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29 Florida opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Raffield v. Stategreen2 sentences1979Indeed, the state has abandoned this argument on appeal as well. 3 In an effort to avoid the clear holdings of the Sanders and Chadwick cases, the state now urges for the first time on appeal that the search herein should be upheld on either one of the two exceptions to the search warrant requirement rule, to wit: as a valid automobile inventory search, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Godbee v. State, 224 So.2d 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), or as a valid exigent circumstances search, Raffield v. State, 351 So.2d 945, 947 (Fla. 1977). 1979Here the state apparently relies on a general exception to the search warrant requirement rule that "[p]robable cause to search plus exigent circumstances will usually justify a warrantless search." Raffield v. State, 351 So.2d 945, 947 (Fla. 1977). | 3 | 3 |
Lee v. Stategreen2 sentences2015This Court has recognized that “[war-rantless searches or arrests conducted in a constitutionally protected area ... are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the five established exceptions to the search warrant requirement.” Lee v. State, 856 So.2d 1133, 1136 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). 2015“Warrantless searches ... conducted in a constitutionally protected area ... are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the five established exceptions to the search warrant requirement.” Lee v. State, 856 So.2d 1133, 1136 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). | 2 | 2 |
Hornblower v. Stategreen2 sentences1981Hornblower v. State, 351 So.2d 716, 718 (Fla. 1977). 1979Hornblower v. State, 351 So.2d 716, 718 (Fla. 1977). | 2 | 2 |
Chambers v. Maroneygreen2 sentences1979The state argued in the trial court, however, that the search should be upheld as a valid probable cause search of an automobile thereby qualifying as an exception to the search warrant requirement rule under Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), adopted by § 933.19, Fla. Stat. (1977); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). 1979The state argued in the trial court, however, that the search should be upheld as a valid probable cause search of an automobile thereby qualifying as an exception to the search warrant requirement rule under Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), adopted by § 933.19, Fla. Stat. (1977); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). | 1 | 4 |
Katz v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2015“Warrantless searches ... conducted in a constitutionally protected area ... are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the five established exceptions to the search warrant requirement.” Lee v. State, 856 So.2d 1133, 1136 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). 2015“Warrantless searches ... conducted in a constitutionally protected area ... are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the five established exceptions to the search warrant requirement.” Lee v. State, 856 So.2d 1133, 1136 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). | 1 | 2 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen1 sentence2023See, e.g., State v. Lynn, 11 Fla. Law Weekly Supp 798b (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. June 15, 2004) (citing Smith v. State, 753 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (discussing the consent exception to the warrant requirement)). 3 The defendant’s consent, however, is irrelevant to whether the temporary investigative detention is supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and Florida’s Stop and Frisk Law, section 901.151, Florida Statutes (2022). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen1 sentence2023See, e.g., State v. Lynn, 11 Fla. Law Weekly Supp 798b (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. June 15, 2004) (citing Smith v. State, 753 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (discussing the consent exception to the warrant requirement)). 3 The defendant’s consent, however, is irrelevant to whether the temporary investigative detention is supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and Florida’s Stop and Frisk Law, section 901.151, Florida Statutes (2022). | 1 | 1 |
Kentucky v. Kinggreen1 sentence2018In Riley v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged “[o]ne well- recognized exception” to the search warrant requirement—an “exigencies of the situation” exception that could include “pursu[ing] a fleeing suspect.” 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)). | 1 | 1 |
Riley v. Cal. United Statesgreen1 sentence2018In Riley v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged “[o]ne well- recognized exception” to the search warrant requirement—an “exigencies of the situation” exception that could include “pursu[ing] a fleeing suspect.” 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mejiagreen1 sentence2009Cf. State v. Mejia, 579 So.2d 766, 766 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (finding a search of a person incident to arrest is a recognized exception to the search warrant requirement). | 1 | 1 |
VH v. Stategreen1 sentence2007See V.H. v. State, 903 So.2d 321, 322 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). | 1 | 1 |
Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Franciscogreen2 sentences2001See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). 2001See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
Grant v. Stategreen1 sentence1993Because (1) the warrantless police entry into the defendant Gina Walker’s apartment through a partially opened door was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the Flori-da Constitution, based on the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement rule, as the police, contrary to the defense argument, had good reason to believe that two unattended crying children on the premises may have been harmed by unknown persons, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Wooten v. State, 398 So.2d 963, 966 (Fla. 1s | 1 | 1 |
Wooten v. Stategreen1 sentence1993Because (1) the warrantless police entry into the defendant Gina Walker’s apartment through a partially opened door was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the Flori-da Constitution, based on the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement rule, as the police, contrary to the defense argument, had good reason to believe that two unattended crying children on the premises may have been harmed by unknown persons, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Wooten v. State, 398 So.2d 963, 966 (Fla. 1s | 1 | 1 |
| Lynch v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Adoue v. Stategreen1 sentence1983Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), adopted in toto by § 933.19 Fla. Stat. (1981); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); Adoue v. State, 408 So.2d 567, 571-72 (Fla. 1981); Collins v. State, 65 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1953). | 1 | 1 |
