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15 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Oyler v. Bolesgreen2 sentences2019"The conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not a constitutional violation unless the decision to prosecute is based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 183 (1999) (citing Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)). 2001Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." [ Bordenkircher, supra, 434 U.S. at 364 , 98 S.Ct. at 668 , 54 L.Ed. 2d at 611 ; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 446 (1962); see also State v. Bauman, 298 N.J.Super. 176, 201 , 689 A. 2d 173 (App.Div.), certif. | 5 | 8 |
Wayte v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021Our Supreme Court has stated that a party alleging an unconstitutional enforcement of the law must show both a discriminatory effect and a motivating discriminatory purpose. [Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).] The conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not a A-1429-19 16 constitutional violation unless the decision to prosecute is based upon an unjustifiable standard such as . . . [an] arbitrary classification. [Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 183 (1999).] See also State v. Di Frisco, 118 N.J. 253, 266 (1990) (noting "[t]he burden in such cases is h 2001As the Court observed in Schad : In order to establish unconstitutional enforcement of the ordinance, defendant must show both a discriminatory effect and a motivating discriminatory purpose. [ Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 , 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1531 , 84 L.Ed. 2d 547, 556 (1985).] The conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not a constitutional violation unless *965 the decision to prosecute is based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. [ Schad, supra, 160 N.J. at 183 , 733 A. 2d 1159 (citation omitted).] The judge | 3 | 4 |
State, Tp. of Pennsauken v. Schadgreen2 sentences2022However, "[t]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not a constitutional violation unless the decision to prosecute is based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Ibid. 2021Our Supreme Court has stated that a party alleging an unconstitutional enforcement of the law must show both a discriminatory effect and a motivating discriminatory purpose. [Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).] The conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not a A-1429-19 16 constitutional violation unless the decision to prosecute is based upon an unjustifiable standard such as . . . [an] arbitrary classification. [Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 183 (1999).] See also State v. Di Frisco, 118 N.J. 253, 266 (1990) (noting "[t]he burden in such cases is h | 2 | 6 |
Bordenkircher v. Hayesgreen2 sentences2001Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." [ Bordenkircher, supra, 434 U.S. at 364 , 98 S.Ct. at 668 , 54 L.Ed. 2d at 611 ; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 446 (1962); see also State v. Bauman, 298 N.J.Super. 176, 201 , 689 A. 2d 173 (App.Div.), certif. 2001Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." [ Bordenkircher, supra, 434 U.S. at 364 , 98 S.Ct. at 668 , 54 L.Ed. 2d at 611 ; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 446 (1962); see also State v. Bauman, 298 N.J.Super. 176, 201 , 689 A. 2d 173 (App.Div.), certif. | 2 | 4 |
State v. Di Friscogreen1 sentence2021Our Supreme Court has stated that a party alleging an unconstitutional enforcement of the law must show both a discriminatory effect and a motivating discriminatory purpose. [Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985).] The conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not a A-1429-19 16 constitutional violation unless the decision to prosecute is based upon an unjustifiable standard such as . . . [an] arbitrary classification. [Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 183 (1999).] See also State v. Di Frisco, 118 N.J. 253, 266 (1990) (noting "[t]he burden in such cases is h | 1 | 1 |
Mandel v. UBS/PaineWebber, Inc.green1 sentence2019A-3580-17T3 8 "Disparate treatment is demonstrated when a member of 'a protected group is shown to have been singled out and treated less favorably than others similarly situated on the basis of an impermissible criterion' under the antidiscrimination laws." Mandel v. UBS/PaineWebber, Inc., 373 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. David D. Schoolcraftgreen1 sentence2008“Public officials engage in unconstitutional discriminatory application or administration of a facially impartial law when they seek to enforce the law ‘on the basis of an unjustifiable standard, such as race, or religion, or some other arbitrary factor,’ or when they seek to enforce the law in order ‘to prevent the exercise of a fundamental right.’” Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 197 (3d Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 995 , 110 S.Ct. 546 , 107 L.Ed.2d 543 (1989)). | 1 | 1 |
