16 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Press, Inc. v. Verrangreen2 sentences2024See Press, Inc. v. Verran, 569 S.W.2d 435 , 441–42 (Tenn. 1978) (interpreting Article I, Section 19, of the Tennessee Constitution to require an actual malice standard).1 Private individuals, by contrast, need only show that allegedly false statements were made negligently to recover in a defamation action. 2024Instead, we stress that, in determining whether a defamation plaintiff is a limited- purpose public figure, a court should focus on “the nature and extent of [the] individual’s participation” in the controversy, Verran, 569 S.W.2d at 441 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 ), and consider whether the participation is of the sort that animates the United States Supreme Court’s rationale for adopting the actual malice standard for public figures—that is, that public figures are less deserving of recovery for defamatory falsehoods because they have “voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of | 3 | 3 |
Lewis v. NewsChannel 5 Network, L.P.green2 sentences2022Lewis v. NewsChannel 5 Network, L.P., 238 S.W.3d 270, 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Burke v. Sparta Newspapers, Inc., 592 S.W.3d 116 (Tenn. 2019); see also Hibdon v. Grabowski, 195 S.W.3d 48, 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (providing that the actual malice standard does not apply unless it is determined that the party alleging defamation is a public figure). 2022Lewis v. NewsChannel 5 Network, L.P., 238 S.W.3d 270, 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Burke v. Sparta Newspapers, Inc., 592 S.W.3d 116 (Tenn. 2019); see also Hibdon v. Grabowski, 195 S.W.3d 48, 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (providing that the actual malice standard does not apply unless it is determined that the party alleging defamation is a public figure). | 3 | 3 |
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughtongreen2 sentences2019See Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton , 491 U.S. 657 , 667 n.7, 109 S.Ct. 2678 , 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989) ("The phrase 'actual malice' is unfortunately confusing in that it has nothing to do with bad motive or ill will."); Crump v. P & C Food Markets, Inc. , 154 Vt. 284 , 576 A.2d 441 , 447 n.1 (1990) ("We note that much confusion has arisen over the terminology applied to the malice requirement in its various contexts: courts have used the term 'actual malice' in reference to both types of malice."); Ullrich v. New York Press Co. , 23 Misc. 168 , 171-72, 50 N.Y.S. 788 , 791 (Sup. Ct. 18 2019See Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton , 491 U.S. 657 , 667 n.7, 109 S.Ct. 2678 , 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989) ("The phrase 'actual malice' is unfortunately confusing in that it has nothing to do with bad motive or ill will."); Crump v. P & C Food Markets, Inc. , 154 Vt. 284 , 576 A.2d 441 , 447 n.1 (1990) ("We note that much confusion has arisen over the terminology applied to the malice requirement in its various contexts: courts have used the term 'actual malice' in reference to both types of malice."); Ullrich v. New York Press Co. , 23 Misc. 168 , 171-72, 50 N.Y.S. 788 , 791 (Sup. Ct. 18 | 3 | 3 |
Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.green2 sentences2001See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 , 95 S.Ct. 465 , 42 L.Ed. 2d 419 (1974). 2001See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 , 95 S.Ct. 465 , 42 L.Ed. 2d 419 (1974). | 2 | 2 |
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.green2 sentences2024Instead, we stress that, in determining whether a defamation plaintiff is a limited- purpose public figure, a court should focus on “the nature and extent of [the] individual’s participation” in the controversy, Verran, 569 S.W.2d at 441 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 ), and consider whether the participation is of the sort that animates the United States Supreme Court’s rationale for adopting the actual malice standard for public figures—that is, that public figures are less deserving of recovery for defamatory falsehoods because they have “voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of 2024Instead, we stress that, in determining whether a defamation plaintiff is a limited- purpose public figure, a court should focus on “the nature and extent of [the] individual’s participation” in the controversy, Verran, 569 S.W.2d at 441 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 ), and consider whether the participation is of the sort that animates the United States Supreme Court’s rationale for adopting the actual malice standard for public figures—that is, that public figures are less deserving of recovery for defamatory falsehoods because they have “voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of | 1 | 5 |
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Buttsgreen1 sentence2024See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 , 342–43 (1974); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
