18 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Journal-Gazette Co. v. Bandido's, Inc.green2 sentences2013Therefore, State Farm’s argument continues, because Benz and Cockerill were the only “speakers,” “the actual malice inquiry necessarily focuses solely on their state of mind.” Id. (emphasis added). 2006(App.30.) Substantively, Indiana Code Seetion 34-7-7-9 does not supplant the Indiana common law of defamation, but provides that the movant must establish that his or her speech was "lawful." Ind. Code § 34-7-7-9 (d). 3 To establish a claim of defamation, a plaintiff must prove the existence of "'a communication with defamatory imputation, malice, publication, and damages"" Trail v. Boys and Girls Clubs of Northwest Ind., 845 N.E.2d 130, 135 (Ind., 2006) (quoting Davidson v. Perron, 716 N.E.2d 29, 37 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trams. demied ). "[The actual malice standard of proof required in defamati | 3 | 4 |
Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc.green2 sentences2002See also Journal-Gazette Co., Inc. v. Bandido’s, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 452 (Ind.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1005 , 120 S.Ct. 499 , 145 L.Ed.2d 385 (1999) (expressly adopting Aafco Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind.App. 671 , 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, which applied the actual malice standard for both public and private individuals). 2002See also Journal-Gazette Co., Inc. v. Bandido’s, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 452 (Ind.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1005 , 120 S.Ct. 499 , 145 L.Ed.2d 385 (1999) (expressly adopting Aafco Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind.App. 671 , 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, which applied the actual malice standard for both public and private individuals). | 3 | 4 |
Bandido's, Inc. v. Journal-Gazette Co.green2 sentences2006(App.30.) Substantively, Indiana Code Seetion 34-7-7-9 does not supplant the Indiana common law of defamation, but provides that the movant must establish that his or her speech was "lawful." Ind. Code § 34-7-7-9 (d). 3 To establish a claim of defamation, a plaintiff must prove the existence of "'a communication with defamatory imputation, malice, publication, and damages"" Trail v. Boys and Girls Clubs of Northwest Ind., 845 N.E.2d 130, 135 (Ind., 2006) (quoting Davidson v. Perron, 716 N.E.2d 29, 37 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trams. demied ). "[The actual malice standard of proof required in defamati 2002See also Journal-Gazette Co., Inc. v. Bandido’s, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 452 (Ind.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1005 , 120 S.Ct. 499 , 145 L.Ed.2d 385 (1999) (expressly adopting Aafco Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind.App. 671 , 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, which applied the actual malice standard for both public and private individuals). | 1 | 2 |
Janice Brandom v. Coupled Products, LLCgreen2 sentences2017Brandom, 975 N.E.2d at 390 (internal citations omitted). [16] First we will consider these issues with respect to 401. 2017Brandom, 975 N.E.2d at 390 (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Shepard v. Schurz Communications, Inc.green2 sentences2012(Appellant’s Br. at 14) (citing Shepard v. Schurz Communications, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 219, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), which applied an actual malice standard in an anti-SLAPP case). 2012(Appellant’s Br. at 14) (citing Shepard v. Schurz Communications, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 219, 224 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), which applied an actual malice standard in an anti-SLAPP case). | 1 | 1 |
Eddie Trail and Katrinka Trail v. Boys and Girls Clubs of Northwest Indianagreen1 sentence2006(App.30.) Substantively, Indiana Code Seetion 34-7-7-9 does not supplant the Indiana common law of defamation, but provides that the movant must establish that his or her speech was "lawful." Ind. Code § 34-7-7-9 (d). 3 To establish a claim of defamation, a plaintiff must prove the existence of "'a communication with defamatory imputation, malice, publication, and damages"" Trail v. Boys and Girls Clubs of Northwest Ind., 845 N.E.2d 130, 135 (Ind., 2006) (quoting Davidson v. Perron, 716 N.E.2d 29, 37 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trams. demied ). "[The actual malice standard of proof required in defamati | 1 | 1 |
