malice standard in Texas

2025“The actual malice standard requires that a defendant have, subjectively, significant doubt about the truth of his statements at the time they are made.” Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 596 (Tex. 2002).

2023“The actual malice standard requires that a defendant have, subjectively, - 25 - 04-21-00582-CV significant doubt about the truth of his statements at the time they are made.” Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 596 (Tex. 2002).

2013Huckabee, 19 S.W.3d at 420 . 21 The actual malice standard serves to protect innocent, but erroneous, speech on public issues, while deterring “calculated falsehoods.” Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 120 .

2011In defamation suits involving public figures, the actual malice standard serves to protect innocent but erroneous speech on public issues, while deterring "calculated falsehoods.” Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 120 (Tex.2000). 6 .

2015First, while correctly stating the actual malice standard announced in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the court actually applied a less severe [*664] standard that merely required a showing of ″’highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.’″ 842 F. 2d, at 845 (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S., at 155 (opinion of Harlan, J.)).

2007The actual malice standard’s purpose is to protect innocent but erroneous speech on public issues, while deterring “calculated falsehoods.” Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 120 (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 , 85 S.Ct. 209, 216 , 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964)); see also New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270 , 84 S.Ct. at 721 (stating that defamation cases must be considered “against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp at

2015Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S., at 510-511 .This rule is not simply premised on common-law [**2695] tradition, 33 but on the [*686] unique character of the interest protected by the actual malice standard.

2015Uncertainty as to the scope of the constitutional protection can only dissuade protected speech -- the more elusive the standard, the less protection it 33 The following cases are illustrative of this tradition: Bose, 466 U.S., at 510-511 (actual malice); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (obscenity); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-109 (1973) (per curiam) (incitement); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) (obscenity); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971) (actual malice); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970) (defamation);

2020Campbell v. Clark, 471 S.W.3d 615, 629 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.). –5– “The actual malice inquiry focuses on the defendant’s state of mind at the time of publication.” Forbes Inc., 124 S.W.3d at 173 .

2018The actual malice standard for both torts is that same, i.e., the plaintiff must establish the defendant made the statement or statements at issue “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or not.” Id. at 171 . - 20 - Concurring and Dissenting Opinion 04-17-00160-CV preponderance of the evidence.

2008See New Times, 146 S.W.3d at 162 ; Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 591 . 21 .

2008See New Times , 146 S.W.3d at 162 ; Bentley , 94 S.W.3d at 591 . 21: In paragraph three of the Clark Memorandum, Clark qualifies his accusation that the staff of Congressman Sessions’s Athens office have ties to the Ku Klux Klan with the statement–“there is a perception on the part of these citizens that . . . .” This qualification indicates Clark at least considered the need to qualify certain language in the Memorandum and either believed additional qualification was unnecessary or chose not to qualify other statements. 22: Regardless whether the jury found Joe’s testimony related to the cov

2007The purpose of the actual malice standard is to protect innocent but erroneous speech on public issues, while deterring “calculated falsehoods.” See Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 120 , citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 , 85 S.Ct. 209 , 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964).

2007The purpose of the actual malice standard is to protect innocent but erroneous speech on public issues, while deterring “calculated falsehoods.” See Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 120 , citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 , 85 S.Ct. 209 , 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964).

2015Moreover, [***576] just four years later, Justice Harlan acquiesced in application of the actual malice standard in public figure cases, see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 69-70 (1971) (dissenting opinion), and by the time of the Court’s decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court was apparently unanimously of this view.

2013Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). 9 The majority of states have adopted a negligence standard for private figures, while Alaska, Colorado, Indiana, and New Jersey have adopted the actual malice standard for private figures. 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA , LAW OF DEFAMATION § 3:31 (2d ed. 1991), cited in Kaitlin M.

2021See Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 593 ; McLemore, 978 S.W.2d at 571 .

1999WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex.1998).

2022But the legislature has decided that in certain classes of legal 16 In In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579, 589 (Tex. 2015), the Texas Supreme Court observed that the “[c]lear and specific evidence” standard used in TCPA dismissal motions is “not a recognized evidentiary standard,” and although similar in plain language to the “clear and convincing evidence” standard used at trial for defamation suits, “the phrases are not legally synonymous.” Id.; see also Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561 , 603–04 (Tex. 2002) (holding that because “the actual malice standard focuses on the defendant's state of mind

2021See Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 593 ; McLemore, 978 S.W.2d at 571 .

2015See id.

2014See id.