Hibdon v. Grabowskigreen2 sentences2022Lewis v. NewsChannel 5 Network, L.P., 238 S.W.3d 270, 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Burke v. Sparta Newspapers, Inc., 592 S.W.3d 116 (Tenn. 2019); see also Hibdon v. Grabowski, 195 S.W.3d 48, 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (providing that the actual malice standard does not apply unless it is determined that the party alleging defamation is a public figure). 2022Lewis v. NewsChannel 5 Network, L.P., 238 S.W.3d 270, 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Burke v. Sparta Newspapers, Inc., 592 S.W.3d 116 (Tenn. 2019); see also Hibdon v. Grabowski, 195 S.W.3d 48, 58 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (providing that the actual malice standard does not apply unless it is determined that the party alleging defamation is a public figure). | 1 | 1 |
Tomlinson v. Kelleygreen1 sentence2021Tomlinson, 969 S.W.2d at 406 (involving the actual malice standard, which must be shown with “convincing clarity” rather than by a preponderance 9 In cases where the plaintiff is a public figure, mere negligence is not sufficient to impose liability. | 1 | 1 |
Campbell v. Robinsongreen1 sentence2020See Campbell v. Robinson, 955 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding, as a matter of first impression, that public school teachers are public officials).1 Third, Ms. Finney argues that the trial court improperly raised the publication issue after the Jeffersons did not raise it. | 1 | 1 |
Zoyle Jones v. State of Tennesseegreen1 sentence2020To prevail on a defamation claim where the actual malice standard applies, the plaintiff “must prove by clear and convincing evidence that [the] defendant acted with actual malice.” See Jones v. State, 426 S.W.3d 50, 57 (Tenn. 2013) (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86 ). | 1 | 1 |
Ullrich v. New York Press Co.green2 sentences2019See Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton , 491 U.S. 657 , 667 n.7, 109 S.Ct. 2678 , 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989) ("The phrase 'actual malice' is unfortunately confusing in that it has nothing to do with bad motive or ill will."); Crump v. P & C Food Markets, Inc. , 154 Vt. 284 , 576 A.2d 441 , 447 n.1 (1990) ("We note that much confusion has arisen over the terminology applied to the malice requirement in its various contexts: courts have used the term 'actual malice' in reference to both types of malice."); Ullrich v. New York Press Co. , 23 Misc. 168 , 171-72, 50 N.Y.S. 788 , 791 (Sup. Ct. 18 2019See Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton , 491 U.S. 657 , 667 n.7, 109 S.Ct. 2678 , 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989) ("The phrase 'actual malice' is unfortunately confusing in that it has nothing to do with bad motive or ill will."); Crump v. P & C Food Markets, Inc. , 154 Vt. 284 , 576 A.2d 441 , 447 n.1 (1990) ("We note that much confusion has arisen over the terminology applied to the malice requirement in its various contexts: courts have used the term 'actual malice' in reference to both types of malice."); Ullrich v. New York Press Co. , 23 Misc. 168 , 171-72, 50 N.Y.S. 788 , 791 (Sup. Ct. 18 | 1 | 1 |
Crump v. P & C Food Markets, Inc.green2 sentences2019See Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton , 491 U.S. 657 , 667 n.7, 109 S.Ct. 2678 , 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989) ("The phrase 'actual malice' is unfortunately confusing in that it has nothing to do with bad motive or ill will."); Crump v. P & C Food Markets, Inc. , 154 Vt. 284 , 576 A.2d 441 , 447 n.1 (1990) ("We note that much confusion has arisen over the terminology applied to the malice requirement in its various contexts: courts have used the term 'actual malice' in reference to both types of malice."); Ullrich v. New York Press Co. , 23 Misc. 168 , 171-72, 50 N.Y.S. 788 , 791 (Sup. Ct. 18 2019See Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton , 491 U.S. 657 , 667 n.7, 109 S.Ct. 2678 , 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989) ("The phrase 'actual malice' is unfortunately confusing in that it has nothing to do with bad motive or ill will."); Crump v. P & C Food Markets, Inc. , 154 Vt. 284 , 576 A.2d 441 , 447 n.1 (1990) ("We note that much confusion has arisen over the terminology applied to the malice requirement in its various contexts: courts have used the term 'actual malice' in reference to both types of malice."); Ullrich v. New York Press Co. , 23 Misc. 168 , 171-72, 50 N.Y.S. 788 , 791 (Sup. Ct. 18 | 1 | 1 |
