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10 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2021 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Grullongreen2 sentences2021Absent a showing of a selection delib- erately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification . . . con- scious selectivity in enforcement of the law is not in itself a constitutional violation.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Grullon, 212 Conn. 195, 217 , 562 A.2d 481 (1989). 2021Absent a showing of a selection delib- erately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification . . . con- scious selectivity in enforcement of the law is not in itself a constitutional violation.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Grullon, 212 Conn. 195, 217 , 562 A.2d 481 (1989). | 1 | 2 |
Harmasse Leclair and Elizabeth Leclair, Appellees-Cross-Appellants v. William Saunders, Appellant-Cross-Appelleegreen1 sentence2000Ed. 2d 687 (1996); LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir. 1980). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bordenkircher v. Hayes
green
2 sentences2021The United States Supreme Court has previously held that, ‘‘[w]ithin the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation so long as the selection was [not] deliberately based [on] an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S. Ct. 663 , 54 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1978). 11 The concurrence and dissent points out that State v. Higg 2021The United States Supreme Court has previously held that, ‘‘[w]ithin the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation so long as the selection was [not] deliberately based [on] an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S. Ct. 663 , 54 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1978). 11 The concurrence and dissent points out that State v. Higg | 3 | 1996–2021 |
Oyler v. Boles
green
2 sentences1998Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S. Ct. 501 , 7 L. 1998Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S. Ct. 501 , 7 L. | 3 | 1982–1998 |
United States v. Jerry Thornton, United States of America v. Frederick Jones, AKA Freddy Earl Jones
green
2 sentences2021The United States Supreme Court has previously held that, ‘‘[w]ithin the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation so long as the selection was [not] deliberately based [on] an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S. Ct. 663 , 54 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1978). 11 The concurrence and dissent points out that State v. Higg 2021The United States Supreme Court has previously held that, ‘‘[w]ithin the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation so long as the selection was [not] deliberately based [on] an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S. Ct. 663 , 54 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1978). 11 The concurrence and dissent points out that State v. Higg | 2 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Angel C.
green
2 sentences2007Moreover, there is nothing in the defendant’s offer of proof that indicates that he could have proven that his claimed “suspect classification” as a “converter of property” was an impermissible consideration for prosecution, which would be necessary to satisfy prong two of the selective prosecution test. 7 See State v. Delossantos, supra, 211 Conn. 287 -88. “[A]bsent a showing of a selection deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification . . . conscious selectivity in enforcement of the *26 law is not in itself a constitutional violat 2007Moreover, there is nothing in the defendant’s offer of proof that indicates that he could have proven that his claimed “suspect classification” as a “converter of property” was an impermissible consideration for prosecution, which would be necessary to satisfy prong two of the selective prosecution test. 7 See State v. Delossantos, supra, 211 Conn. 287 -88. “[A]bsent a showing of a selection deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification . . . conscious selectivity in enforcement of the *26 law is not in itself a constitutional violat | 1 | 2007–2007 |
United States v. Armstrong
green
2 sentences2000Ed. 2d 446 (1962), the United State Supreme Court expressly stated that a party may establish a federal constitutional violation under a claim of selective enforcement in violation of equal protection if “the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” (Emphasis added.) See also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 , 116 S. Ct. 1480 , 134 L. 2000Ed. 2d 446 (1962), the United State Supreme Court expressly stated that a party may establish a federal constitutional violation under a claim of selective enforcement in violation of equal protection if “the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” (Emphasis added.) See also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 , 116 S. Ct. 1480 , 134 L. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Delossantos
green
2 sentences1989State v. Chetcuti, 173 Conn. 165, 168 , 377 A.2d 263 (1977). “ ‘Absent a showing of a selection deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.. . . conscious selectivity in enforcement of the law is not in itself a constitutional violation.’ ” State v. Delossantos, 211 Conn. 258, 287 , 559 A.2d 164 (1989), quoting State v. Haskins, 188 Conn. 432, 474 , 450 A.2d 828 (1982). 1989State v. Chetcuti, 173 Conn. 165, 168 , 377 A.2d 263 (1977). “ ‘Absent a showing of a selection deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.. . . conscious selectivity in enforcement of the law is not in itself a constitutional violation.’ ” State v. Delossantos, 211 Conn. 258, 287 , 559 A.2d 164 (1989), quoting State v. Haskins, 188 Conn. 432, 474 , 450 A.2d 828 (1982). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Chetcuti
yellow
2 sentences1989State v. Chetcuti, 173 Conn. 165, 168 , 377 A.2d 263 (1977). “ ‘Absent a showing of a selection deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.. . . conscious selectivity in enforcement of the law is not in itself a constitutional violation.’ ” State v. Delossantos, 211 Conn. 258, 287 , 559 A.2d 164 (1989), quoting State v. Haskins, 188 Conn. 432, 474 , 450 A.2d 828 (1982). 1989State v. Chetcuti, 173 Conn. 165, 168 , 377 A.2d 263 (1977). “ ‘Absent a showing of a selection deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.. . . conscious selectivity in enforcement of the law is not in itself a constitutional violation.’ ” State v. Delossantos, 211 Conn. 258, 287 , 559 A.2d 164 (1989), quoting State v. Haskins, 188 Conn. 432, 474 , 450 A.2d 828 (1982). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Haskins
green
2 sentences1989State v. Chetcuti, 173 Conn. 165, 168 , 377 A.2d 263 (1977). “ ‘Absent a showing of a selection deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.. . . conscious selectivity in enforcement of the law is not in itself a constitutional violation.’ ” State v. Delossantos, 211 Conn. 258, 287 , 559 A.2d 164 (1989), quoting State v. Haskins, 188 Conn. 432, 474 , 450 A.2d 828 (1982). 1989State v. Chetcuti, 173 Conn. 165, 168 , 377 A.2d 263 (1977). “ ‘Absent a showing of a selection deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.. . . conscious selectivity in enforcement of the law is not in itself a constitutional violation.’ ” State v. Delossantos, 211 Conn. 258, 287 , 559 A.2d 164 (1989), quoting State v. Haskins, 188 Conn. 432, 474 , 450 A.2d 828 (1982). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.