malice inquiry in Idaho

2016The New York Times standard requires the plaintiff to prove “knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth, by clear and convincing evidence.” Clark, 144 Idaho at 430 , 163 P.3d at 219 .

2016The New York Times standard requires the plaintiff to prove “knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth, by clear and convincing evidence.” Clark, 144 Idaho at 430 , 163 P.3d at 219 .

2007However, *431 we have adopted the United States Supreme Court standard for ruling on a motion for summary judgment in a defamation case which requires that the trial judge bear in mind the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary and noted the appropriateness of this standard is supported by the "unique character of the interest protected by the actual malice standard” and the duty a judge has to "independently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing proo

2007However, *431 we have adopted the United States Supreme Court standard for ruling on a motion for summary judgment in a defamation case which requires that the trial judge bear in mind the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary and noted the appropriateness of this standard is supported by the "unique character of the interest protected by the actual malice standard” and the duty a judge has to "independently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing proo

1991Consider, for example, this discussion of what the Alaska Supreme Court decided to do with Anderson — put it aside: The malice standard was more fully discussed in an earlier decision, Moffat[t] v. Brown [ 751 P.2d 939 (Alaska 1988)], in which the court reaffirmed the requisite mental state for a finding of malice in libel actions as reckless disregard sufficient to permit the inference that the defendant “subjectively entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statement.” More importantly, perhaps, in Moffat[t] , the court declined to follow the United States Supreme Court’s standard f

1991Consider, for example, this discussion of what the Alaska Supreme Court decided to do with Anderson — put it aside: The malice standard was more fully discussed in an earlier decision, Moffat[t] v. Brown [ 751 P.2d 939 (Alaska 1988)], in which the court reaffirmed the requisite mental state for a finding of malice in libel actions as reckless disregard sufficient to permit the inference that the defendant "subjectively entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statement." More importantly, perhaps, in Moffat[t] , the court declined to follow the United States Supreme Court's standard f

1990The Supreme Court in Harte-Hanks stated that: Although courts must be careful not to place too much reliance on such factors, a plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant's state of mind through circumstantial evidence, see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 [ 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1640 , 60 L.Ed.2d 115 ] (1979); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 260 U.S.App.D.C. 39, 66 , 817 F.2d 762, 789 (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 [ 108 S.Ct. 200 , 98 L.Ed.2d 151 ] (1987), and it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry.

1990The Supreme Court in Harte-Hanks stated that: Although courts must be careful not to place too much reliance on such factors, a plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant’s state of mind through circumstantial evidence, see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 [ 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1640 , 60 L.Ed.2d 115 ] (1979); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 260 U.S.App.D.C. 39, 66 , 817 F.2d 762, 789 (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 [ 108 S.Ct. 200 , 98 L.Ed.2d 151 ] (1987), and it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry.

1990The Supreme Court in Harte-Hanks stated that: Although courts must be careful not to place too much reliance on such factors, a plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant's state of mind through circumstantial evidence, see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 [ 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1640 , 60 L.Ed.2d 115 ] (1979); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 260 U.S.App.D.C. 39, 66 , 817 F.2d 762, 789 (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 [ 108 S.Ct. 200 , 98 L.Ed.2d 151 ] (1987), and it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry.

1990The Supreme Court in Harte-Hanks stated that: Although courts must be careful not to place too much reliance on such factors, a plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant’s state of mind through circumstantial evidence, see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 [ 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1640 , 60 L.Ed.2d 115 ] (1979); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 260 U.S.App.D.C. 39, 66 , 817 F.2d 762, 789 (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 [ 108 S.Ct. 200 , 98 L.Ed.2d 151 ] (1987), and it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry.

1990The Supreme Court in Harte-Hanks stated that: Although courts must be careful not to place too much reliance on such factors, a plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant's state of mind through circumstantial evidence, see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 [ 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1640 , 60 L.Ed.2d 115 ] (1979); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 260 U.S.App.D.C. 39, 66 , 817 F.2d 762, 789 (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 [ 108 S.Ct. 200 , 98 L.Ed.2d 151 ] (1987), and it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry.

1990The Supreme Court in Harte-Hanks stated that: Although courts must be careful not to place too much reliance on such factors, a plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant’s state of mind through circumstantial evidence, see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 [ 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1640 , 60 L.Ed.2d 115 ] (1979); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 260 U.S.App.D.C. 39, 66 , 817 F.2d 762, 789 (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 [ 108 S.Ct. 200 , 98 L.Ed.2d 151 ] (1987), and it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry.

1990The Supreme Court in Harte-Hanks stated that: Although courts must be careful not to place too much reliance on such factors, a plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant's state of mind through circumstantial evidence, see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 [ 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1640 , 60 L.Ed.2d 115 ] (1979); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 260 U.S.App.D.C. 39, 66 , 817 F.2d 762, 789 (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 [ 108 S.Ct. 200 , 98 L.Ed.2d 151 ] (1987), and it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry.

1990The Supreme Court in Harte-Hanks stated that: Although courts must be careful not to place too much reliance on such factors, a plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant’s state of mind through circumstantial evidence, see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 [ 99 S.Ct. 1635, 1640 , 60 L.Ed.2d 115 ] (1979); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 260 U.S.App.D.C. 39, 66 , 817 F.2d 762, 789 (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 [ 108 S.Ct. 200 , 98 L.Ed.2d 151 ] (1987), and it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the actual malice inquiry.