malice standard in Mississippi

2023Claypool “determin[ed] the scope of the peer review privilege from the language of our statutes and the purpose that language was intended to achieve.” Claypool, 724 So. 2d at 385 -86 (quoting Holum, 544 N.W.2d at 154 ).

2023Claypool “determin[ed] the scope of the peer review privilege from the language of our statutes and the purpose that language was intended to achieve.” Claypool, 724 So. 2d at 385 -86 (quoting Holum, 544 N.W.2d at 154 ).

2002Three years after Sullivan , the Supreme Court, in the consolidated cases of Butts and Walker , was faced with the question of whether the malice standard enunciated in Sullivan applied to defamation actions "instituted by persons who are not public officials but who are public figures and involved in issues which the public has a justified and important interest." Id. at 134, 87 S.Ct. 1975 .

2002Justice Harlan, Justice Clark, Justice Stewart and Justice Fortas thought the malice standard was too high and *1252 would hold that a person who is a public figure but not a public official "may recover damages for a defamatory falsehood ... on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. at 155 , 87 S.Ct. 1975 .

2002New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , created the "actual malice" standard to apply to public officials in defamation cases.

2002New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , created the "actual malice" standard to apply to public officials in defamation cases.

1989In Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 , 105 S.Ct. 2939 , 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985), five justices of the U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the actual malice standard applied to private individuals if the offending speech involved a matter of public concern or general public interest.

1989In Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 , 105 S.Ct. 2939 , 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985), five justices of the U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the actual malice standard applied to private individuals if the offending speech involved a matter of public concern or general public interest.

1989Whether a particular debate involves a matter of public concern is "`determined by [the expression's] content, form, and context ... as revealed by the whole record.'" Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 , 105 S.Ct. at 2946 , 86 L.Ed.2d at 604 , quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 , 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690 , 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983).

1989Whether a particular debate involves a matter of public concern is "`determined by [the expression's] content, form, and context ... as revealed by the whole record.'" Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 , 105 S.Ct. at 2946 , 86 L.Ed.2d at 604 , quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 , 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690 , 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983).

1988The Edmonds case, supra, acknowledged that, not only were "public figures" subject to the malice standard of proof, but also "quasi-public officials." The same concept was carried forward in Ferguson v. Watkins, 448 So.2d 271 (Miss. 1984) when this Court using an analogous term of "vortex public figure" defined such person as "one who though otherwise a private figure becomes active or involved in a matter of public concern." *601 Admittedly, P.L.

1988Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 , 91 S.Ct. 1811 , 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971).

1988Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 , 91 S.Ct. 1811 , 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971).

1983In Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., Inc., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.1980), the Court held: It might be that during the "active" public figure period a wider ranger of articles, including those only peripherally related to the basis of the public figure's fame, are protected by the malice standard and that the passage of time or intentional retreat narrows the range of articles so protected to those directly related to the basis for fame. [ Id. at 1257 ].

1983In Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., Inc., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.1980), the Court held: It might be that during the "active" public figure period a wider ranger of articles, including those only peripherally related to the basis of the public figure's fame, are protected by the malice standard and that the passage of time or intentional retreat narrows the range of articles so protected to those directly related to the basis for fame. [ Id. at 1257 ].

1983In Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 , 99 S.Ct. 2701 , 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not a public figure and was not required to meet the actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan .

1983In Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 , 99 S.Ct. 2701 , 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not a public figure and was not required to meet the actual malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan .

1977Hailes v. State, 315 So.2d 917 (Miss.1975); King v. State, 315 So.2d 925 (Miss.1975); Null v. State, 311 So.2d 654 (Miss.1975); Minor v. State, 302 So.2d 248 (Miss.1974); Bragg v. State, 210 So.2d 652 (Miss.1968).

1977Hailes v. State, 315 So.2d 917 (Miss.1975); King v. State, 315 So.2d 925 (Miss.1975); Null v. State, 311 So.2d 654 (Miss.1975); Minor v. State, 302 So.2d 248 (Miss.1974); Bragg v. State, 210 So.2d 652 (Miss.1968).

1977Hailes v. State, 315 So.2d 917 (Miss.1975); King v. State, 315 So.2d 925 (Miss.1975); Null v. State, 311 So.2d 654 (Miss.1975); Minor v. State, 302 So.2d 248 (Miss.1974); Bragg v. State, 210 So.2d 652 (Miss.1968).

1977Hailes v. State, 315 So.2d 917 (Miss.1975); King v. State, 315 So.2d 925 (Miss.1975); Null v. State, 311 So.2d 654 (Miss.1975); Minor v. State, 302 So.2d 248 (Miss.1974); Bragg v. State, 210 So.2d 652 (Miss.1968).

1977Hailes v. State, 315 So.2d 917 (Miss.1975); King v. State, 315 So.2d 925 (Miss.1975); Null v. State, 311 So.2d 654 (Miss.1975); Minor v. State, 302 So.2d 248 (Miss.1974); Bragg v. State, 210 So.2d 652 (Miss.1968).