24 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2022 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Oyler v. Bolesgreen2 sentences2005To demonstrate such intentional discrimination, the defendant must allege “ ‘that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ ” Id. at 123-24 , 316 S.E.2d at 51 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 7 L. 2005To demonstrate such intentional discrimination, the defendant must allege “ ‘that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ ” Id. at 123-24 , 316 S.E.2d at 51 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 7 L. | 8 | 13 |
State v. Cherrygreen2 sentences2003This Court has also recognized "that there may be selectivity in prosecutions and that the exercise of this prosecutorial prerogative does not reach constitutional proportion unless there be a showing that the selection was deliberately based upon `an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.'" State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 103 , 257 S.E.2d 551, 562 (1979) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446, 453 (1962)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 , 100 S.Ct. 2165 , 64 L.Ed.2d 796 (1980). 2003This Court has also recognized "that there may be selectivity in prosecutions and that the exercise of this prosecutorial prerogative does not reach constitutional proportion unless there be a showing that the selection was deliberately based upon `an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.'" State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 103 , 257 S.E.2d 551, 562 (1979) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446, 453 (1962)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 , 100 S.Ct. 2165 , 64 L.Ed.2d 796 (1980). | 8 | 8 |
State v. Spiveygreen2 sentences2022Between his second and third speedy trial motion in August 2019, “the State was awaiting the resolution of a motion for appropriate relief filed in a co-defendant’s matter, to determine whether a trial proceeding against defendant should be joined with those showing that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Spivey, 357 N.C. at 121 , 579 S.E.2d at 256 (discussing prosecutorial preference in trying a backlog of murder cases in the speedy trial context) (quotations omitted). 2022Between his second and third speedy trial motion in August 2019, “the State was awaiting the resolution of a motion for appropriate relief filed in a co-defendant’s matter, to determine whether a trial proceeding against defendant should be joined with those showing that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Spivey, 357 N.C. at 121 , 579 S.E.2d at 256 (discussing prosecutorial preference in trying a backlog of murder cases in the speedy trial context) (quotations omitted). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2007Id. at 550 , 533 S.E.2d at 870 (quotations and citations omitted). 2005State v. Wilson, 139 N.C. | 2 | 5 |
Bordenkircher v. Hayesgreen2 sentences2009There is no question that the April 19th charges were supported by the evidence and that they were not "`based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.'" Id. at 364 , 54 L. 2009There is no question that the April 19th charges were supported by the evidence and that they were not "`based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.'" Id. at 364 , 54 L. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Lawsongreen2 sentences2000It is well established that there may be selectivity in prosecutions and that the exercise of this prosecutorial prerogative does not reach constitutional proportion unless there be a showing that the selection was deliberately based upon “an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.” *551 State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 644 , 314 S.E.2d 493, 501 (1984) (quoting State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 103 , 257 S.E.2d 551, 562 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 , 64 L. 2000It is well established that there may be selectivity in prosecutions and that the exercise of this prosecutorial prerogative does not reach constitutional proportion unless there be a showing that the selection was deliberately based upon “an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.” *551 State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 644 , 314 S.E.2d 493, 501 (1984) (quoting State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 103 , 257 S.E.2d 551, 562 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 , 64 L. | 1 | 5 |
State v. Garnergreen2 sentences2000Ed. 2d at 453 (“conscious exercise of some selectivity” by prosecutor in application of West Virginia recidivist statute not, in itself, denial of equal protection absent selection deliberately based upon “unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification”); see generally Garner, 340 N.C. at 588 , 459 S.E.2d at 725 (“only limitation on [district attorney’s] discretion [in first-degree murder cases] ... is that the decision to prosecute capitally may not be deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification” 2000Ed. 2d at 453 (“conscious exercise of some selectivity” by prosecutor in application of West Virginia recidivist statute not, in itself, denial of equal protection absent selection deliberately based upon “unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification”); see generally Garner, 340 N.C. at 588 , 459 S.E.2d at 725 (“only limitation on [district attorney’s] discretion [in first-degree murder cases] ... is that the decision to prosecute capitally may not be deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification” | 1 | 1 |
State v. Roriegreen2 sentences2000Ed. 2d at 453 (“conscious exercise of some selectivity” by prosecutor in application of West Virginia recidivist statute not, in itself, denial of equal protection absent selection deliberately based upon “unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification”); see generally Garner, 340 N.C. at 588 , 459 S.E.2d at 725 (“only limitation on [district attorney’s] discretion [in first-degree murder cases] ... is that the decision to prosecute capitally may not be deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification” 2000Ed. 2d at 453 (“conscious exercise of some selectivity” by prosecutor in application of West Virginia recidivist statute not, in itself, denial of equal protection absent selection deliberately based upon “unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification”); see generally Garner, 340 N.C. at 588 , 459 S.E.2d at 725 (“only limitation on [district attorney’s] discretion [in first-degree murder cases] ... is that the decision to prosecute capitally may not be deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification” | 1 | 1 |
