12 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bordenkircher v. Hayesgreen2 sentences2017This discretion is permissible “so long as the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Id. at 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 669 (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (“It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is ‘unusual’ if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, s 2017This discretion is permissible “so long as the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Id. at 364 (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S. Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L. | 2 | 6 |
Oyler v. Bolesgreen2 sentences2017This discretion is permissible “so long as the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Id. at 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 669 (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (“It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is ‘unusual’ if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, s 2017This discretion is permissible “so long as the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Id. at 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 669 (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (“It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is ‘unusual’ if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, s | 1 | 8 |
Furman v. Georgiagreen2 sentences2017This discretion is permissible “so long as the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Id. at 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 669 (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (“It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is ‘unusual’ if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, s 2017This discretion is permissible “so long as the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Id. at 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 669 (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (“It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on one defendant is ‘unusual’ if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, s | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Climmie Jones, Jr.green1 sentence1999See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969 , 978 n. 8 (6th Cir.1998) ("our finding that Jones is entitled to discovery does not warrant a new trial, but only gives Jones the opportunity to move to dismiss the indictment following discovery"). ¶ 93. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. William Steelegreen1 sentence1975United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir.1972). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Goodwin
green
2 sentences1998In particular, the decision to prosecute may not be "`deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification,' " Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra, [ 434 U.S. 357 ] at 364[ 98 S.Ct. 663, 668 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)], quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 *472 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962), including the exercise of protected statutory and constitutional rights, see United States v. Goodwin, supra, [ 457 U.S. 368 ] at 372[ 102 S.Ct. 2485 , 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982)]. 1998In particular, the decision to prosecute may not be "`deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification,' " Bordenkircher v. Hayes, supra, [ 434 U.S. 357 ] at 364[ 98 S.Ct. 663, 668 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)], quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 *472 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962), including the exercise of protected statutory and constitutional rights, see United States v. Goodwin, supra, [ 457 U.S. 368 ] at 372[ 102 S.Ct. 2485 , 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982)]. | 2 | 1984–1998 |
State v. Badon
green
2 sentences1985Also, see Knight v. State, 243 Ga. 770 , 257 S.E.2d 182 (1979), State v. Badon, 338 So.2d 665 (La.1976), Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962) (conscious selectivity in enforcement of a habitual criminal statute is not in itself a violation of the Federal constitution where the selection is not deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification). 1985Also, see Knight v. State, 243 Ga. 770 , 257 S.E.2d 182 (1979), State v. Badon, 338 So.2d 665 (La. 1976), Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962) (conscious selectivity in enforcement of a habitual criminal statute is not in itself a violation of the Federal constitution where the selection is not deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification). | 2 | 1985–1985 |
Knight v. State
green
2 sentences1985Also, see Knight v. State, 243 Ga. 770 , 257 S.E.2d 182 (1979), State v. Badon, 338 So.2d 665 (La.1976), Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962) (conscious selectivity in enforcement of a habitual criminal statute is not in itself a violation of the Federal constitution where the selection is not deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification). 1985Also, see Knight v. State, 243 Ga. 770 , 257 S.E.2d 182 (1979), State v. Badon, 338 So.2d 665 (La.1976), Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962) (conscious selectivity in enforcement of a habitual criminal statute is not in itself a violation of the Federal constitution where the selection is not deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification). | 2 | 1985–1985 |
McGruder v. State
green
1 sentence2000Heath-erly also cites McGruder , in which the Mississippi Supreme Court provides, “[a] conscious exercise of selectivity of enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation, so long as the selection is not based on an unjustifiable standard, such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.” McGruder, 454 So.2d at 1311 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
United States v. Filippo Sacco AKA John Rosselli
green
2 sentences1974The following statement was made in the case of United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1970): The conscious exercise of selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a constitutional violation where it is not further alleged that “the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.” ( 428 F.2d at 271 ). 1974The following statement was made in the case of United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1970): The conscious exercise of selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a constitutional violation where it is not further alleged that “the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.” ( 428 F.2d at 271 ). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.