Davidson v. Perrongreen1 sentence2006(App.30.) Substantively, Indiana Code Seetion 34-7-7-9 does not supplant the Indiana common law of defamation, but provides that the movant must establish that his or her speech was "lawful." Ind. Code § 34-7-7-9 (d). 3 To establish a claim of defamation, a plaintiff must prove the existence of "'a communication with defamatory imputation, malice, publication, and damages"" Trail v. Boys and Girls Clubs of Northwest Ind., 845 N.E.2d 130, 135 (Ind., 2006) (quoting Davidson v. Perron, 716 N.E.2d 29, 37 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trams. demied ). "[The actual malice standard of proof required in defamati | 1 | 1 |
State v. Defleygreen2 sentences2002See State v. Defley, 395 So.2d 759, 761 (La.1981) (school supervisor is a public official); Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md.App. 514 , 343 A.2d 251, 258 (1975) (principal sued for defamation to recover for injury to his reputation due to alleged libelous newspaper article in which he was rated "unsuitable" for his position); Andreucci v. Foresteire, 1998 WL 1184151 , *4 (Mass.Dist.Ct.1998) (retired principal sued school superintendent for allegedly defamatory statements regarding his conduct as principal made by the superinien-dent and published in a newspaper article); Jee v. New York Post Co., Inc., 2002See State v. Defley, 395 So.2d 759, 761 (La.1981) (school supervisor is a public official); Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md.App. 514 , 343 A.2d 251, 258 (1975) (principal sued for defamation to recover for injury to his reputation due to alleged libelous newspaper article in which he was rated "unsuitable" for his position); Andreucci v. Foresteire, 1998 WL 1184151 , *4 (Mass.Dist.Ct.1998) (retired principal sued school superintendent for allegedly defamatory statements regarding his conduct as principal made by the superintendent and published in a newspaper article); Jee v. New York Post Co., Inc., | 1 | 1 |
Jee v. New York Post Co.green2 sentences2002See State v. Defley, 395 So.2d 759, 761 (La.1981) (school supervisor is a public official); Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md.App. 514 , 343 A.2d 251, 258 (1975) (principal sued for defamation to recover for injury to his reputation due to alleged libelous newspaper article in which he was rated "unsuitable" for his position); Andreucci v. Foresteire, 1998 WL 1184151 , *4 (Mass.Dist.Ct.1998) (retired principal sued school superintendent for allegedly defamatory statements regarding his conduct as principal made by the superinien-dent and published in a newspaper article); Jee v. New York Post Co., Inc., 2002See State v. Defley, 395 So.2d 759, 761 (La.1981) (school supervisor is a public official); Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md.App. 514 , 343 A.2d 251, 258 (1975) (principal sued for defamation to recover for injury to his reputation due to alleged libelous newspaper article in which he was rated "unsuitable" for his position); Andreucci v. Foresteire, 1998 WL 1184151 , *4 (Mass.Dist.Ct.1998) (retired principal sued school superintendent for allegedly defamatory statements regarding his conduct as principal made by the superinien-dent and published in a newspaper article); Jee v. New York Post Co., Inc., | 1 | 1 |
Palmer v. Bennington School District, Inc.green2 sentences2002See State v. Defley, 395 So.2d 759, 761 (La.1981) (school supervisor is a public official); Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md.App. 514 , 343 A.2d 251, 258 (1975) (principal sued for defamation to recover for injury to his reputation due to alleged libelous newspaper article in which he was rated "unsuitable" for his position); Andreucci v. Foresteire, 1998 WL 1184151 , *4 (Mass.Dist.Ct.1998) (retired principal sued school superintendent for allegedly defamatory statements regarding his conduct as principal made by the superinien-dent and published in a newspaper article); Jee v. New York Post Co., Inc., 2002See State v. Defley, 395 So.2d 759, 761 (La.1981) (school supervisor is a public official); Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md.App. 514 , 343 A.2d 251, 258 (1975) (principal sued for defamation to recover for injury to his reputation due to alleged libelous newspaper article in which he was rated "unsuitable" for his position); Andreucci v. Foresteire, 1998 WL 1184151 , *4 (Mass.Dist.Ct.1998) (retired principal sued school superintendent for allegedly defamatory statements regarding his conduct as principal made by the superinien-dent and published in a newspaper article); Jee v. New York Post Co., Inc., | 1 | 1 |
