unjustifiable standard in New York

1977It would be necessary to show that the selectivity "was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification” (Oyler v Boles, supra, p 456 ).

1976"Even though the statistics in this case might imply a policy of selective enforcement, it was not stated that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification” (Oyler v Boles, 368 US 448, 456 ; see, also, Matter of Di Maggio v Brown, 19 NY2d 283 ).

1993Absent are any necessary allegations (or evidence) that the law was not applied to others similarly situated or that petitioners’ prosecution was the result of intentional discrimination or based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or otherwise (see, e.g., Matter of Di Maggio v Brown, 19 NY2d 283, 290-292 ).

1984Corp. v Klein, supra, at p 693.) To invoke the right successfully, not only must both the “unequal hand” and “evil eye” requirements be met, but the defense must establish that the selective enforcement was “‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or [some otherwise] arbitrary classification.’” (Mat ter of Di Maggio v Brown, 19 NY2d 283, 290 .) It has been consistently held that absent any consciously illegal discrimination, selectivity in enforcement or unequal application of penal statutes is not in itself unconstitutional.

1984(People v Mollette, 87 Misc 2d 236 ; see, also, People v Acme Markets, 37 NY2d 326 .) Considerations of police resources, manpower, and deterrence are all valid factors in enforcement selectivity.

1984Corp. v Klein, supra, at p 693.) To invoke the right successfully, not only must both the “unequal hand” and “evil eye” requirements be met, but the defense must establish that the selective enforcement was “‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or [some otherwise] arbitrary classification.’” (Mat ter of Di Maggio v Brown, 19 NY2d 283, 290 .) It has been consistently held that absent any consciously illegal discrimination, selectivity in enforcement or unequal application of penal statutes is not in itself unconstitutional.

1976Nor is this the type of extreme case where the "grant of consent under similar circumstances has been so frequent, both before and after refusal in one instance, that inference arises that the refusal is the result of unfair discrimination and oppression” (Matter of Larkin Co. v Schwab, 242 NY 330, 336 ; see, also, Matter of Ozolins v Horn, 26 AD2d 555 ).