malice standard in Pennsylvania

2025This rule is premised on “the unique character of the interest protected by the actual malice standard.” Harte–Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685-86 , 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2695 , 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989).

2025This rule is premised on “the unique character of the interest protected by the actual malice standard.” Harte–Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685-86 , 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2695 , 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989).

2017Our High Court held in Joseph that a private-figure plaintiff in a libel case involving media defendants may only recover punitive damages upon satisfaction of the actual malice test enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964).

2017Our High Court held in Joseph that a private-figure plaintiff in a libel case involving media defendants may only recover punitive damages upon satisfaction of the actual malice test enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964).

1994Moreover, just four years later, Justice Harlan acquiesced in application of the actual malice standard in public figure cases, see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 69-70 [ 91 S.Ct. 1811, 1832-33 , 29 L.Ed.2d 296 ] (1971) (dissenting opinion), and by the time of the Court’s decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 [ 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 ] (1974), the Court was apparently unanimously of this view.

1994Moreover, just four years later, Justice Harlan acquiesced in application of the actual malice standard in public figure cases, see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 69-70 [ 91 S.Ct. 1811, 1832-33 , 29 L.Ed.2d 296 ] (1971) (dissenting opinion), and by the time of the Court’s decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 [ 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 ] (1974), the Court was apparently unanimously of this view.

2025Commonwealth v. Miller, 955 A.2d 419, 422 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citations omitted).

2016Commonwealth v. Miller, 955 A.2d 419, 422 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted).

2015See Norton v. Glenn, 860 A.2d 48, 56 (Pa. 2004) (concluding, “the U.S. Supreme Court has, pursuant to the actual malice standard, provided considerable protection to defendants in defamation actions filed by public (Footnote Continued Next Page) - 13 - J-A07037-15 In Appellant’s final issue on appeal, he suggests that the trial court should have disclosed to Appellant a “potential conflict” that would be material to Appellant in considering whether to file a motion for recusal.

2005Indeed, the actual malice standard “goes so far as to forbid imposition of liability even in those instances where the defendant negligently publishes false, defamatory statements about a public figure or public official.” Norton v. Glenn, 580 Pa. 212 , 860 A.2d 48, 56 (2004). ¶ 21 The actual malice standard “is a constitutionally mandated safeguard, and, as such, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, the highest standard of proof for civil claims.” Lewis, 833 A.2d at 192 .

2005The actual malice standard is “a rigorous, if not impossible, burden to meet in most circumstances.” See Weaver v. Lancaster Newspapers Inc., 875 A.2d 1093, 1103 (Pa.Super.2005) (McCaffery, J., concurring).

2005The actual malice standard is “a rigorous, if not impossible, burden to meet in most circumstances.” See Weaver v. Lancaster Newspapers Inc., 875 A.2d 1093, 1103 (Pa.Super.2005) (McCaffery, J., concurring).

2026Then, “[a]t the conclusion of the opinion, when issuing its holding, the Packer Court again repeated the malice standard as requiring a conscious disregard for the risks of conduct that ‘might cause a death or serious personal injury.’” Id., quoting Packer, 168 A.3d at 172 .

2026Then, “[a]t the conclusion of the opinion, when issuing its holding, the Packer Court again repeated the malice standard as requiring a conscious disregard for the risks of conduct that ‘might cause a death or serious personal injury.’” Id., quoting Packer, 168 A.3d at 172 .

2022See Kuwait & Gulf Link Transport Co. v. Doe, 216 A.3d 1074 , 1087 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2019) (rejecting claim that plaintiff in defamation cases did not have to show falsity where defendant was not part of the news media and concluding that “a plaintiff asserting defamation concerning a publication of a matter of ‘public concern’ bears the burden of proving that the publication was false”), appeal denied, 226 A.3d 92 (Pa. 2020).

2022See Kuwait & Gulf Link Transport Co. v. Doe, 216 A.3d 1074 , 1087 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2019) (rejecting claim that plaintiff in defamation cases did not have to show falsity where defendant was not part of the news media and concluding that “a plaintiff asserting defamation concerning a publication of a matter of ‘public concern’ bears the burden of proving that the publication was false”), appeal denied, 226 A.3d 92 (Pa. 2020).

2019“However, in some circumstances the malice requirement has been met, and this [C]ourt has not hesitated to uphold an aggravated assault or a third degree murder - 19 - J-E02008-18 charge depending on the particular facts of a motor vehicle crash.” Riggs, 63 A.3d at 785 (citation omitted).8 While the circumstances of most motor vehicle crashes cannot establish the malice required to sustain a third degree murder conviction, we note several exceptions in the case law.

2016This Court additionally concluded that “a motorist’s conduct is more egregious if he does not apply his [brakes] or attempt to slow down before a collision than if he attempts to flee.” Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 A.3d 780, 784-785 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted) (emphases added).

2005See Stickney v. Chester County Communications, Ltd., 361 Pa.Super. 166 , 522 A.2d 66 (1987) (holding that police officers are public officials for purposes of defamation).

2005See Stickney v. Chester County Communications, Ltd., 361 Pa.Super. 166 , 522 A.2d 66 (1987) (holding that police officers are public officials for purposes of defamation).

