search warrant requirement in Washington

2007Furthermore, "`an arrest warrant requirement may afford less protection than a search warrant requirement, but it will suffice to interpose the magistrate's determination of probable cause between the zealous officer and the citizen.'" Williams, 142 Wash.2d at 24 , 11 P.3d 714 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 602 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 ).

2007Furthermore, “ ‘an arrest warrant requirement may afford less protection than a search warrant requirement, but it will suffice to interpose the magistrate’s determination of probable cause between the zealous officer and the citizen.’ ” Williams, 142 Wn.2d at 24 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 602 ).

2016This is analyzed under two questions: (1) whether the individual, by his or her conduct, has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and (2) whether the individual's subjective expectation of privacy is "'one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable.""' Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739-41 , 99 S. Ct. 2577 , 61 L.

2016This is analyzed under two questions: (1) whether the individual, by his or her conduct, has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and (2) whether the individual's subjective expectation of privacy is "'one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable.""' Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739-41 , 99 S. Ct. 2577 , 61 L.

2011Dist., 187 F.3d 272 , 278 (2d Cir. 1999). ¶31 Feis contends that Deputy McCutchen’s search for firearms violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers did not possess a search warrant and no exception to the warrant requirement applied to justify the search. 10 Conversely, the Department asserts that the community caretaking doctrine justifies the deputies’ entry into the Feis home to search for and seize firearms.

2011Dist., 187 F.3d 272 , 278 (2nd Cir.1999). ¶ 31 Feis contends that Deputy McCutchen's search for firearms violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers did not possess a search warrant and no exception to the warrant requirement applied to justify the search. [10] Conversely, the Department asserts that the community caretaking doctrine justifies the deputies' entry into the Feis home to search for and seize firearms.

2007Kinzy, 141 Wash.2d at 386 , 5 P.3d 668 .

2007Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d at 386 .

2007Furthermore, "`an arrest warrant requirement may afford less protection than a search warrant requirement, but it will suffice to interpose the magistrate's determination of probable cause between the zealous officer and the citizen.'" Williams, 142 Wash.2d at 24 , 11 P.3d 714 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 602 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 ).

2007Furthermore, “ ‘an arrest warrant requirement may afford less protection than a search warrant requirement, but it will suffice to interpose the magistrate’s determination of probable cause between the zealous officer and the citizen.’ ” Williams, 142 Wn.2d at 24 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 602 ).

2006See, e.g., United States v. Spencer, 684 F.2d 220, 223-24 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1109 (1983); State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 31-32 , 981 P.2d 754 (Ct. App. 1999).

2006See, e.g., United States v. Spencer, 684 F.2d 220, 223-24 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1109 (1983); State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 31-32 , 981 P.2d 754 (Ct. App. 1999).

2006We believe that article I, section 7, like the Fourth Amendment, recognizes that "[b]ecause an arrest warrant authorizes the police to deprive a person of his liberty, it necessarily also authorizes a limited invasion of that person's privacy interest when it is necessary to arrest him in his home." Steagald, 451 U.S. at 214 n. 7, 101 S.Ct. 1642 . ¶ 30 The privacy concerns implicated by our holding are best addressed by narrowly drawing the scope of the search warrant exception rather than creating a distinction *527 between misdemeanor and felony arrest warrants.

2006We believe that article I, section 7, like the Fourth Amendment, recognizes that “[b]ecause an arrest warrant authorizes the police to deprive a person of his liberty, it necessarily also authorizes a limited invasion of that person’s privacy interest when it is necessary to arrest him in his home.” Steagald, 451 U.S. at 214 n.7. ¶30 The privacy concerns implicated by our holding are best addressed by narrowly drawing the scope of the search warrant exception rather than creating a distinction between misdemeanor and felony arrest warrants.

2002App. 554 , 958 P.2d 1017 (1998), Clausen contends that the search incident to arrest exception to the search warrant requirement does not apply here because he was not under custodial arrest at the time of the search due to the jail’s status.

2002ANALYSIS Relying on State v. McKenna, 91 Wash. App. 554 , 958 P.2d 1017 (1998), Clausen contends that the search incident to arrest exception to the search warrant requirement does not apply here because he was not under custodial arrest at the time of the search due to the jail's status.

2000The majority thus dispenses with the requirement that "the waiver of the right to require production of a warrant must, in the final analysis, be the product of an informed decision." Ferrier, 136 Wash.2d at 118 , 960 P.2d 927 .

2000The majority thus dispenses with the requirement that “the waiver of the right to require production of a warrant must, in the final analysis, be the product of an informed decision.” Ferrier, 136 Wn.2d at 118 .

2016Finally, we look to the reasonableness of the interest asserted. /d. (voluntary exposure to the public can negate an asserted privacy interest); State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 894 , 168 P.3d 1265 (2007) (evidence in open or plain view will not be excluded). 2 Under the Fourth Amendment, the search warrant requirement attaches to items in which individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

2016Finally, we look to the reasonableness of the interest asserted. /d. (voluntary exposure to the public can negate an asserted privacy interest); State v. Day, 161 Wn.2d 889, 894 , 168 P.3d 1265 (2007) (evidence in open or plain view will not be excluded). 2 Under the Fourth Amendment, the search warrant requirement attaches to items in which individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy.

2015An exigent circumstance exists where "obtaining a warrant is not practical because the delay inherent in securing a warrant would ... permit the destruction of evidence." State v. Smith, 165 Wn.2d 511, 517 , 199 P.3d 386 (2009).

2015Cantrell, 124 Wn.2d at 187 .

2013Khounvichai, 149 Wn.2d at 562 . ¶13 In Ferrier, police officers suspected a marijuana grow operation was located at a private residence. 136 Wn.2d at 106.

2011There was no reason to believe that defendant at the time of the stop was committing a crime or had evidence of a crime to fit within the exception of the search warrant requirement authorized by Terry v. Ohio, 5 Ohio App.2d 122 , 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966) [7] [sic], or in State v. Markham, 40 Wn.

2011There was no reason to believe that defendant at the time of the stop was committing a crime or had evidence of a crime to fit within the exception of the search warrant requirement authorized by Terry v. Ohio, 5 Ohio App.2d 122 , 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966) [7] [sic], or in State v. Markham, 40 Wn.

2011There was no reason to believe that defendant at the time of the stop was committing a crime or had evidence of a crime to fit within the exception of the search warrant requirement authorized by Terry v. Ohio, 5 Ohio App.2d 122 , 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966) [7] [sic], or in State v. Markham, 40 Wn.

2010NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] The United States Supreme Court issued Gant on April 21, 2009. [3] The parties disputed whether Barnes's car was impounded following his arrest.

2010NOTES [1] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). [2] The United States Supreme Court issued Gant on April 21, 2009. [3] The parties disputed whether Barnes's car was impounded following his arrest.

2007Furthermore, "`an arrest warrant requirement may afford less protection than a search warrant requirement, but it will suffice to interpose the magistrate's determination of probable cause between the zealous officer and the citizen.'" Williams, 142 Wash.2d at 24 , 11 P.3d 714 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 602 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 ).

2007Kinzy, 141 Wash.2d at 386 , 5 P.3d 668 .

2003Id. at 71, 917 P.2d 563 .

2000The majority thus dispenses with the requirement that "the waiver of the right to require production of a warrant must, in the final analysis, be the product of an informed decision." Ferrier, 136 Wash.2d at 118 , 960 P.2d 927 .

1996State v. Campbell, 103 Wn.2d 1, 22 , 691 P.2d 929 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1094 (1985).