malice standard in Maryland

2016Piscatelli, 424 Md. at 307-08 , 35 A.3d at 1148 (some 10 Seley-Radtke also directs our attention to a footnote in Chesapeake Publ’g Corp. v. Williams, 339 Md. 285 , 296 n.4, 661 A.2d 1169 , 1175 n.4 (1995), in which this Court stated that the actual malice standard necessary to overcome a common law conditional privilege was “the same standard as is required to prove defamation of a public figure, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.” We observe that a streamlining of the malice standard does not automatically equate with an adoption of the clear and convincing evidence st

2016Piscatelli, 424 Md. at 307-08 , 35 A.3d at 1148 (some 10 Seley-Radtke also directs our attention to a footnote in Chesapeake Publ’g Corp. v. Williams, 339 Md. 285 , 296 n.4, 661 A.2d 1169 , 1175 n.4 (1995), in which this Court stated that the actual malice standard necessary to overcome a common law conditional privilege was “the same standard as is required to prove defamation of a public figure, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.” We observe that a streamlining of the malice standard does not automatically equate with an adoption of the clear and convincing evidence st

2016F.S.B., 337 Md. 216 , 652 A.2d 1117 (1995)), and malice for proving abuse of defamation privileges.

2016F.S.B., 337 Md. 216 , 652 A.2d 1117 (1995)), and malice for proving abuse of defamation privileges.

2013Id. at 728-30 , 602 A.2d 1191 .

2013Id. at 728-30 , 602 A.2d 1191 .

2012Of importance here, in Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1 , 867 A.2d 276 (2005), the Court emphasized that, although an action for fraud may be sustained based upon a showing that a defendant made a false representation to the plaintiff and that the falsity of that statement was “either known to the defendant or that the representation was made with reckless indifference as to its truth,” an award of punitive damages premised on fraud requires a showing of “conscious and deliberate wrongdoing.” Id. at 41-42 , 867 A.2d 276 .

2012Of importance here, in Hoffman v. Stamper, 385 Md. 1 , 867 A.2d 276 (2005), the Court emphasized that, although an action for fraud may be sustained based upon a showing that a defendant made a false representation to the plaintiff and that the falsity of that statement was “either known to the defendant or that the representation was made with reckless indifference as to its truth,” an award of punitive damages premised on fraud requires a showing of “conscious and deliberate wrongdoing.” Id. at 41-42 , 867 A.2d 276 .

2002Under these circumstances, the acts would be unlawful and thus improper. 302 Md. at 74 , 485 A.2d 663 .

2002Under these circumstances, the acts would be unlawful and thus improper. 302 Md. at 74 , 485 A.2d 663 .

1997The actual malice standard was a result of the difficult struggle to “define the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment.” Hepps, 475 U.S. at 768 , 106 S.Ct. at 1559 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325 , 94 S.Ct. at 3000 ).

1997The actual malice standard was a result of the difficult struggle to “define the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment.” Hepps, 475 U.S. at 768 , 106 S.Ct. at 1559 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325 , 94 S.Ct. at 3000 ).

1997In a concurring opinion in Schaefer, supra, a medical malpractice action which upheld the reversal of a punitive damages award, 322 Md. 297 , 587 A.2d 491 (1991), Judges Eldridge, Cole, and Chasanow called upon this Court to abandon the distinction between torts arising out of a contractual relationship versus those that do not, otherwise known as the Testerman-Wedeman Rule, and to return to the actual malice standard announced in Davis, supra. In its reasoning, the concurrence pointed out that the Testerman-Wedeman Rule was (1) unsupported by Maryland authority, Schaefer, 322 Md. at 316-18 ,

1997In a concurring opinion in Schaefer, supra, a medical malpractice action which upheld the reversal of a punitive damages award, 322 Md. 297 , 587 A.2d 491 (1991), Judges Eldridge, Cole, and Chasanow called upon this Court to abandon the distinction between torts arising out of a contractual relationship versus those that do not, otherwise known as the Testerman-Wedeman Rule, and to return to the actual malice standard announced in Davis, supra. In its reasoning, the concurrence pointed out that the Testerman-Wedeman Rule was (1) unsupported by Maryland authority, Schaefer, 322 Md. at 316-18 ,

1997The actual malice standard was a result of the difficult struggle to “define the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment.” Hepps, 475 U.S. at 768 , 106 S.Ct. at 1559 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325 , 94 S.Ct. at 3000 ).