Holder v. City of Allentowngreen1 sentence2008“Public officials engage in unconstitutional discriminatory application or administration of a facially impartial law when they seek to enforce the law ‘on the basis of an unjustifiable standard, such as race, or religion, or some other arbitrary factor,’ or when they seek to enforce the law in order ‘to prevent the exercise of a fundamental right.’” Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 197 (3d Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 995 , 110 S.Ct. 546 , 107 L.Ed.2d 543 (1989)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Baumangreen2 sentences2001Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." [ Bordenkircher, supra, 434 U.S. at 364 , 98 S.Ct. at 668 , 54 L.Ed. 2d at 611 ; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 446 (1962); see also State v. Bauman, 298 N.J.Super. 176, 201 , 689 A. 2d 173 (App.Div.), certif. 2001Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." [ Bordenkircher, supra, 434 U.S. at 364 , 98 S.Ct. at 668 , 54 L.Ed. 2d at 611 ; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 446 (1962); see also State v. Bauman, 298 N.J.Super. 176, 201 , 689 A. 2d 173 (App.Div.), certif. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Baumangreen1 sentence2001Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." [ Bordenkircher, supra, 434 U.S. at 364 , 98 S.Ct. at 668 , 54 L.Ed. 2d at 611 ; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 446 (1962); see also State v. Bauman, 298 N.J.Super. 176, 201 , 689 A. 2d 173 (App.Div.), certif. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Goodwingreen2 sentences2001Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." [ Bordenkircher, supra, 434 U.S. at 364 , 98 S.Ct. at 668 , 54 L.Ed. 2d at 611 ; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 446 (1962); see also State v. Bauman, 298 N.J.Super. 176, 201 , 689 A. 2d 173 (App.Div.), certif. 2001Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." [ Bordenkircher, supra, 434 U.S. at 364 , 98 S.Ct. at 668 , 54 L.Ed. 2d at 611 ; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 446 (1962); see also State v. Bauman, 298 N.J.Super. 176, 201 , 689 A. 2d 173 (App.Div.), certif. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jenningsgreen1 sentence1976See also, State v. Jennings, 126 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Yick Wo v. Hopkins
green
2 sentences1995Rather, in order for a defendant to prevail on an equal protection challenge, he must demonstrate that the decision to prosecute him and not others was "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 [668], 54 L.Ed. 2d 604, 611 (1978); see e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 [505], 7 L.Ed. 2d 446, 453 (1962); Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 , 6 S.Ct. 1064 , 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). 1995Rather, in order for a defendant to prevail on an equal protection challenge, he must demonstrate that the decision to prosecute him and not others was "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 [668], 54 L.Ed. 2d 604, 611 (1978); see e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 [505], 7 L.Ed. 2d 446, 453 (1962); Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 , 6 S.Ct. 1064 , 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). | 2 | 1995–2008 |
Cannon v. United States
green
2 sentences2008Our State Supreme Court has amplified the federal rule that “[discriminatory enforcement of an otherwise impartial law by state and local officials is unconstitutional.” Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 183 , 733 A.2d 1159 (1999) (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 538-41 , 85 S.Ct. 453 , 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 , 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1073 , 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886)). 1995Rather, in order for a defendant to prevail on an equal protection challenge, he must demonstrate that the decision to prosecute him and not others was "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 [668], 54 L.Ed. 2d 604, 611 (1978); see e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 [505], 7 L.Ed. 2d 446, 453 (1962); Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 , 6 S.Ct. 1064 , 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). | 2 | 1995–2008 |
Cox v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2008Our State Supreme Court has amplified the federal rule that “[discriminatory enforcement of an otherwise impartial law by state and local officials is unconstitutional.” Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 183 , 733 A.2d 1159 (1999) (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 538-41 , 85 S.Ct. 453 , 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 , 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1073 , 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886)). 2008Our State Supreme Court has amplified the federal rule that “[discriminatory enforcement of an otherwise impartial law by state and local officials is unconstitutional.” Twp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 183 , 733 A.2d 1159 (1999) (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 538-41 , 85 S.Ct. 453 , 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 , 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1073 , 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Smith v. Mazurkiewicz
green
1 sentence2008“Public officials engage in unconstitutional discriminatory application or administration of a facially impartial law when they seek to enforce the law ‘on the basis of an unjustifiable standard, such as race, or religion, or some other arbitrary factor,’ or when they seek to enforce the law in order ‘to prevent the exercise of a fundamental right.’” Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 197 (3d Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 995 , 110 S.Ct. 546 , 107 L.Ed.2d 543 (1989)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Corbit v. Hotel Redmont
green
1 sentence2008“Public officials engage in unconstitutional discriminatory application or administration of a facially impartial law when they seek to enforce the law ‘on the basis of an unjustifiable standard, such as race, or religion, or some other arbitrary factor,’ or when they seek to enforce the law in order ‘to prevent the exercise of a fundamental right.’” Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 197 (3d Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 995 , 110 S.Ct. 546 , 107 L.Ed.2d 543 (1989)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.