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7 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bell v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Deliberately basing the decision to prosecute upon race, religion, or other "unjustifiable" classification, however, is prohibited; see Barber v. State, 564 So.2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 576 So.2d 284 (Fla.1990); State v. J.M., 718 So.2d 316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Bell v. State, 369 So.2d 932, 934 (Fla.1979)(explaining that in order to constitute a denial of equal protection, selective or discriminatory prosecution "must be deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification."); see also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 60 1996Accord Bell, 369 So.2d at 934 (To constitute a denial of equal protection, selective or discriminatory prosecution “must be deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.”); Barber v. State, 564 So.2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 576 So.2d 284 (Fla. 1990). | 3 | 4 |
Barber v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Deliberately basing the decision to prosecute upon race, religion, or other "unjustifiable" classification, however, is prohibited; see Barber v. State, 564 So.2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 576 So.2d 284 (Fla.1990); State v. J.M., 718 So.2d 316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Bell v. State, 369 So.2d 932, 934 (Fla.1979)(explaining that in order to constitute a denial of equal protection, selective or discriminatory prosecution "must be deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification."); see also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 60 1996Accord Bell, 369 So.2d at 934 (To constitute a denial of equal protection, selective or discriminatory prosecution “must be deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.”); Barber v. State, 564 So.2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 576 So.2d 284 (Fla. 1990). | 3 | 3 |
Glock v. Mooregreen1 sentence2006Glock v. Moore, 776 So.2d 243, 252 (Fla. 2001); see also Polk County v. Mitchell, 931 So.2d 922 , 926 n. 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (describing selective enforcement defense *8 to ordinance as "deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification"). | 1 | 1 |
Lang v. Stategreen1 sentence2006Glock v. Moore, 776 So.2d 243, 252 (Fla. 2001); see also Polk County v. Mitchell, 931 So.2d 922 , 926 n. 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (describing selective enforcement defense *8 to ordinance as "deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification"). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Stategreen1 sentence2006See Thomas v. State, 583 So.2d 336, 340 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). | 1 | 1 |
Wayte v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2002Deliberately basing the decision to prosecute upon race, religion, or other "unjustifiable" classification, however, is prohibited; see Barber v. State, 564 So.2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 576 So.2d 284 (Fla.1990); State v. J.M., 718 So.2d 316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Bell v. State, 369 So.2d 932, 934 (Fla.1979)(explaining that in order to constitute a denial of equal protection, selective or discriminatory prosecution "must be deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification."); see also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 60 2002Deliberately basing the decision to prosecute upon race, religion, or other "unjustifiable" classification, however, is prohibited; see Barber v. State, 564 So.2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 576 So.2d 284 (Fla.1990); State v. J.M., 718 So.2d 316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Bell v. State, 369 So.2d 932, 934 (Fla.1979)(explaining that in order to constitute a denial of equal protection, selective or discriminatory prosecution "must be deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification."); see also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 60 | 1 | 1 |
King v. Stategreen1 sentence1991Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962); Bell v. State, 369 So.2d 932 (Fla. 1979); see also, King v. State, 557 So.2d 899 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), rev. denied, 564 So.2d 1086 (Fla. 1990). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Oyler v. Boles
green
2 sentences2000Of course, a defendant may still mount an equal protection challenge where prosecutorial discretion is alleged to have been deliberately exercised pursuant to an "unjustifiable standard." Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)(observing that, "[w]ithin the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, `the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation' so long as `the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as r 2000Of course, a defendant may still mount an equal protection challenge where prosecutorial discretion is alleged to have been deliberately exercised pursuant to an "unjustifiable standard." Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)(observing that, "[w]ithin the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, `the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation' so long as `the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as r | 2 | 1991–2000 |
State v. JM
green
1 sentence2002Deliberately basing the decision to prosecute upon race, religion, or other "unjustifiable" classification, however, is prohibited; see Barber v. State, 564 So.2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 576 So.2d 284 (Fla.1990); State v. J.M., 718 So.2d 316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Bell v. State, 369 So.2d 932, 934 (Fla.1979)(explaining that in order to constitute a denial of equal protection, selective or discriminatory prosecution "must be deliberately based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification."); see also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 60 | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Bordenkircher v. Hayes
green
2 sentences2000Of course, a defendant may still mount an equal protection challenge where prosecutorial discretion is alleged to have been deliberately exercised pursuant to an "unjustifiable standard." Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)(observing that, "[w]ithin the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, `the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation' so long as `the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as r 2000Of course, a defendant may still mount an equal protection challenge where prosecutorial discretion is alleged to have been deliberately exercised pursuant to an "unjustifiable standard." Cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)(observing that, "[w]ithin the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, `the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation' so long as `the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as r | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.