1997The actual malice standard was a result of the difficult struggle to “define the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment.” Hepps, 475 U.S. at 768 , 106 S.Ct. at 1559 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325 , 94 S.Ct. at 3000 ).

1993The actual malice test the majority adopts, and attributes to Davis , is conduct “characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, ill will or fraud.... ” 331 Md. at 729 , 629 A.2d at 726 .

1993The actual malice test the majority adopts, and attributes to Davis , is conduct “characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, ill will or fraud.... ” 331 Md. at 729 , 629 A.2d at 726 .

1985In General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627 , 381 A.2d 16 (1977), the appellant contended that the torts of assault and false imprisonment committed against appellee, their employee, arose out of their employment contract and, therefore, required a showing of actual malice as a prerequisite to recovering punitive damages.

1985In General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627 , 381 A.2d 16 (1977), the appellant contended that the torts of assault and false imprisonment committed against appellee, their employee, arose out of their employment contract and, therefore, required a showing of actual malice as a prerequisite to recovering punitive damages.

1984Although noting that there was a split of authority as to whether the privilege should be a qualified one defeasible upon a showing of malice, we, and ultimately the Court of Appeals, determined that “[t]he most recent, better reasoned cases hold the privilege to be absolute,” and thus rejected the malice standard. 53 Md.App. at 567 , 456 A.2d 59 .

1984Although noting that there was a split of authority as to whether the privilege should be a qualified one defeasible upon a showing of malice, we, and ultimately the Court of Appeals, determined that “[t]he most recent, better reasoned cases hold the privilege to be absolute,” and thus rejected the malice standard. 53 Md.App. at 567 , 456 A.2d 59 .

1978It points out that a plaintiff “in a malicious prosecution case, however, need only demonstrate a want of probable cause, i.e., that the defendant’s suspicion of the plaintiff’s guilt was merely unreasonable.” (Emphasis theirs.) From this the argument is constructed that “permitting punitive damage awards to be predicated upon ‘malice’ inferred from a want of probable cause [is] inconsistent with the malice standard set up by this Court for torts in general and, more importantly, inconsistent with this Court’s traditional rule that malicious prosecution suits are disfavored in the law.” The Ba

1978It points out that a plaintiff “in a malicious prosecution case, however, need only demonstrate a want of probable cause, i.e., that the defendant’s suspicion of the plaintiff’s guilt was merely unreasonable.” (Emphasis theirs.) From this the argument is constructed that “permitting punitive damage awards to be predicated upon ‘malice’ inferred from a want of probable cause [is] inconsistent with the malice standard set up by this Court for torts in general and, more importantly, inconsistent with this Court’s traditional rule that malicious prosecution suits are disfavored in the law.” The Ba

1978It points out that a plaintiff “in a malicious prosecution case, however, need only demonstrate a want of probable cause, i.e., that the defendant’s suspicion of the plaintiff’s guilt was merely unreasonable.” (Emphasis theirs.) From this the argument is constructed that “permitting punitive damage awards to be predicated upon ‘malice’ inferred from a want of probable cause [is] inconsistent with the malice standard set up by this Court for torts in general and, more importantly, inconsistent with this Court’s traditional rule that malicious prosecution suits are disfavored in the law.” The Ba

1978It points out that a plaintiff “in a malicious prosecution case, however, need only demonstrate a want of probable cause, i.e., that the defendant’s suspicion of the plaintiff’s guilt was merely unreasonable.” (Emphasis theirs.) From this the argument is constructed that “permitting punitive damage awards to be predicated upon ‘malice’ inferred from a want of probable cause [is] inconsistent with the malice standard set up by this Court for torts in general and, more importantly, inconsistent with this Court’s traditional rule that malicious prosecution suits are disfavored in the law.” The Ba