2007Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561, 596 (Tex.2002) (finding one of the defendants did not know or have reckless disregard he was communicating a falsehood); see Turner v. KTRK TV., Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 120 (Tex.2000); see also Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P. v. Penick, 219 S.W.3d 425 (Tex.App.-Austin 2007, pet. filed) (no evidence that appellants were or should have been aware that the omission would create a substantially false impression of the relevant events).

2007Bentley v. Bunton , 94 S.W.3d 561, 596 (Tex. 2002) (finding one of the defendants did not know or have reckless disregard he was communicating a falsehood); see Turner v. KTRK TV, Inc. , 38 S.W.3d 103, 120 (Tex. 2000); see also Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P. v. Penick , 219 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. App.--Austin 2007, pet. filed) (no evidence that appellants were or should have been aware that the omission would create a substantially false impression of the relevant events).

2015First, while correctly stating the actual malice standard announced in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the court actually applied a less severe [*664] standard that merely required a showing of ″’highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.’″ 842 F. 2d, at 845 (quoting Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S., at 155 (opinion of Harlan, J.)).

2015In place of the actual malice standard, Justice Harlan suggested that a public figure need only make ″a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.″ Id., at 155 .

2020Campbell v. Clark, 471 S.W.3d 615, 629 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.). –5– “The actual malice inquiry focuses on the defendant’s state of mind at the time of publication.” Forbes Inc., 124 S.W.3d at 173 .

2015Uncertainty as to the scope of the constitutional protection can only dissuade protected speech -- the more elusive the standard, the less protection it 33 The following cases are illustrative of this tradition: Bose, 466 U.S., at 510-511 (actual malice); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (obscenity); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-109 (1973) (per curiam) (incitement); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) (obscenity); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971) (actual malice); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970) (defamation);

2015Uncertainty as to the scope of the constitutional protection can only dissuade protected speech -- the more elusive the standard, the less protection it 33 The following cases are illustrative of this tradition: Bose, 466 U.S., at 510-511 (actual malice); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (obscenity); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-109 (1973) (per curiam) (incitement); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) (obscenity); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971) (actual malice); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970) (defamation);

2015Uncertainty as to the scope of the constitutional protection can only dissuade protected speech -- the more elusive the standard, the less protection it 33 The following cases are illustrative of this tradition: Bose, 466 U.S., at 510-511 (actual malice); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (obscenity); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-109 (1973) (per curiam) (incitement); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) (obscenity); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971) (actual malice); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970) (defamation);

2015Today, there is no question that public figure libel cases are controlled by the New York Times standard and not by the professional standards rule, which never commanded a majority of this Court. [4A]It also is worth emphasizing that the actual malice standard is not satisfied merely through a showing of ill will or ″malice″ in the ordinary sense of the term. 7 See Beckley [*667] Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967)(per curiam); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965)(per curiam).

2015Today, there is no question that public figure libel cases are controlled by the New York Times standard and not by the professional standards rule, which never commanded a majority of this Court. [4A]It also is worth emphasizing that the actual malice standard is not satisfied merely through a showing of ill will or ″malice″ in the ordinary sense of the term. 7 See Beckley [*667] Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967)(per curiam); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965)(per curiam).

2015Uncertainty as to the scope of the constitutional protection can only dissuade protected speech -- the more elusive the standard, the less protection it 33 The following cases are illustrative of this tradition: Bose, 466 U.S., at 510-511 (actual malice); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (obscenity); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-109 (1973) (per curiam) (incitement); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) (obscenity); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971) (actual malice); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970) (defamation);

2015See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160-177 (1979).

2015If the defendant were required to wait until final judgment to appeal the denial of a meritorious anti-SLAPP motion, a decision by this court reversing the district 14 In addition, Appellee cites to Herbert v. Lando. 441 U.S. 153 ( 1979) improperly claiming that it stands for the proposition that a plaintiff ''must be given a right to discovery prior to dismissal of a defamation action if liability is governed by a malice standard." Appellee's Motion, p. 7.

2015Moreover, [***576] just four years later, Justice Harlan acquiesced in application of the actual malice standard in public figure cases, see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 69-70 (1971) (dissenting opinion), and by the time of the Court’s decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court was apparently unanimously of this view.

2015Uncertainty as to the scope of the constitutional protection can only dissuade protected speech -- the more elusive the standard, the less protection it 33 The following cases are illustrative of this tradition: Bose, 466 U.S., at 510-511 (actual malice); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974) (obscenity); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-109 (1973) (per curiam) (incitement); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973) (obscenity); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971) (actual malice); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970) (defamation);