Burko v. Stategreen2 sentences2002See State v. Defley, 395 So.2d 759, 761 (La.1981) (school supervisor is a public official); Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md.App. 514 , 343 A.2d 251, 258 (1975) (principal sued for defamation to recover for injury to his reputation due to alleged libelous newspaper article in which he was rated "unsuitable" for his position); Andreucci v. Foresteire, 1998 WL 1184151 , *4 (Mass.Dist.Ct.1998) (retired principal sued school superintendent for allegedly defamatory statements regarding his conduct as principal made by the superinien-dent and published in a newspaper article); Jee v. New York Post Co., Inc., 2002See State v. Defley, 395 So.2d 759, 761 (La.1981) (school supervisor is a public official); Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md.App. 514 , 343 A.2d 251, 258 (1975) (principal sued for defamation to recover for injury to his reputation due to alleged libelous newspaper article in which he was rated "unsuitable" for his position); Andreucci v. Foresteire, 1998 WL 1184151 , *4 (Mass.Dist.Ct.1998) (retired principal sued school superintendent for allegedly defamatory statements regarding his conduct as principal made by the superintendent and published in a newspaper article); Jee v. New York Post Co., Inc., | 1 | 1 |
Gazette, Inc. v. Harrisgreen2 sentences1999I, sec. 12) 29 recognize[s] the interest of the individual in the protection of his reputation, for [it] provide[s] that the exercise of the right to speak freely shall not relieve the speaker from responsibility for his abuse of that right” and adopting the negligence standard rather than the actual malice standard in private defamation actions against media defendants); Jones v. Palmer Communications, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 884, 898 (Iowa 1989) (construing Article I, Section 7 of the Iowa Constitution 30 to require the adoption of a negligence standard for private plaintiffs in defamation actions) 1999I, sec. 12) 29 recognize[s] the interest of the individual in the protection of his reputation, for [it] provide[s] that the exercise of the right to speak freely shall not relieve the speaker from responsibility for his abuse of that right” and adopting the negligence standard rather than the actual malice standard in private defamation actions against media defendants); Jones v. Palmer Communications, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 884, 898 (Iowa 1989) (construing Article I, Section 7 of the Iowa Constitution 30 to require the adoption of a negligence standard for private plaintiffs in defamation actions) | 1 | 1 |
Denny v. Mertzgreen2 sentences1999I, sec. 12) 29 recognize[s] the interest of the individual in the protection of his reputation, for [it] provide[s] that the exercise of the right to speak freely shall not relieve the speaker from responsibility for his abuse of that right” and adopting the negligence standard rather than the actual malice standard in private defamation actions against media defendants); Jones v. Palmer Communications, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 884, 898 (Iowa 1989) (construing Article I, Section 7 of the Iowa Constitution 30 to require the adoption of a negligence standard for private plaintiffs in defamation actions) 1999I, sec. 12) 29 recognize[s] the interest of the individual in the protection of his reputation, for [it] provide[s] that the exercise of the right to speak freely shall not relieve the speaker from responsibility for his abuse of that right” and adopting the negligence standard rather than the actual malice standard in private defamation actions against media defendants); Jones v. Palmer Communications, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 884, 898 (Iowa 1989) (construing Article I, Section 7 of the Iowa Constitution 30 to require the adoption of a negligence standard for private plaintiffs in defamation actions) | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. PALMER COMMUNICATIONS, INCORPORATEDgreen2 sentences1999I, sec. 12) [29] recognize[s] the interest of the individual in the protection of his reputation, for [it] provide[s] that the exercise of the right to speak freely shall not relieve the speaker from responsibility for his abuse of that right" and adopting the negligence standard rather than the actual malice standard in private defamation actions against media defendants); Jones v. Palmer Communications, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 