malice standard in Massachusetts

2025Ctr., 59 Mass. App. Ct. 550, 554 (2003); accord Weber v. Community Teamwork, Inc., 434 Mass. 761, 783 (2001) (“behavior must rise to the level of personal hostility or ill-will to satisfy the actual malice standard”). “[T]he ‘actual malice’ standard for proving improper motive or means on the part of a corporate official is a heightened burden placed on the plaintiff, not a defense that must be proved by a defendant.” Blackstone, 448 Mass. at 261 n.10.

2007To satisfy the actual malice standard, a supervisor’s behavior “must rise to the level of personal hostility or ill-will.” Weber, 434 Mass. at 783 .

2011Neither “the motivation of personal gain, including financial gain,” nor “personal dislike,” is sufficient to “warrant an inference of the requisite ill will.” King v. Driscoll, 418 Mass. 576, 587 (1994).

2007See Wright, supra at 476 (hospital administrator had right to fire employee “unless he did so malevolently, i.e., for a spiteful, malignant purpose unrelated to the legitimate corporate interest”); Boothby, supra at 487 (same, citing Wright and Gram); King v. Driscoll, 418 Mass. 576, 581 (1994) (King) (same, citing Wright, Boothby, and Gram); Shea, supra at 764 (where plaintiff employee complained that supervisor interfered with employment relationship, “[t]he improper motive or means required [to be proved] is ‘actual malice.’ . . . any ‘spiteful, malignant purpose, unrelated to the legitimat

1982Id. at 41-44, 52 (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.).

1981A further extension of the doctrine occurred in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971) wherein the Court applied the stringent actual malice standard to the reporting of events of public or general concern.

2025Ctr., 59 Mass. App. Ct. 550, 554 (2003); accord Weber v. Community Teamwork, Inc., 434 Mass. 761, 783 (2001) (“behavior must rise to the level of personal hostility or ill-will to satisfy the actual malice standard”). “[T]he ‘actual malice’ standard for proving improper motive or means on the part of a corporate official is a heightened burden placed on the plaintiff, not a defense that must be proved by a defendant.” Blackstone, 448 Mass. at 261 n.10.

2014Before this court, Kimberlin embraces the Appeals Court’s theory and argues that he is entitled to the actual malice standard because, as the Appeals Court concluded, he was a PortfolioScope “corporate official.” We have stated that “[t]he ‘actual malice’ standard for proving improper motive or means on the part of a corporate official is a burden placed on the plaintiff, not a defense that must be proved by the defendant.” Blackstone, 448 Mass. at 261 .

2013In Vascular Solutions, Inc. v. Marine Polymer Techs., Inc., 590 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (per curiam), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted that “neither the Supreme Court nor this one has decided whether the First Amendment [to the United States Constitution] requires in product disparagement actions the actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, [ 376 U.S. 254, 279-280 (1964)].” The court pointed out that “[w]hether Massachusetts courts might independently read such a requirement into its common law cause of action is also unclear.” Id.

2013In Vascular Solutions, Inc. v. Marine Polymer Techs., Inc., 590 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (per curiam), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted that “neither the Supreme Court nor this one has decided whether the First Amendment [to the United States Constitution] requires in product disparagement actions the actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, [ 376 U.S. 254, 279-280 (1964)].” The court pointed out that “[w]hether Massachusetts courts might independently read such a requirement into its common law cause of action is also unclear.” Id.

2017See Rotkiewicz, 431 Mass. at 755 .

2008The actual malice inquiry “is a subjective one as to the defendant’s attitude toward the truth or falsity of the statement rather than the defendant’s attitude toward the plaintiff.” Rotkiewicz v. Sadowsky, 431 Mass. 748, 754 (2000).

2011See Weber v. Community Teamwork, Inc., 434 Mass. 761, 781-782 (2001); Shea v. Emmanuel College, 425 Mass. 761, 764 (1997).

2007See Wright, supra at 476 (hospital administrator had right to fire employee “unless he did so malevolently, i.e., for a spiteful, malignant purpose unrelated to the legitimate corporate interest”); Boothby, supra at 487 (same, citing Wright and Gram); King v. Driscoll, 418 Mass. 576, 581 (1994) (King) (same, citing Wright, Boothby, and Gram); Shea, supra at 764 (where plaintiff employee complained that supervisor interfered with employment relationship, “[t]he improper motive or means required [to be proved] is ‘actual malice.’ . . . any ‘spiteful, malignant purpose, unrelated to the legitimat

2009See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967) (applying the New York Times rule to public figures); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (applying the New York Times rule to limited purpose public figures); accord Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass. 42, 48 (2007).

1995See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974).

2008“Reckless disregard” requires “sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.” Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 867 (1975).

1996See Stone, 367 Mass. at 867-68 (fact that information available would cause a reasonably prudent person to entertain serious doubts is insufficient to prove reckless disregard; rather, must be shown that such doubts were in fact entertained by the defendant).

1999See Commonwealth v. Jenks, 426 Mass. 582, 585 (1998); Commonwealth v. Diaz, 426 Mass. 548, 553 (1998); Commonwealth v. Judge, 420 Mass. 433, 441 (1995).

1998See Commonwealth v. Diaz, 426 Mass. 548, 552-554 (1998); Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 426 Mass. 67, 75 (1997); Commonwealth v. Richardson, supra at 768 .

1995Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, supra at 65.

1982Those policies were summed up by the Supreme Court in Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 58 (1966): “Labor disputes are ordinarily heated affairs; the language that is commonplace there might well be deemed actionable per se in some state jurisdictions.

