10 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughtongreen2 sentences2021See Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 667-68 ("Although courts must be careful not to place too much reliance on such factors, a plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant's state of mind through circumstantial evidence, and it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry." (citations omitted)). 1993Id. [4] The actual Harte-Hanks language to which Currier refers is this: "Although courts must be careful not to place too much reliance on such factors [as motive and professional standards of care], a plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant's state of mind through circumstantial evidence, and it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry." 491 U.S. at 668 , 109 S.Ct. at 2686 (citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Biro v. Condé Nastgreen1 sentence2022See, e.g., Biro v. Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that a plaintiff could allege malice if the defendant provides no source for defamatory statements, if the source is unreliable, or if there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of source’s information). ¶20 More importantly, the court did not find that the pleadings disproved Gitman’s defamation claim. | 1 | 1 |
Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyngreen1 sentence2008Cf. Tabrizi v. Village of Glen Ellyn, 684 F.Supp. 207, 209 (N.D.Ill.1988) (Rule 11 authorizes “sanctions based either on a subjective or an objective standard. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Brockgreen2 sentences1976Appellant cites State v. Brock, 101 Ariz. 168, 172 , 416 P.2d 601, 605 (1966) in support of his contention. 1976Appellant cites State v. Brock, 101 Ariz. 168, 172 , 416 P.2d 601, 605 (1966) in support of his contention. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences2025“The actual malice standard is reached when there is clear and convincing evidence that [a] defendant published either knowing that the [publication] 5 FINCHEM, et al. v. FERNANDEZ Decision of the Court was false and defamatory or that [they] published with ‘reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.’” Id. at 487 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 279–86 (1964)). ¶16 Because direct evidence of a defendant’s state of mind is rare, actual malice inquiries are fact dependent and regularly rely on circumstantial evidence. 2006In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 , 84 S.Ct. 710, 727 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), the Court mandated an actual malice standard for libel actions brought by public officials. | 3 | 1986–2025 |
Dombey v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.
green
2 sentences2025“The actual malice standard is reached when there is clear and convincing evidence that [a] defendant published either knowing that the [publication] 5 FINCHEM, et al. v. FERNANDEZ Decision of the Court was false and defamatory or that [they] published with ‘reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.’” Id. at 487 (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 279–86 (1964)). ¶16 Because direct evidence of a defendant’s state of mind is rare, actual malice inquiries are fact dependent and regularly rely on circumstantial evidence. 1988Our Supreme Court has commented that “conscious disregard” would better describe the actual malice test than "reckless diregard.” Dom-bey, 150 Ariz. at 487 , 724 P.2d at 573 . | 2 | 1988–2025 |
Rosenblatt v. Baer
green
1 sentence1993Id. [4] The actual Harte-Hanks language to which Currier refers is this: "Although courts must be careful not to place too much reliance on such factors [as motive and professional standards of care], a plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant's state of mind through circumstantial evidence, and it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry." 491 U.S. at 668 , 109 S.Ct. at 2686 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy
green
2 sentences1991The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the malice standard, "knowing or reckless disregard," is "not always easy of ascertainment." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 276 , 91 S.Ct. 621, 627 , 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1970). 1991The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the malice standard, "knowing or reckless disregard," is "not always easy of ascertainment." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 276 , 91 S.Ct. 621, 627 , 28 L.Ed.2d 35 (1970). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.