884, 898 (Iowa 1989) (construing Article I, Section 7 of the Iowa Constitution [30] to require the adoption of a negligence standard for private plaintiffs in defamation acti 1999I, sec. 12) 29 recognize[s] the interest of the individual in the protection of his reputation, for [it] provide[s] that the exercise of the right to speak freely shall not relieve the speaker from responsibility for his abuse of that right” and adopting the negligence standard rather than the actual malice standard in private defamation actions against media defendants); Jones v. Palmer Communications, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 884, 898 (Iowa 1989) (construing Article I, Section 7 of the Iowa Constitution 30 to require the adoption of a negligence standard for private plaintiffs in defamation actions) | 1 | 1 |
Patten v. Smithgreen2 sentences1996I further expressed my disagreement with the application of the actual malice standard to private libel plaintiffs, as opposed to a negligence standard, in Patten v. Smith, 172 Ind.App. 300 , 360 N.E.2d 233, 238 (1977) (Garrard, J., concurring in result with opinion in which Hoffman, J., concurred). 1996I further expressed my disagreement with the application of the actual malice standard to private libel plaintiffs, as opposed to a negligence standard, in Patten v. Smith, 172 Ind.App. 300 , 360 N.E.2d 233, 238 (1977) (Garrard, J., concurring in result with opinion in which Hoffman, J., concurred). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton
green
2 sentences2013Nevertheless, “it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry.” Id. 1996However, "it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry." Id. at *973 667, 109 S.Ct. at 2686 . | 3 | 1991–2013 |
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences2011The actual malice standard thus protects those negligent or careless false statements of fact that are inevitable in free debate, as is required by the Constitution. 13 See id. at 292 n. 30, 84 S.Ct. 710 . 2011The actual malice standard thus protects those negligent or careless false statements of fact that are inevitable in free debate, as is required by the Constitution. 13 See id. at 292 n. 30, 84 S.Ct. 710 . | 2 | 2011–2013 |
Haggerty v. City of Mountain View
green
2 sentences2006(App.30.) Substantively, Indiana Code Seetion 34-7-7-9 does not supplant the Indiana common law of defamation, but provides that the movant must establish that his or her speech was "lawful." Ind. Code § 34-7-7-9 (d). 3 To establish a claim of defamation, a plaintiff must prove the existence of "'a communication with defamatory imputation, malice, publication, and damages"" Trail v. Boys and Girls Clubs of Northwest Ind., 845 N.E.2d 130, 135 (Ind., 2006) (quoting Davidson v. Perron, 716 N.E.2d 29, 37 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trams. demied ). "[The actual malice standard of proof required in defamati 2002See also Journal-Gazette Co., Inc. v. Bandido’s, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 452 (Ind.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1005 , 120 S.Ct. 499 , 145 L.Ed.2d 385 (1999) (expressly adopting Aafco Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind.App. 671 , 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, which applied the actual malice standard for both public and private individuals). | 2 | 2002–2006 |
Roe v. Carter
green
2 sentences2006(App.30.) Substantively, Indiana Code Seetion 34-7-7-9 does not supplant the Indiana common law of defamation, but provides that the movant must establish that his or her speech was "lawful." Ind. Code § 34-7-7-9 (d). 3 To establish a claim of defamation, a plaintiff must prove the existence of "'a communication with defamatory imputation, malice, publication, and damages"" Trail v. Boys and Girls Clubs of Northwest Ind., 845 N.E.2d 130, 135 (Ind., 2006) (quoting Davidson v. Perron, 716 N.E.2d 29, 37 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trams. demied ). "[The actual malice standard of proof required in defamati 2002See also Journal-Gazette Co., Inc. v. Bandido’s, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 452 (Ind.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1005 , 120 S.Ct. 499 , 145 L.Ed.2d 385 (1999) (expressly adopting Aafco Heating and Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind.App. 671 , 321 N.E.2d 580 (1974), cert. denied, which applied the actual malice standard for both public and private individuals). | 2 | 2002–2006 |
Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc.