| Dixon v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Wayne Allardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lyonsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Thomas Griffin and Catherine Tuckergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ensor v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bailey v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Boynton v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Southwellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Carroll v. United States
green
2 sentences1979No contention is made or could be made that the search herein was valid under those exceptions to the search warrant requirement rule which permit (1) a warrantless search of a person incident to effecting a lawful arrest of such person, see State v. Gustafson, 258 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1972), or (2) a warrantless search of an automobile based on probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of crime, see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), adopted as the law of Florida by Section 933.-19, Florida Statutes (1977); Collins v. Stat 1979No contention is made or could be made that the search herein was valid under those exceptions to the search warrant requirement rule which permit (1) a warrantless search of a person incident to effecting a lawful arrest of such person, see State v. Gustafson, 258 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1972), or (2) a warrantless search of an automobile based on probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of crime, see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), adopted as the law of Florida by Section 933.-19, Florida Statutes (1977); Collins v. Stat | 4 | 1978–1983 |
Collins v. State
green
2 sentences1983Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), adopted in toto by § 933.19 Fla. Stat. (1981); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); Adoue v. State, 408 So.2d 567, 571-72 (Fla. 1981); Collins v. State, 65 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1953). 1979No contention is made or could be made that the search herein was valid under those exceptions to the search warrant requirement rule which permit (1) a warrantless search of a person incident to effecting a lawful arrest of such person, see State v. Gustafson, 258 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1972), or (2) a warrantless search of an automobile based on probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of crime, see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), adopted as the law of Florida by Section 933.-19, Florida Statutes (1977); Collins v. Stat | 3 | 1978–1983 |
State v. Gustafson
green
2 sentences1982Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 , 94 S.Ct. 488 , 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973), affirming, State v. Gustafson, 258 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1972); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 , 94 S.Ct. 467, 477 , 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); Dixon v. State, 343 So.2d 1345, 1347 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); § 905.21, Fla. Stat. (1981). 1979No contention is made or could be made that the search herein was valid under those exceptions to the search warrant requirement rule which permit (1) a warrantless search of a person incident to effecting a lawful arrest of such person, see State v. Gustafson, 258 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1972), or (2) a warrantless search of an automobile based on probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of crime, see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), adopted as the law of Florida by Section 933.-19, Florida Statutes (1977); Collins v. Stat | 3 | 1979–1982 |
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
green
2 sentences1981Such plain sight seizures have been treated either as an exception to the search warrant requirement rule, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-473 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 [2037-42], 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), or as being entirely beyond the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. 1981Such plain sight seizures have been treated either as an exception to the search warrant requirement rule, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-473 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 [2037-42], 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), or as being entirely beyond the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. | 2 | 1979–1981 |
Godbee v. State
green
2 sentences1979South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Altman v. State, 335 So.2d 626 (Fla.2d DCA 1976); Godbee v. State, 224 So.2d 441 (Fla.2d DCA 1969). 1979Indeed, the state has abandoned this argument on appeal as well. 3 In an effort to avoid the clear holdings of the Sanders and Chadwick cases, the state now urges for the first time on appeal that the search herein should be upheld on either one of the two exceptions to the search warrant requirement rule, to wit: as a valid automobile inventory search, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Godbee v. State, 224 So.2d 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), or as a valid exigent circumstances search, Raffield v. State, 351 So.2d 945, 947 (Fla. 1977). | 2 | 1979–1979 |
South Dakota v. Opperman
green
2 sentences1979Indeed, the state has abandoned this argument on appeal as well. 3 In an effort to avoid the clear holdings of the Sanders and Chadwick cases, the state now urges for the first time on appeal that the search herein should be upheld on either one of the two exceptions to the search warrant requirement rule, to wit: as a valid automobile inventory search, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Godbee v. State, 224 So.2d 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), or as a valid exigent circumstances search, Raffield v. State, 351 So.2d 945, 947 (Fla. 1977). 1979Indeed, the state has abandoned this argument on appeal as well. 3 In an effort to avoid the clear holdings of the Sanders and Chadwick cases, the state now urges for the first time on appeal that the search herein should be upheld on either one of the two exceptions to the search warrant requirement rule, to wit: as a valid automobile inventory search, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976); Godbee v. State, 224 So.2d 441 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969), or as a valid exigent circumstances search, Raffield v. State, 351 So.2d 945, 947 (Fla. 1977). | 2 | 1979–1979 |
State v. Bamber
green
1 sentence2024The Court in Bamber addressed a no-knock search conducted under a search warrant in violation of section 933.09 and refused to expand the exclusionary rule exceptions recognized under Benefield to include a blanket exception “any time a small quantity of drugs is believed to be present in a residence with standard plumbing.” 630 So. 2d at 1053 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. Leon
green
2 sentences2008Id. at 918 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ("suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule"). 2008Id. at 918 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 ("suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a warrant should be ordered only on a case-by-case basis and only in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule"). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Davis v. State
green
