour level 4 — namely, upon probable cause to believe that the target of the sniff search has committed a crime ( id. at 196). [FN1] In light of the foregoing, and given the fact that County Court only evaluated the evidence under the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, we are constrained to remit this case to that court for a determination of whether the police had probable cause to perform the canine sniff search of defen

2025Accordingly, we conclude that the serious "intrusion on personal privacy, security, and dignity" that accompanies a canine sniff of the body can only be justified at DeBour level 4 — namely, upon probable cause to believe that the target of the sniff search has committed a crime ( id. at 196). [FN1] In light of the foregoing, and given the fact that County Court only evaluated the evidence under the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, we are constrained to remit this case to that court for a determination of whether the police had probable cause to perform the canine sniff search of defen

2021The officers were permitted to ask defendant to exit the vehicle both as part of the traffic stop ( see People v Garcia , 20 NY3d 317, 321 [2012]; People v Robinson , 74 NY2d 773, 775 [1989], cert denied 493 US 966 [1989]) and because they had probable cause to arrest defendant based on his failure to produce a valid driver's license ( see People v Holt , 192 AD3d 1680, 1681 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 957 [2021]; see also People v Clark , 227 AD2d 983 , 984 [4th Dept 1996]).

2021The officers were permitted to ask defendant to exit the vehicle both as part of the traffic stop ( see People v Garcia , 20 NY3d 317, 321 [2012]; People v Robinson , 74 NY2d 773, 775 [1989], cert denied 493 US 966 [1989]) and because they had probable cause to arrest defendant based on his failure to produce a valid driver's license ( see People v Holt , 192 AD3d 1680, 1681 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 957 [2021]; see also People v Clark , 227 AD2d 983 , 984 [4th Dept 1996]).

2021The subsequent search of the vehicle, which resulted in the recovery of the handgun, was justified under the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement inasmuch as "[t]he circumstances furnishing probable cause for the arrest also gave the police probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of the crime" ( People v Hampton , 50 AD3d 1605, 1606 [4th Dept 2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 959 [2008]; see generally People v Nichols , 175 AD3d 1117 , 1118-1119 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1018 [2019]; People v Barclay , 201 AD2d 952, 953 [4th Dept 1994]).

2021The officers were permitted to ask defendant to exit the vehicle both as part of the traffic stop ( see People v Garcia , 20 NY3d 317, 321 [2012]; People v Robinson , 74 NY2d 773, 775 [1989], cert denied 493 US 966 [1989]) and because they had probable cause to arrest defendant based on his failure to produce a valid driver's license ( see People v Holt , 192 AD3d 1680, 1681 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 957 [2021]; see also People v Clark , 227 AD2d 983 , 984 [4th Dept 1996]).

2021The subsequent search of the vehicle, which resulted in the recovery of the handgun, was justified under the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement inasmuch as "[t]he circumstances furnishing probable cause for the arrest also gave the police probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained evidence of the crime" ( People v Hampton , 50 AD3d 1605, 1606 [4th Dept 2008], lv denied 10 NY3d 959 [2008]; see generally People v Nichols , 175 AD3d 1117 , 1118-1119 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 34 NY3d 1018 [2019]; People v Barclay , 201 AD2d 952, 953 [4th Dept 1994]).

2021The officers were permitted to ask defendant to exit the vehicle both as part of the traffic stop ( see People v Garcia , 20 NY3d 317, 321 [2012]; People v Robinson , 74 NY2d 773, 775 [1989], cert denied 493 US 966 [1989]) and because they had probable cause to arrest defendant based on his failure to produce a valid driver's license ( see People v Holt , 192 AD3d 1680, 1681 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 957 [2021]; see also People v Clark , 227 AD2d 983 , 984 [4th Dept 1996]).

2021We have upheld the validity of a warrant procured after police “secured” an apartment after a buy and bust, but only where the warrant was based “solely on information obtained by the undercover officer prior to and independent of the illegal entry” and there was “not the slightest hint that the search warrant was in any way tainted by the illegal entry or that the police had exploited the entry in an effort to obtain evidence” (People v Arnau, 58 NY2d 27, 33 [1982]).

2020Footnote 4: The People's reliance upon the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's search warrant requirement to justify the search of the hidden compartment is misplaced, as the search of the vehicle here occurred prior to the arrest of defendant or Bocio, who were only arrested after the contraband was found in the hidden compartment ( see People v Galak , 81 NY2d 463, 466-467 [1993]; People v Raghnal , 135 AD3d 1168, 1169 [2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1137 [2016]).