green
2 sentences2006This is so because, "in most instances, there is little disparity in the ability of private versus public individuals to obtain access 'to the channels of effective communication in order to 'counteract false statements'" and because " '[al citizen ... assume{s] the risk of media comment when he becomes involved ... in a matter of general or public interest.?" Id. at 452-58 (quoting Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publ'ns, Inc., 162 Ind.App. 671, 682 , 321 N.E.2d 580, 588 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 , 96 S.Ct. 1112 , 47 L.Ed.2d 318 (1976)). 1996Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind.App. 671 , 321 N.E.2d 580, 586 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 , 96 S.Ct. 1112 , 47 L.Ed.2d 318 (1975). 3 The case before us previously came up on appeal from summary judgment granted in favor of the Journal. | 2 | 1996–2006 |
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999The Gertz Court also described all purpose public figures as those who "invite attention and comment,’’ id. at 345 , 94 S.Ct. at 3009 , 41 L.Ed.2d at 808 , and who “assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions," id. at 351 , 94 S.Ct. at 3013 , 41 L.Ed.2d at 812 , and as public figures "for all purposes and in all contexts” because those "individual[s] ... achieve ... pervasive fame or notoriety [in the community],” id. .Similarly, Professor Smolla has also provided' the following commentary regarding the implications of Dun & Bradstreet when the plaintiffs are public officia 1999The Gertz Court also described all purpose public figures as those who "invite attention and comment,’’ id. at 345 , 94 S.Ct. at 3009 , 41 L.Ed.2d at 808 , and who “assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions," id. at 351 , 94 S.Ct. at 3013 , 41 L.Ed.2d at 812 , and as public figures "for all purposes and in all contexts” because those "individual[s] ... achieve ... pervasive fame or notoriety [in the community],” id. .Similarly, Professor Smolla has also provided' the following commentary regarding the implications of Dun & Bradstreet when the plaintiffs are public officia | 2 | 1991–1999 |
St. Amant v. Thompson
green
2 sentences1977Amant v. Thompson (1968), 390 U.S. 727 , 88 S.Ct. 1323 , 20 L.Ed.2d 262 , whose formulation of the malice test provides trial courts with a relatively clear guidance. 1977Amant v. Thompson (1968), 390 U.S. 727 , 88 S.Ct. 1323 , 20 L.Ed.2d 262 , whose formulation of the malice test provides trial courts with a relatively clear guidance. | 2 | 1974–1977 |
Daniel Brewington v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2015Bowers specifically contends that our Supreme Court’s decision in Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946 (Ind. 2014), compels us to reverse his conviction due to this instructional error because the allegations against him involve a public figure, the Magistrate, and involve threatened harm to the Magistrate’s credit or business reputation, which he claims is subject to the actual malice standard for speech about public officials. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Pickering v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty.
