acceleration clause in Washington

1991Co., 203 Neb. 574 , 279 N.W.2d 397 (1979) (interpretation of sales provision); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974) (course of dealing is used to interpret contract term; further, no conflict existed between course of dealing and express terms of contract); Luedtke Eng'g Co. v. Indiana Limestone Co., 740 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1984) (interpretation of provision establishing shipping requirements); Farmers Elevator Co. v. Anderson, 170 Mont. 175 , 552 P.2d 63 (1976) (modification of original oral contract as to date of delivery).

1991Co., 203 Neb. 574 , 279 N.W.2d 397 (1979) (interpretation of sales provision); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974) (course of dealing is used to interpret contract term; further, no conflict existed between course of dealing and express terms of contract); Luedtke Eng'g Co. v. Indiana Limestone Co., 740 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1984) (interpretation of provision establishing shipping requirements); Farmers Elevator Co. v. Anderson, 170 Mont. 175 , 552 P.2d 63 (1976) (modification of original oral contract as to date of delivery).

1991App. 17 , 521 P.2d 226 (1974) (waiver of contract term requiring written consent before collateral was sold); Dunn v. General Equities of Iowa, Ltd., 319 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 1982) (waiver of right to enforce an acceleration clause in an installment note); In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.) (interpretation of sales provision), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); Peck v. Augustin Bros.

1990App. 17 , 521 P.2d 226 (1974) (course of conduct acquiescing in sale of cattle without written consent raises fact question re waiver of the requirement); Dunn v. General Equities of Iowa, Ltd., 319 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 1982) (right to enforce an acceleration clause in an installment note can be waived by a course of dealing accepting late payments); a pattern of conducting transactions in a given way, In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.1976) (evidence of course of dealing showing past conduct of transactions in manner consistent with the Packers and Stockyards Act supported view that sal

1991Co., 203 Neb. 574 , 279 N.W.2d 397 (1979) (interpretation of sales provision); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974) (course of dealing is used to interpret contract term; further, no conflict existed between course of dealing and express terms of contract); Luedtke Eng'g Co. v. Indiana Limestone Co., 740 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1984) (interpretation of provision establishing shipping requirements); Farmers Elevator Co. v. Anderson, 170 Mont. 175 , 552 P.2d 63 (1976) (modification of original oral contract as to date of delivery).

1990Co., 203 Neb. 574 , 279 N.W.2d 397 (1979) (course of dealing indicated that parties conducted cattle transactions in a certain way and intended sale in question to be no different); and past willingness to allow for modification of performance, Luedtke Eng'g Co. v. Indiana Limestone Co., 740 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.1984) (evidence of prior dealings showed that buyer was willing to accept late deliveries of limestone from time to time); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir.1974) (course of dealing shows buyer's willingness to modify place of delivery); Farmers Elevat

1991App. 17 , 521 P.2d 226 (1974) (waiver of contract term requiring written consent before collateral was sold); Dunn v. General Equities of Iowa, Ltd., 319 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 1982) (waiver of right to enforce an acceleration clause in an installment note); In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.) (interpretation of sales provision), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); Peck v. Augustin Bros.

1990App. 17 , 521 P.2d 226 (1974) (course of conduct acquiescing in sale of cattle without written consent raises fact question re waiver of the requirement); Dunn v. General Equities of Iowa, Ltd., 319 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 1982) (right to enforce an acceleration clause in an installment note can be waived by a course of dealing accepting late payments); a pattern of conducting transactions in a given way, In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.1976) (evidence of course of dealing showing past conduct of transactions in manner consistent with the Packers and Stockyards Act supported view that sal

1991Co., 203 Neb. 574 , 279 N.W.2d 397 (1979) (interpretation of sales provision); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974) (course of dealing is used to interpret contract term; further, no conflict existed between course of dealing and express terms of contract); Luedtke Eng'g Co. v. Indiana Limestone Co., 740 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1984) (interpretation of provision establishing shipping requirements); Farmers Elevator Co. v. Anderson, 170 Mont. 175 , 552 P.2d 63 (1976) (modification of original oral contract as to date of delivery).

1990Co., 203 Neb. 574 , 279 N.W.2d 397 (1979) (course of dealing indicated that parties conducted cattle transactions in a certain way and intended sale in question to be no different); and past willingness to allow for modification of performance, Luedtke Eng'g Co. v. Indiana Limestone Co., 740 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.1984) (evidence of prior dealings showed that buyer was willing to accept late deliveries of limestone from time to time); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir.1974) (course of dealing shows buyer's willingness to modify place of delivery); Farmers Elevat

1991Co., 203 Neb. 574 , 279 N.W.2d 397 (1979) (interpretation of sales provision); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974) (course of dealing is used to interpret contract term; further, no conflict existed between course of dealing and express terms of contract); Luedtke Eng'g Co. v. Indiana Limestone Co., 740 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1984) (interpretation of provision establishing shipping requirements); Farmers Elevator Co. v. Anderson, 170 Mont. 175 , 552 P.2d 63 (1976) (modification of original oral contract as to date of delivery).

1991Co., 203 Neb. 574 , 279 N.W.2d 397 (1979) (interpretation of sales provision); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 508 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1974) (course of dealing is used to interpret contract term; further, no conflict existed between course of dealing and express terms of contract); Luedtke Eng'g Co. v. Indiana Limestone Co., 740 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1984) (interpretation of provision establishing shipping requirements); Farmers Elevator Co. v. Anderson, 170 Mont. 175 , 552 P.2d 63 (1976) (modification of original oral contract as to date of delivery).