Daniel B. Eisenstein v. WTVF-TV, News Channel 5 Network, LLCgreen1 sentence2018Mayor Lawson first contends that the trial court correctly dismissed this claim because the statement made by him “is not something that can be proven demonstrably false[.]” This Court has previously held however, that “[l]iteral truth is not . . . a defense in a false light claim[.]” Eisenstein v. WTVF-TV, News Channel 5 Network, LLC, 389 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.green2 sentences2007This is true at both the directed verdict and summary judgment stages.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). 10 Accordingly, where the actual malice standard applies, the “burden is upon plaintiff to show with ‘convincing clarity’ the facts which make up the ‘actual malice.’ ” Trigg v. Lakeway Publishers, Inc., 720 S.W.2d at 75 . 11 Thus, “a public figure cannot resist a ... motion for summary judgment under Tenn. R. 2007This is true at both the directed verdict and summary judgment stages.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). 10 Accordingly, where the actual malice standard applies, the “burden is upon plaintiff to show with ‘convincing clarity’ the facts which make up the ‘actual malice.’ ” Trigg v. Lakeway Publishers, Inc., 720 S.W.2d at 75 . 11 Thus, “a public figure cannot resist a ... motion for summary judgment under Tenn. R. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
West v. Media General Convergence, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 643–44.12 Where the claim involves either a public figure or a matter of public concern, the actual malice standard is applicable. 2007Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d at 647 . 35 Consciously departing from the Restatement which applies the actual malice standard to ah false hght claims, 36 the Tennessee Supreme Court excluded from this heightened standard “false hght claims brought by private plaintiffs about matters of private concern.” West v. Media Gen. | 4 | 2007–2022 |
Trigg v. Lakeway Publishers, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014Accordingly, where the actual malice standard applies, the “burden is upon plaintiff to show with ‘convincing clarity’ the facts which make up the ‘actual malice.’ ” Trigg v. Lakeway Publishers, Inc., 720 S.W.2d at 75 . 2012Accordingly, where the actual malice standard applies, the “burden is upon plaintiff to show with ‘convincing clarity’ the facts which make up the ‘actual malice.’” Trigg v. Lakeway Publishers, Inc., 720 S.W.2d at 75 . | 4 | 2007–2014 |
Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols
green
2 sentences2024Nichols, 569 S.W.2d at 417–18. 2001In Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978), this Court adopted negligence as the standard for defamation claims asserted by private individuals about matters of private concern. | 3 | 2001–2024 |
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences2020To prevail on a defamation claim where the actual malice standard applies, the plaintiff “must prove by clear and convincing evidence that [the] defendant acted with actual malice.” See Jones v. State, 426 S.W.3d 50, 57 (Tenn. 2013) (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86 ). 2019Id. at 268 , 84 S.Ct. 710 (quoting Beauharnais v. Illinois , 343 U.S. 250 , 263 n.18, 72 S.Ct. 725 , 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952) ); see also Press, Inc. v. Verran , 569 S.W.2d 435 , 438-41 (Tenn. 1978) (providing a detailed history of United States Supreme Court opinions on this topic). | 3 | 2013–2020 |
Time, Inc. v. Hill
green
2 sentences2001In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 , 87 S.Ct 534 , 17 L.Ed. 2d 456 (1967), the Court extended the actual malice standard to alleged defamatory statements about matters of public interest.9 In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), the Court held that negligence is a sufficient constitutional standard for defamation claims asserted by a private individual about matters of private concern, but the Court has not yet decided which standard applies to false light claims. 2001In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 , 87 S.Ct 534 , 17 L.Ed. 2d 456 (1967), the Court extended the actual malice standard to alleged defamatory statements about matters of public interest.9 In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), the Court held that negligence is a sufficient constitutional standard for defamation claims asserted by a private individual about matters of private concern, but the Court has not yet decided which standard applies to false light claims. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Beauharnais v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2019Id. at 268 , 84 S.Ct. 710 (quoting Beauharnais v. Illinois , 343 U.S. 250 , 263 n.18, 72 S.Ct. 725 , 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952) ); see also Press, Inc. v. Verran , 569 S.W.2d 435 , 438-41 (Tenn. 1978) (providing a detailed history of United States Supreme Court opinions on this topic). 2019Id. at 268 , 84 S.Ct. 710 (quoting Beauharnais v. Illinois , 343 U.S. 250 , 263 n.18, 72 S.Ct. 725 , 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952) ); see also Press, Inc. v. Verran , 569 S.W.2d 435 , 438-41 (Tenn. 1978) (providing a detailed history of United States Supreme Court opinions on this topic). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.