acceleration clause in Louisiana

1981Morgan’s Discount Corporation v. Belote, 338 So.2d 1222 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1976); A Second Mortgage Company of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Gatlin, 233 So.2d 583 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1970); Dassau v. Seary, 158 So.2d 243 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1963).

1970The note further provides for eight percent per annum interest from maturity until paid and contains the following acceleration clause: “In the event that any installment of this note, or any interest thereon, is not paid promptly when due, this note and each and every installment thereof shall, ipso facto, and without any demand or putting in default, become immediately due and exigible.” (Plaintiff Exhibit-1) In Dassau v. Seary, 158 So.2d 243 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1963), the Court held that a note, which was payable in monthly installments and which contained a provision that in the event the ma

1964Loyacano v. Villere & Burglass, 6 La.App. 37 ; Burglass v. Villere (La.App.) 147 So. 727 .

1934Loyacano v. Villere & Burglass, 6 La.

2025Id., 23-0349 at pp. 12-13, 382 So. 3d at 1008. 11 We disagree that the absence of an acceleration clause does not preclude a lawsuit to collect the balance of the note.

2025Id., 23-0349 at pp. 12-13, 382 So. 3d at 1008. 11 We disagree that the absence of an acceleration clause does not preclude a lawsuit to collect the balance of the note.

1993Lytell, supra, 373 So.2d at 144 .

1993Lytell, supra, 373 So.2d at 144 .

1991Cunningham Apts., Inc. v. Dupre, 428 So.2d 1046 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983), for the proposition that "late" installment payments that are customarily accepted past the due date deems the payee has acquiesced thereby waiving his right to demand that an acceleration clause be enforced without first placing the payer in default, thereby signaling an end to such conduct.

1990Home Finance Corp. v. Fisher, 361 So.2d 463 (La.App. 1st Cir.1978).

1981In Meyer, supra, the note was payable in annual installments.

1981Morgan’s Discount Corporation v. Belote, 338 So.2d 1222 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1976); A Second Mortgage Company of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Gatlin, 233 So.2d 583 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1970); Dassau v. Seary, 158 So.2d 243 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1963).

1981Morgan’s Discount Corporation v. Belote, 338 So.2d 1222 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1976); A Second Mortgage Company of Baton Rouge, Inc. v. Gatlin, 233 So.2d 583 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1970); Dassau v. Seary, 158 So.2d 243 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1963).

1979Corp. v. Eubanks, 347 So.2d 1277 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1977), we reversed the confirmation of a default judgment awarding plaintiff-lessor past due rent and rent becoming due under an acceleration clause of a sub-lease, where the record did not contain the primary lease to which the sub-lease was subject, evidence that notice was given of acceleration of rent payments, or evidence that the president of the lessor corporation was authorized by the corporation to enter the sub-lease.

1977Jones v. Paul, 254 So.2d 915 (1st La.App., 1971).

1976THE ACCELERATION CLAUSE In Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257 (U.S.Ct.App., 3rd Cir., 1975), the court was "called upon to determine whether the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z thereunder require a creditor to disclose an acceleration clause where state law provides that the creditor must rebate the unearned [interest] portion of the finance charge." The acceleration clause therein was similar to that presently before this court.

1973"In addition to this fact, there was introduced in evidence several memoranda written by Mr. Simon, the president of the defendant corporation, all of which were written subsequent to the death of Mr. Torrey, which occurred in 1966; which memoranda clearly indicates that at least as of that date subsequent to the death of Mr. Torrey, both parties understood that the value of the notes had not been reduced." In regard to this court's amendment of the holding of the lower court, in regard to the absence of an acceleration clause in either the credit sale or the promissory notes paraphed thereto,

1973"In addition to this fact, there was introduced in evidence several memoranda written by Mr. Simon, the president of the defendant corporation, all of which were written subsequent to the death of Mr. Torrey, which occurred in 1966; which memoranda clearly indicates that at least as of that date subsequent to the death of Mr. Torrey, both parties understood that the value of the notes had not been reduced." In regard to this court's amendment of the holding of the lower court, in regard to the absence of an acceleration clause in either the credit sale or the promissory notes paraphed thereto,

1973Heller & Company v. Mall, Inc., 267 F.Supp. 343 (E.D.La.1967), viz.: Thus it is clear that when the holder of a note, because of default by the maker, makes use of an acceleration clause contained therein to declare all unpaid payments immediately due and exigible, he must remit all capitalized, unearned interest or discount as of that date.

1964Loyacano v. Villere & Burglass, 6 La.App. 37 ; Burglass v. Villere (La.App.) 147 So. 727 .

1964If, however, he elects to avail himself of the latter right, he elects to continue the contract in force, notwithstanding the default of the lessee in his payments, and thereby accords to the latter the right to remain on the premises and to use them in accordance with the terms of the lease, and continues in force the obligation imposed by law upon him to maintain the lessee in the peaceable possession of the property.'" In Succession of Israel, La.App., 154 So. 487 , the Supreme Court held: "* * * When the default took place in the prompt payment of the rent, the plaintiffs, as lessors, had

1962The note provides for waiver of demand, protest, notice of nonpayment by the endorser, therefore judgment will be rendered against the maker and endorser, in solido.” Counsel for defendants contend that Emblem, Inc. v. Picolo, La.App., 123 So.2d 799 , is authority for their position and justifies a reversal of the judgment here, on the ground that the acceleration clause in such a note and the provision for the' attorney’s fees are not applicable unless it appears that the holder of the note notifies the maker that payment is demanded and that the acceleration clause and the attorney’s fees pr

1937The Supreme Court, in Kearney v. Fenerty, 185 La. 862 , 171 So. 57 , discussed the effect of article 2065, Civ.Code, concerning conjunctive obligations and held that, where there is a conjunctive obligation made up of several different items, each represents a separate claim and may be sued on separately, provided the entire obligation is not subject to an acceleration stipulation.

1937The Supreme Court, in Kearney v. Fenerty, 185 La. 862 , 171 So. 57 , discussed the effect of article 2065, Civ.Code, concerning conjunctive obligations and held that, where there is a conjunctive obligation made up of several different items, each represents a separate claim and may be sued on separately, provided the entire obligation is not subject to an acceleration stipulation.

1933The case of Heirs of Williams v. Sheriff, 47 La.