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23 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 1997–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Oyler v. Bolesgreen2 sentences2023Accordingly, a prosecutor’s decision to prosecute “may not be based on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)); Roise, 7 S.W.3d at 243 (quoting Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456 ). 2023Accordingly, a prosecutor’s decision to prosecute “may not be based on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)); Roise, 7 S.W.3d at 243 (quoting Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456 ). | 15 | 21 |
Green v. Stategreen2 sentences2009For example, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits prosecutorial decisions based on “an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 , 116 S.Ct. 1480 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)); Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 103 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). 2008For example, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits prosecutorial decisions based on “an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)); Green v. 18 State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 103 (Tex. Crim. | 4 | 4 |
Roise v. Stategreen2 sentences2023Accordingly, a prosecutor’s decision to prosecute “may not be based on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)); Roise, 7 S.W.3d at 243 (quoting Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456 ). 2015One such restraints, imposed by the Equal Protection clause of the Fifth Amendment, “is that the decision whether to prosecute may not be based on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’" Id., quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 . (1962). | 3 | 7 |
Gunnels v. City of Brownfieldgreen2 sentences2010Beeler, 328 F.3d at 817 ; see Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456 , 82 S.Ct. at 506 (selective enforcement violative of equal protection is that “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification”); Gunnels v. City of Brownfield, 153 S.W.3d 452, 464 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2003, pet. denied); Roise v. State, 7 S.W.3d 225, 243 (Tex. App.–Austin 1999, pet. ref’d). 2010Beeler, 328 F.3d at 817 ; see Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456 , 82 S.Ct. at 506 (selective enforcement viola-tive of equal protection is that “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification”); Gunnels v. City of Brownfield, 153 S.W.3d 452, 464 (Tex.App.-Amar *217 illo 2003, pet. denied); Roise v. State, 7 S.W.3d 225, 243 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. ref'd). | 3 | 3 |
Wayte v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2018For the same reason, the trial court lacked authority to quash Counts II and III on the basis, as alleged in Martinez’s written motion to quash, that there is legally and factually insufficient evidence that Martinez acted with “intent to obtain a benefit.” Finally, Martinez asserted in his motion to quash that all three counts should be quashed because “he was singled out for prosecution based on an unjustifiable standard such as race or other arbitrary classification.” Pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “the decision to prosecute may not be deliberately base 2012No showing of selective prosecution Turning to the first alleged equal protection violation, the United States Supreme Court has stated that “the decision to prosecute may not be ‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 , 105 S.Ct. 1524 , 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)). | 2 | 4 |
Bordenkircher v. Hayesgreen2 sentences2014Id. "[T]he mere fact that a defendant refuses to plead guilty and forces the government to prove its case is insufficient to warrant a presumption that subsequent changes in the charging decision are unjustified." Id. at 382–83. "[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, 11 generally rests entirely in his discretion." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). "[T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement 2014Id. "[T]he mere fact that a defendant refuses to plead guilty and forces the government to prove its case is insufficient to warrant a presumption that subsequent changes in the charging decision are unjustified." Id. at 382–83. "[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, 11 generally rests entirely in his discretion." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). "[T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement | 1 | 1 |
Allred's Produce v. United States Department of Agriculturegreen1 sentence2005“It must be shown that the selective enforcement ‘was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ ” Id. (quoting Allred’s Produce v. USDA, 178 F.3d 743, 748 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962))). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Armstrong
green
2 sentences2023Accordingly, a prosecutor’s decision to prosecute “may not be based on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting Oyler 13 Again, although Appellees did not argue equal protection in their responsive brief, for the reasons described in the footnote above, we review the equal protection arguments they raised below. - 21 - 04-22-00513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519-CR v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)). 2023Accordingly, a prosecutor’s decision to prosecute “may not be based on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’” Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)); Roise, 7 S.W.3d at 243 (quoting Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456 ). | 6 | 2008–2023 |
United States v. Gary Greene, United States of America v. Harry L. Grant, United States of America v. Ronald A. May
green
2 sentences2008That contention is based on a statement in Greene , 697 F.2d at 1234 , listing those as impermissible considerations in the decision to prosecute. 2004That contention is based on a statement in Greene, 697 F.2d at 1234 , listing those as impermissible considerations in the decision to prosecute. | 6 | 2001–2008 |
Beeler v. Rounsavall
green
2 sentences2010Beeler, 328 F.3d at 817 ; see Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456 , 82 S.Ct. at 506 (selective enforcement violative of equal protection is that “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification”); Gunnels v. City of Brownfield, 153 S.W.3d 452, 464 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2003, pet. denied); Roise v. State, 7 S.W.3d 225, 243 (Tex. App.–Austin 1999, pet. ref’d). 2010Beeler, 328 F.3d at 817 ; see Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456 , 82 S.Ct. at 506 (selective enforcement viola-tive of equal protection is that “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification”); Gunnels v. City of Brownfield, 153 S.W.3d 452, 464 (Tex.App.-Amar *217 illo 2003, pet. denied); Roise v. State, 7 S.W.3d 225, 243 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. ref'd). | 3 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. Goodwin
green
2 sentences2014Id. "[T]he mere fact that a defendant refuses to plead guilty and forces the government to prove its case is insufficient to warrant a presumption that subsequent changes in the charging decision are unjustified." Id. at 382–83. "[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, 11 generally rests entirely in his discretion." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). "[T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement 2014Id. "[T]he mere fact that a defendant refuses to plead guilty and forces the government to prove its case is insufficient to warrant a presumption that subsequent changes in the charging decision are unjustified." Id. at 382–83. "[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, 11 generally rests entirely in his discretion." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). "[T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Cannon v. United States
green
1 sentence2012“A defendant may demonstrate that the administration of a criminal law is ‘directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons .... with a mind so unequal and oppressive’ that the system of prosecution amounts to ‘a practical denial’ of equal protection of the law.” United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 , 116 S.Ct. 1480 , 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 , 6 S.Ct. 1064 , 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Yick Wo v. Hopkins
green
2 sentences2012“A defendant may demonstrate that the administration of a criminal law is ‘directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons .... with a mind so unequal and oppressive’ that the system of prosecution amounts to ‘a practical denial’ of equal protection of the law.” United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 , 116 S.Ct. 1480 , 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 , 6 S.Ct. 1064 , 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886)). 2012“A defendant may demonstrate that the administration of a criminal law is ‘directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons .... with a mind so unequal and oppressive’ that the system of prosecution amounts to ‘a practical denial’ of equal protection of the law.” United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 , 116 S.Ct. 1480 , 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 , 6 S.Ct. 1064 , 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886)). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Bryan v. City of Madison MS
green
1 sentence2005“It must be shown that the selective enforcement ‘was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ ” Id. (quoting Allred’s Produce v. USDA, 178 F.3d 743, 748 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962))). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.