State v. Spicergreen2 sentences1985To show prosecution based upon an unjustifiable standard would “inevitably lead to having the district attorney take the stand to be cross-examined concerning his motive and purpose in prosecuting the case.” State v. Spicer, 299 N.C. 309, 314 , 261 S.E. 2d 893, 897 (1980). 1985To show prosecution based upon an unjustifiable standard would “inevitably lead to having the district attorney take the stand to be cross-examined concerning his motive and purpose in prosecuting the case.” State v. Spicer, 299 N.C. 309, 314 , 261 S.E. 2d 893, 897 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
Woodson v. North Carolinagreen2 sentences1979See also, State v. Woodson, 287 N.C. 578 , 215 S.E.2d 607 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 . 1979See also, State v. Woodson, 287 N.C. 578 , 215 S.E.2d 607 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Woodsongreen2 sentences1979See also, State v. Woodson, 287 N.C. 578 , 215 S.E.2d 607 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 . 1979See also, State v. Woodson, 287 N.C. 578 , 215 S.E.2d 607 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. William Steelegreen2 sentences1975To invoke the defense [denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment] one must prove that the selection was deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard, such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” United States v. Steele, 461 F. 2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1972). 1975To invoke the defense [denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment] one must prove that the selection was deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard, such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1972). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Schiff
green
2 sentences2003This Court has also recognized "that there may be selectivity in prosecutions and that the exercise of this prosecutorial prerogative does not reach constitutional proportion unless there be a showing that the selection was deliberately based upon `an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.'" State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 103 , 257 S.E.2d 551, 562 (1979) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446, 453 (1962)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 , 100 S.Ct. 2165 , 64 L.Ed.2d 796 (1980). 2000It is well established that there may be selectivity in prosecutions and that the exercise of this prosecutorial prerogative does not reach constitutional proportion unless there be a showing that the selection was deliberately based upon “an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.” *551 State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 644 , 314 S.E.2d 493, 501 (1984) (quoting State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 103 , 257 S.E.2d 551, 562 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 , 64 L. | 7 | 1984–2003 |
Betancourt v. Texas
green
2 sentences2003This Court has also recognized "that there may be selectivity in prosecutions and that the exercise of this prosecutorial prerogative does not reach constitutional proportion unless there be a showing that the selection was deliberately based upon `an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.'" State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 103 , 257 S.E.2d 551, 562 (1979) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446, 453 (1962)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 , 100 S.Ct. 2165 , 64 L.Ed.2d 796 (1980). 2000It is well established that there may be selectivity in prosecutions and that the exercise of this prosecutorial prerogative does not reach constitutional proportion unless there be a showing that the selection was deliberately based upon “an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.” *551 State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 644 , 314 S.E.2d 493, 501 (1984) (quoting State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 103 , 257 S.E.2d 551, 562 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 , 64 L. | 5 | 1996–2003 |
State v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2005To demonstrate such intentional discrimination, the defendant must allege “ ‘that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ ” Id. at 123-24 , 316 S.E.2d at 51 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 7 L. 2005To demonstrate such intentional discrimination, the defendant must allege “ ‘that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ ” Id. at 123-24 , 316 S.E.2d at 51 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 7 L. | 3 | 2003–2005 |
Green v. Summers
green
2 sentences2003This Court has also recognized "that there may be selectivity in prosecutions and that the exercise of this prosecutorial prerogative does not reach constitutional proportion unless there be a showing that the selection was deliberately based upon `an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.'" State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 103 , 257 S.E.2d 551, 562 (1979) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446, 453 (1962)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 , 100 S.Ct. 2165 , 64 L.Ed.2d 796 (1980). 2001Ed 2d at 453), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 , 100 S.Ct. 2165 , 64 L.Ed.2d 796 (1980), quoted in Lawson, 310 N.C. at 644 , 314 S.E.2d at 501 . | 2 | 2001–2003 |
Gaskins v. South Carolina
green
1 sentence2000Ed. 2d 796 (1980)), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1120 , 86 L. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Maxson v. Court of Appeal
green
1 sentence1997Moreover, “the only limitation on this discretion pertinent to this case is that the decision to prosecute capitally may not be deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Id. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.