2023This malice requirement is just as applicable to the crime of attempted arson under § 5A, as that offense "is so closely related to arson that it is very unlikely that the Legislature intended the word to be used in a different sense." Lamothe, supra at 420 .

2000See Commonwealth v. Niziolek, supra. Second, she implied that the meaning of the malice element of arson is identical to the ordinary meaning of the word “malice.” See Commonwealth v. Lamothe, 343 Mass. 417, 419 (1961), quoting State v. Pisano, 107 Conn. 630, 632 (1928); Commonwealth v. York, supra. Third, she described malice as “used in the sense of improper, selfish motive,” rather than “wrong and unlawful motive or purpose.” Fourth, she used the phrase “legal justification” instead of “legal [or lawful] excuse.” 5 The malice instruction was erroneous.

2007See, e.g., United, Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 406 Mass. 811, 816 (1990) (in commercial context, liability may arise from improper motives or improper means); Draghetti v. Chmielewski, 416 Mass. 808 , 816 n.ll (1994) (where plaintiff’s supervisor caused third party organization to fire plaintiff from his second job, proof of either improper motive or means adequate).

2001See id. at 664; King v. Driscoll, 418 Mass. 576, 587 (1994), S.C., 424 Mass. 1 (1996); Draghetti v. Chmielewski, 416 Mass. 808, 816-817 (1994).

2007We have not applied the actual malice standard to motive and means separately. 18 Rather, when applying the actual malice standard, we have engaged in a single analysis of the entirety of the defendant’s relevant conduct. 19 “Improper motive” and “improper means” become subsumed into the more stringent analysis implied by “actual malice.” See, e.g., Boothby, supra at 487 (defining “actual malice” as “spiteful, malignant purpose” without separate mention of mo- live or means).

2005The individual defendant’s behavior “must rise to the level of personal hostility or ill-will to satisfy the malice standard.” Id. at 783 .

1998Rather than offer any counterarguments against defendant’s contention that the actual malice standard applies, plaintiff asserts that defendant’s introduction of this issue raises a determination of defendant’s state of mind and “is the disputed issue of material fact on which this cases rises or falls.” Where there is such an issue of disputed fact, summary judgment may be inappropriate, Godbout v. Cousens, 396 Mass. 254, 258 , 485 N.E.2d 940 (1985), citing Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120, n.9 , 99 S.Ct. 2675 , 2680 n.9, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979), but only if there is some indication be

1998Rather than offer any counterarguments against defendant’s contention that the actual malice standard applies, plaintiff asserts that defendant’s introduction of this issue raises a determination of defendant’s state of mind and “is the disputed issue of material fact on which this cases rises or falls.” Where there is such an issue of disputed fact, summary judgment may be inappropriate, Godbout v. Cousens, 396 Mass. 254, 258 , 485 N.E.2d 940 (1985), citing Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120, n.9 , 99 S.Ct. 2675 , 2680 n.9, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979), but only if there is some indication be

1995The Supreme Court of the United States has used the actual malice standard in free speech cases involving unions because “federal policies favor [ ] uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate in labor disputes.” Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 273 (1974) (Letter Carriers).

1995See Letter Carriers, supra at 278-279. 6 Instead, the Supreme Court reasoned that “application [of the actual malice standard] of Linn [v. United Plant Guard Workers] must turn on whether the defamatory publication is made in a context where the policies of the federal labor laws leading to protection for freedom of speech are significantly implicated.” Letter Carriers, supra at 279.

2025Ctr., 59 Mass. App. Ct. 550, 554 (2003); accord Weber v. Community Teamwork, Inc., 434 Mass. 761, 783 (2001) (“behavior must rise to the level of personal hostility or ill-will to satisfy the actual malice standard”). “[T]he ‘actual malice’ standard for proving improper motive or means on the part of a corporate official is a heightened burden placed on the plaintiff, not a defense that must be proved by a defendant.” Blackstone, 448 Mass. at 261 n.10.

2023See Mehales, 284 Mass. at 415 (malice for purposes of § 5A is "all acts done with an evil disposition, a wrong and unlawful motive or purpose; the wilful doing of an injurious act without lawful excuse" [citation omitted]).

2018See Wade , 428 Mass. at 153 , 697 N.E.2d 541 .

2018See Wade , 428 Mass. at 153 , 697 N.E.2d 541 .

2013See Commonwealth v. Williams, 439 Mass. 678, 682 (2003).

2013In Vascular Solutions, Inc. v. Marine Polymer Techs., Inc., 590 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (per curiam), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted that “neither the Supreme Court nor this one has decided whether the First Amendment [to the United States Constitution] requires in product disparagement actions the actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, [ 376 U.S. 254, 279-280 (1964)].” The court pointed out that “[w]hether Massachusetts courts might independently read such a requirement into its common law cause of action is also unclear.” Id.

2011In his decision, the trial judge misstated the actual malice standard. 41 The settlement agreement indicates by its terms and by the notarized signatures that Valenzano was a named party to it and signed it in his individual as well as his representative corporate capacities. 42 For this proposition, the judge cited Shafir v. Steele, 431 Mass. 365, 368-371 (2000).

2011Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434 Mass. 570, 588 (2001).

2009See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967) (applying the New York Times rule to public figures); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (applying the New York Times rule to limited purpose public figures); accord Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass. 42, 48 (2007).

2009See Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967) (applying the New York Times rule to public figures); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) (applying the New York Times rule to limited purpose public figures); accord Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass. 42, 48 (2007).

2007See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 668 (1989) (“it cannot be said that evidence concerning . . . care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry”).

2007See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 668 (1989) (“it cannot be said that evidence concerning . . . care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry”).