Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1984–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bordenkircher v. Hayesgreen2 sentences2017Within the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, ‘the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation’ so long as ‘the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ Id. at 364 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)). 2001In the latter situation, an equal protection challenge will not he (1) “as long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that an accused committed an offense,” State v. Skidmore, 15 S.W.3d 502, 508 (Tenn.Crim.App.1999) (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 , 105 S.Ct. 1524 , 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985)), and (2) the decision was not “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification,” Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 536 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992) (quoting Borden- *278 kircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed. | 3 | 6 |
Oyler v. Bolesgreen2 sentences2017Within the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, ‘the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation’ so long as ‘the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ Id. at 364 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)). 1997That discretion does not violate the principles of equal protection unless the choice to prosecute is “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). 9 In this case, the record is devoid of any evidence demonstrating that the warden at the NECC arbitrarily selects cases to be referred for prosecution. | 2 | 4 |
Cooper v. Stategreen2 sentences2001In the latter situation, an equal protection challenge will not he (1) “as long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that an accused committed an offense,” State v. Skidmore, 15 S.W.3d 502, 508 (Tenn.Crim.App.1999) (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 , 105 S.Ct. 1524 , 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985)), and (2) the decision was not “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification,” Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 536 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992) (quoting Borden- *278 kircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed. 2001App. 1999) (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)), and (2) the decision was not “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification,” Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 536 (Tenn. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Wayte v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001In the latter situation, an equal protection challenge will not he (1) “as long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that an accused committed an offense,” State v. Skidmore, 15 S.W.3d 502, 508 (Tenn.Crim.App.1999) (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 , 105 S.Ct. 1524 , 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985)), and (2) the decision was not “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification,” Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 536 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992) (quoting Borden- *278 kircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed. 2001In the latter situation, an equal protection challenge will not he (1) “as long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that an accused committed an offense,” State v. Skidmore, 15 S.W.3d 502, 508 (Tenn.Crim.App.1999) (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 , 105 S.Ct. 1524 , 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985)), and (2) the decision was not “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification,” Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 536 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992) (quoting Borden- *278 kircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Josephine C. Skidmoregreen1 sentence2001In the latter situation, an equal protection challenge will not he (1) “as long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that an accused committed an offense,” State v. Skidmore, 15 S.W.3d 502, 508 (Tenn.Crim.App.1999) (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 , 105 S.Ct. 1524 , 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985)), and (2) the decision was not “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification,” Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 536 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992) (quoting Borden- *278 kircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.