1991App. 17 , 521 P.2d 226 (1974) (waiver of contract term requiring written consent before collateral was sold); Dunn v. General Equities of Iowa, Ltd., 319 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 1982) (waiver of right to enforce an acceleration clause in an installment note); In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.) (interpretation of sales provision), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); Peck v. Augustin Bros.

1990App. 17 , 521 P.2d 226 (1974) (course of conduct acquiescing in sale of cattle without written consent raises fact question re waiver of the requirement); Dunn v. General Equities of Iowa, Ltd., 319 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 1982) (right to enforce an acceleration clause in an installment note can be waived by a course of dealing accepting late payments); a pattern of conducting transactions in a given way, In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.1976) (evidence of course of dealing showing past conduct of transactions in manner consistent with the Packers and Stockyards Act supported view that sal

2026Rather, the requirement of a prima facie defense to the claim has the purpose of “avoid[ing] a useless subsequent trial if the defaulted defendant cannot bring forth facts to make such a showing when seeking to vacate the default.” Griggs, 92 Wn.2d at 583 .

2023IV As a final matter, Reed requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to RCW 26.09.140, which gives the court discretion to order a party to pay the other party’s reasonable attorney fees “after considering the financial resources of both parties.” In making an award of attorney fees under the statute, “ ‘the court must balance the needs of the one party against the other party’s ability to pay.’ ” In re Marriage of Nelson, 62 Wn.

1991App. 17 , 521 P.2d 226 (1974) (waiver of contract term requiring written consent before collateral was sold); Dunn v. General Equities of Iowa, Ltd., 319 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 1982) (waiver of right to enforce an acceleration clause in an installment note); In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.) (interpretation of sales provision), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); Peck v. Augustin Bros.

1986Review denied by Supreme Court September 2, 1986. 1 Though Olawsky v. Clausen, 87 S.D. 578 , 212 N.W.2d 653 (1973), cited by Tallman, appears to be on point, it is not clear whether an acceleration clause was involved in that case.

1986Review denied by Supreme Court September 2, 1986. 1 Though Olawsky v. Clausen, 87 S.D. 578 , 212 N.W.2d 653 (1973), cited by Tallman, appears to be on point, it is not clear whether an acceleration clause was involved in that case.

1986We also note Denbina v. Hurst, 516 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ.

1983Glassmaker v. Ricard, 23 Wn.

1980Llewellyn Iron Works v. Littlefield, 74 Wash. 86 , 132 P. 867 (1913).

1980Llewellyn Iron Works v. Littlefield, 74 Wash. 86 , 132 P. 867 (1913).

1969Bernard v. Triangle Music Co., 1 Wn.2d 41 , 95 P.2d 43 , 126 A.L.R. 558 (1939).

1969Bernard v. Triangle Music Co., 1 Wn.2d 41 , 95 P.2d 43 , 126 A.L.R. 558 (1939).

1968The majority distinguishes our holding in Heath Northwest, Inc. v. Peterson, 67 Wn.2d 582 , 408 P.2d 896 (1965), on the ground that in Heath the chattel involved was a sign built for special purposes and not capable of being used by others, whereas here the chattel is a tractor of a type in common use by many types of businesses.

1968The majority distinguishes our holding in Heath Northwest, Inc. v. Peterson, 67 Wn.2d 582 , 408 P.2d 896 (1965), on the ground that in Heath the chattel involved was a sign built for special purposes and not capable of being used by others, whereas here the chattel is a tractor of a type in common use by many types of businesses.

1929We quoted with approval from Underwood v. Tew, 7 Wash. 297 , 34 Pac. 1100 , as follows: “The obligation to pay the notes which fell due prior to the time when the conveyance was to be made under the contract, was independent of the obligation on the part of plaintiff to convey, and payment of each of said notes might have been enforced by action as they became due and payable, had the plaintiff seen fit to do so.” A similar case containing such a supposed acceleration clause as that in this case, is Putthoff v. Walker, 213 Mo. App. 228 , 248 S. W. 619 , and the purported acceleration clause re

1929We quoted with approval from Underwood v. Tew, 7 Wash. 297 , 34 Pac. 1100 , as follows: “The obligation to pay the notes which fell due prior to the time when the conveyance was to be made under the contract, was independent of the obligation on the part of plaintiff to convey, and payment of each of said notes might have been enforced by action as they became due and payable, had the plaintiff seen fit to do so.” A similar case containing such a supposed acceleration clause as that in this case, is Putthoff v. Walker, 213 Mo. App. 228 , 248 S. W. 619 , and the purported acceleration clause re

1929We quoted with approval from Underwood v. Tew, 7 Wash. 297 , 34 Pac. 1100 , as follows: “The obligation to pay the notes which fell due prior to the time when the conveyance was to be made under the contract, was independent of the obligation on the part of plaintiff to convey, and payment of each of said notes might have been enforced by action as they became due and payable, had the plaintiff seen fit to do so.” A similar case containing such a supposed acceleration clause as that in this case, is Putthoff v. Walker, 213 Mo. App. 228 , 248 S. W. 619 , and the purported acceleration clause re

1929We quoted with approval from Underwood v. Tew, 7 Wash. 297 , 34 Pac. 1100 , as follows: “The obligation to pay the notes which fell due prior to the time when the conveyance was to be made under the contract, was independent of the obligation on the part of plaintiff to convey, and payment of each of said notes might have been enforced by action as they became due and payable, had the plaintiff seen fit to do so.” A similar case containing such a supposed acceleration clause as that in this case, is Putthoff v. Walker, 213 Mo. App. 228 , 248 S. W. 619 , and the purported acceleration clause re