1994Moreover, just four years later, Justice Harlan acquiesced in application of the actual malice standard in public figure cases, see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 69-70 [ 91 S.Ct. 1811, 1832-33 , 29 L.Ed.2d 296 ] (1971) (dissenting opinion), and by the time of the Court’s decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 [ 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 ] (1974), the Court was apparently unanimously of this view.

1994Moreover, just four years later, Justice Harlan acquiesced in application of the actual malice standard in public figure cases, see Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 69-70 [ 91 S.Ct. 1811, 1832-33 , 29 L.Ed.2d 296 ] (1971) (dissenting opinion), and by the time of the Court’s decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 [ 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 ] (1974), the Court was apparently unanimously of this view.

2019Thus, the actual malice standard, by design, assures “that public debate will not suffer for lack of ‘imaginative expression’ or ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ which has traditionally added much to the discourse of this Nation.” Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 2 , 110 S.Ct. 2695 . “[T]he First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.” Thus, the “actual malice” standard is a constitutionally mandated safeguard and, as such, must be proven by clear and ____________________________________________ United States Constitution, a plaintiff asserting defamation concer

2019Thus, the actual malice standard, by design, assures “that public debate will not suffer for lack of ‘imaginative expression’ or ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ which has traditionally added much to the discourse of this Nation.” Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 2 , 110 S.Ct. 2695 . “[T]he First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.” Thus, the “actual malice” standard is a constitutionally mandated safeguard and, as such, must be proven by clear and ____________________________________________ United States Constitution, a plaintiff asserting defamation concer

2003Thus, the actual malice standard, by design, assures “that public debate will not suffer for lack of ‘imaginative expression’ or ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ which has traditionally added much to the discourse of this Nation.” Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 2 , 110 S.Ct. 2695 . “[T]he First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.” Hepps, 475 U.S. at 778 , 106 S.Ct. 1558 . *192 ¶ 13 Thus, the “actual malice” standard is a constitutionally mandated safeguard and, as such, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, the highest standard of proof for civil

2003Thus, the actual malice standard, by design, assures “that public debate will not suffer for lack of ‘imaginative expression’ or ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ which has traditionally added much to the discourse of this Nation.” Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 2 , 110 S.Ct. 2695 . “[T]he First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters.” Hepps, 475 U.S. at 778 , 106 S.Ct. 1558 . *192 ¶ 13 Thus, the “actual malice” standard is a constitutionally mandated safeguard and, as such, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, the highest standard of proof for civil

2024Our Supreme Court previously announced the requisite degree of malice and recklessness, described above, in O’ Hanlon, supra, and Commonwealth v. Comer, 716 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1998), and recently reaffirmed the standard in Packer, supra. In Packer, our Supreme Court addressed this “notice,” or “warning,”1 requirement of malice with respect to motor vehicle accidents, noting: ____________________________________________ 1 I use “notice” or “warning” as shorthand to refer to the malice standard which, as stated throughout this opinion, is met when a perpetrator consciously disregards an unjustified o

2024See Packer, supra; Comer, supra; O’ Hanlon, supra. Additionally, the two 911 reports of Peters’ driving are meaningless under the facts of this case.

2007If the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, see Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 , 87 S.Ct. 1975, 1996 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967) (extending the actual malice requirement to public figures who are not governmental officials), and the statement relates to a matter of public concern, then to satisfy First Amendment strictures the plaintiff must establish that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement with actual malice.

2007If the plaintiff is a public official or public figure, see Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 , 87 S.Ct. 1975, 1996 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967) (extending the actual malice requirement to public figures who are not governmental officials), and the statement relates to a matter of public concern, then to satisfy First Amendment strictures the plaintiff must establish that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement with actual malice.

2005Indeed, the actual malice standard “goes so far as to forbid imposition of liability even in those instances where the defendant negligently publishes false, defamatory statements about a public figure or public official.” Norton v. Glenn, 580 Pa. 212 , 860 A.2d 48, 56 (2004). ¶ 21 The actual malice standard “is a constitutionally mandated safeguard, and, as such, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, the highest standard of proof for civil claims.” Lewis, 833 A.2d at 192 .

2005Indeed, the actual malice standard "goes so far as to forbid imposition of liability even in those instances where the defendant negligently publishes false, defamatory statements about a public figure or public official." *1144 Norton v. Glenn, 580 Pa. 212 , 860 A.2d 48, 56 (2004). ¶ 21 The actual malice standard "is a constitutionally mandated safeguard, and, as such, must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, the highest standard of proof for civil claims." Lewis, 833 A.2d at 192 .

2026See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 739 A.2d 1023 (Pa. 1999).

2026Trial, 9/13/21, at 141. 25 The dissent below concluded “Peters’[s] decision to drive his vehicle instead of taking a train or taxi, and to use a highway rather than a local road, is of no moment” as “the mere decision to drive intoxicated does not satisfy the malice requirement.” Peters, 320 A.3d at 1252 (Lazarus, J., dissenting).

2025This, Appellant asserts, negates the inference of malice, citing Commonwealth v. Hetherington, 385 A.2d 338, 341 (Pa. 1978), which recognizes that provocation or evidence of self-defense can defeat the malice requirement.

2024See id. at 188-89 .

2024“A PCRA court passes on witness credibility at PCRA hearings, and its credibility determinations should be provided great deference by reviewing courts.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 539 (Pa. 2009).

2024“A PCRA court passes on witness credibility at PCRA hearings, and its credibility determinations should be provided great deference by reviewing courts.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523 , 539 (Pa. 2009).