malice standard in Florida

1986According to the Court, the actual malice standard was mandated because "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open...." Id. at 270 , 84 S.Ct. at 721 (emphasis added). *75 In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 , 87 S.Ct. 1975 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967), the same strict standard of proving actual malice was extended to "public figure" plaintiffs.

1986According to the Court, the actual malice standard was mandated because "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open...." Id. at 270 , 84 S.Ct. at 721 (emphasis added). *75 In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 , 87 S.Ct. 1975 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967), the same strict standard of proving actual malice was extended to "public figure" plaintiffs.

2020Fla. State Univ., 724 So. 2d 163, 167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (citation omitted).

2019Fla. State Univ., 724 So. 2d 163, 167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (citation omitted).

2024Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 9 "[W]hen a motion for summary judgment is brought by a defendant against a public-figure plaintiff, such as [Flynn], in a defamation action in which the actual malice test applies, summary judgments are to be more liberally granted." Dockery, 799 So. 2d at 294 .

2019When the plaintiff in a defamation action is a public figure and the actual malice test applies, “summary judgments are to be more liberally granted.” Dockery, 799 So. 2d at 294 .

2024Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 9 "[W]hen a motion for summary judgment is brought by a defendant against a public-figure plaintiff, such as [Flynn], in a defamation action in which the actual malice test applies, summary judgments are to be more liberally granted." Dockery, 799 So. 2d at 294 .

1995See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), Della-Donna v. Gore Newspapers Co., 489 So.2d 72, 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), rev. den., 494 So.2d 1150 , cert. den., 479 U.S. 1088 , 107 S.Ct. 1294 , 94 L.Ed.2d 150 (1987).

2021The malice requirement is satisfied if the threat is made “willfully and purposely to the prejudice and injury of another, . . . .” Alonso v. State, 447 So. 2d 1029, 1030 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed.); see also Dudley v. State, 634 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

2013As previously stated, we hold that Carn-earte requires use of an actual malice standard for the crime of extortion and, as to this issue, certify conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s holding in Alonso, 447 So.2d at 1030 , and the Second District Court of Appeal’s holding in Dudley, 634 So.2d at 1094 .

2021The malice requirement is satisfied if the threat is made “willfully and purposely to the prejudice and injury of another, . . . .” Alonso v. State, 447 So. 2d 1029, 1030 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed.); see also Dudley v. State, 634 So. 2d 1093, 1094 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

2013As previously stated, we hold that Carn-earte requires use of an actual malice standard for the crime of extortion and, as to this issue, certify conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s holding in Alonso, 447 So.2d at 1030 , and the Second District Court of Appeal’s holding in Dudley, 634 So.2d at 1094 .

2025For this reason, Justice Thomas explained that the actual malice standard “comes at a heavy cost, allowing media organizations and interest groups ‘to cast false aspersions on public figures with near impunity.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Tah, 991 F. 3d at 254 (Silberman, J., dissenting)).

2025See Gonzalez v. State, 982 So. 2d 77, 78 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (noting that inferior courts have “no authority to overrule the precedent from the United States Supreme Court”).

2021In 2013, however, the Fifth District reluctantly 1 created a conflict with Alonso and Dudley, holding that “[i]t is fundamental error to use the definition of legal malice when that of actual malice is appropriate because it reduces the State’s burden on an essential element of the offense charged.” Calamia v. State, 125 So. 3d 1007, 1011 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).

2001Cronley v. Pensacola News-Journal, Inc., 561 So.2d 402, 405 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Newton v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 447 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Menendez v. Key West Newspaper Corp., 293 So.2d 751, 752 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

2001Cronley v. Pensacola News-Journal, Inc., 561 So.2d 402, 405 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Newton v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 447 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Menendez v. Key West Newspaper Corp., 293 So.2d 751, 752 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

1998Although the statute does not define "bad faith," under section 768.28(9)(a), "[b]ad faith has been equated with the actual malice standard." Ford v. Rowland, 562 So.2d 731, 734 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (citations omitted).

1995See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), Della-Donna v. Gore Newspapers Co., 489 So.2d 72, 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), rev. den., 494 So.2d 1150 , cert. den., 479 U.S. 1088 , 107 S.Ct. 1294 , 94 L.Ed.2d 150 (1987).

1995See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), Della-Donna v. Gore Newspapers Co., 489 So.2d 72, 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), rev. den., 494 So.2d 1150 , cert. den., 479 U.S. 1088 , 107 S.Ct. 1294 , 94 L.Ed.2d 150 (1987).

1995See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), Della-Donna v. Gore Newspapers Co., 489 So.2d 72, 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), rev. den., 494 So.2d 1150 , cert. den., 479 U.S. 1088 , 107 S.Ct. 1294 , 94 L.Ed.2d 150 (1987).

1995See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), Della-Donna v. Gore Newspapers Co., 489 So.2d 72, 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), rev. den., 494 So.2d 1150 , cert. den., 479 U.S. 1088 , 107 S.Ct. 1294 , 94 L.Ed.2d 150 (1987).

1984As the court stated in Rodriguez v. Nishiki, 653 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Hawaii 1982), wherein local entertainment personalities sued a candidate for public office: Although at one time there was some dispute about whether the actual malice standard of liability would only be applicable to media defendants, it is now generally recognized, at least with regard to defamation actions involving public officials and public figures, that the New York Times standard of actual malice is applicable to both media and nonmedia defendants.

1984As the court stated in Rodriguez v. Nishiki, 653 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Hawaii 1982), wherein local entertainment personalities sued a candidate for public office: Although at one time there was some dispute about whether the actual malice standard of liability would only be applicable to media defendants, it is now generally recognized, at least with regard to defamation actions involving public officials and public figures, that the New York Times standard of actual malice is applicable to both media and nonmedia defendants.