1 sentence2004Davis v. State, 834 So.2d 322 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Ker v. California
green
2 sentences1993Because (1) the warrantless police entry into the defendant Gina Walker’s apartment through a partially opened door was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the Flori-da Constitution, based on the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement rule, as the police, contrary to the defense argument, had good reason to believe that two unattended crying children on the premises may have been harmed by unknown persons, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Wooten v. State, 398 So.2d 963, 966 (Fla. 1s 1993Because (1) the warrantless police entry into the defendant Gina Walker’s apartment through a partially opened door was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the Flori-da Constitution, based on the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement rule, as the police, contrary to the defense argument, had good reason to believe that two unattended crying children on the premises may have been harmed by unknown persons, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Wooten v. State, 398 So.2d 963, 966 (Fla. 1s | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Webster v. State
green
1 sentence1993Because (1) the warrantless police entry into the defendant Gina Walker’s apartment through a partially opened door was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the Flori-da Constitution, based on the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement rule, as the police, contrary to the defense argument, had good reason to believe that two unattended crying children on the premises may have been harmed by unknown persons, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Wooten v. State, 398 So.2d 963, 966 (Fla. 1s | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Mincey v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1993Because (1) the warrantless police entry into the defendant Gina Walker’s apartment through a partially opened door was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the Flori-da Constitution, based on the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement rule, as the police, contrary to the defense argument, had good reason to believe that two unattended crying children on the premises may have been harmed by unknown persons, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Wooten v. State, 398 So.2d 963, 966 (Fla. 1s 1993Because (1) the warrantless police entry into the defendant Gina Walker’s apartment through a partially opened door was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the Flori-da Constitution, based on the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement rule, as the police, contrary to the defense argument, had good reason to believe that two unattended crying children on the premises may have been harmed by unknown persons, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Wooten v. State, 398 So.2d 963, 966 (Fla. 1s | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences1993Because (1) the warrantless police entry into the defendant Gina Walker’s apartment through a partially opened door was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the Flori-da Constitution, based on the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement rule, as the police, contrary to the defense argument, had good reason to believe that two unattended crying children on the premises may have been harmed by unknown persons, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Wooten v. State, 398 So.2d 963, 966 (Fla. 1s 1993Because (1) the warrantless police entry into the defendant Gina Walker’s apartment through a partially opened door was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the Flori-da Constitution, based on the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement rule, as the police, contrary to the defense argument, had good reason to believe that two unattended crying children on the premises may have been harmed by unknown persons, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Wooten v. State, 398 So.2d 963, 966 (Fla. 1s | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Illinois v. Andreas
green
2 sentences1993Assuming without deciding that the defendant Carlos Daniel had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the brown bag which the police searched and seized cocaine from, and, therefore, was authorized to challenge such search as a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, but see Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 , 103 S.Ct. 3319 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983), we conclude that the subject search was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment based on the moving vehicle exception to the search warrant requirement rule and that, accordingly, the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s m 1993Assuming without deciding that the defendant Carlos Daniel had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the brown bag which the police searched and seized cocaine from, and, therefore, was authorized to challenge such search as a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, but see Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 , 103 S.Ct. 3319 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983), we conclude that the subject search was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment based on the moving vehicle exception to the search warrant requirement rule and that, accordingly, the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s m | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Colorado v. Bertine
green
2 sentences1991Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 , 107 S.Ct. 738 , 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987). 1991Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 , 107 S.Ct. 738 , 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Mattson v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| United States v. Braxton Lake Freeman, Lawrence John Graham, Peter Martell, A/K/A Pita, A/K/A Peter green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Gustafson v. Florida green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| United States v. Robinson green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Mann v. State green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| State v. Hinton green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Bicking v. State green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Andress v. State green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Chimel v. California red | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Mullins v. State green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Altman v. State green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Sagonias v. State green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Schneckloth v. Bustamonte green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Miranda v. State green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| State v. Skrobacki neutral | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| City of Miami v. Aronovitz green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Hill v. State green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| United States v. Chadwick red | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.