green
2 sentences2011In Pickering , the Court expressly declined to adopt the New York Times standard as the test to apply to government-employee speech on public matters because of the difficulty in applying a general standard to the “enormous variety of fact situations” in which public employees speak to the dismay of their employers. 391 U.S. at 569 , 88 S.Ct. 1731 . 2011In Pickering , the Court expressly declined to adopt the New York Times standard as the test to apply to government-employee speech on public matters because of the difficulty in applying a general standard to the “enormous variety of fact situations” in which public employees speak to the dismay of their employers. 391 U.S. at 569 , 88 S.Ct. 1731 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell
green
2 sentences2007Id. at 51-53, 56 , 108 S.Ct. 876 . 2007Id. at 51-53, 56 , 108 S.Ct. 876 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Williams v. United States
green
1 sentence2006This is so because, "in most instances, there is little disparity in the ability of private versus public individuals to obtain access 'to the channels of effective communication in order to 'counteract false statements'" and because " '[al citizen ... assume{s] the risk of media comment when he becomes involved ... in a matter of general or public interest.?" Id. at 452-58 (quoting Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publ'ns, Inc., 162 Ind.App. 671, 682 , 321 N.E.2d 580, 588 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918 , 96 S.Ct. 1112 , 47 L.Ed.2d 318 (1976)). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Kapiloff v. Dunn
green
2 sentences2002See State v. Defley, 395 So.2d 759, 761 (La.1981) (school supervisor is a public official); Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md.App. 514 , 343 A.2d 251, 258 (1975) (principal sued for defamation to recover for injury to his reputation due to alleged libelous newspaper article in which he was rated "unsuitable" for his position); Andreucci v. Foresteire, 1998 WL 1184151 , *4 (Mass.Dist.Ct.1998) (retired principal sued school superintendent for allegedly defamatory statements regarding his conduct as principal made by the superinien-dent and published in a newspaper article); Jee v. New York Post Co., Inc., 2002See State v. Defley, 395 So.2d 759, 761 (La.1981) (school supervisor is a public official); Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md.App. 514 , 343 A.2d 251, 258 (1975) (principal sued for defamation to recover for injury to his reputation due to alleged libelous newspaper article in which he was rated "unsuitable" for his position); Andreucci v. Foresteire, 1998 WL 1184151 , *4 (Mass.Dist.Ct.1998) (retired principal sued school superintendent for allegedly defamatory statements regarding his conduct as principal made by the superintendent and published in a newspaper article); Jee v. New York Post Co., Inc., | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Garrison v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1999The Gertz Court also described all purpose public figures as those who "invite attention and comment," id. at 345 , 94 S.Ct. at 3009 , 41 L.Ed.2d at 808 , and who "assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions," id. at 351 , 94 S.Ct. at 3013 , 41 L.Ed.2d at 812 , and as public figures "for all purposes and in all contexts" because those "individual[s] ... achieve ... pervasive fame or notoriety [in the community]," id. [6] Similarly, Professor Smolla has also provided the following commentary regarding the implications of Dun & Bradstreet when the plaintiffs are public offici 1999The Gertz Court also described all purpose public figures as those who "invite attention and comment,’’ id. at 345 , 94 S.Ct. at 3009 , 41 L.Ed.2d at 808 , and who “assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions," id. at 351 , 94 S.Ct. at 3013 , 41 L.Ed.2d at 812 , and as public figures "for all purposes and in all contexts” because those "individual[s] ... achieve ... pervasive fame or notoriety [in the community],” id. .Similarly, Professor Smolla has also provided' the following commentary regarding the implications of Dun & Bradstreet when the plaintiffs are public officia | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Sisler v. Gannett Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences1999Sisler v. Gannett Co., 104 N.J. 256 , 516 A.2d 1083 (1986). 1999Sisler v. Gannett Co., 104 N.J. 256 , 516 A.2d 1083 (1986). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Le Conté Cosmetics, Inc. v. J. B. Williams Co.
green
1 sentence1996Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind.App. 671 , 321 N.E.2d 580, 586 (1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 , 96 S.Ct. 1112 , 47 L.Ed.2d 318 (1975). 3 The case before us previously came up on appeal from summary judgment granted in favor of the Journal. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc. And Dan Jenkins green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Jack Wasserman v. Time, Inc green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Klinck v. . Colby neutral | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Rennert v. State green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Coombs v. Rose green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Harris v. State green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.