acceleration clause in Oklahoma

2024Furthermore, there is nothing contained in the record showing Judge Moody reviewed a transcript of the preliminary hearing either before or during the acceleration hearing and relied upon that transcript in making the court's finding. ¶10 "[A]t an acceleration hearing, the court only makes a factual determination involving the existence of a violation of the terms of the deferred sentence." Hagar v. State , 1999 OK CR 35, ¶ 10 , 990 P.2d 894, 898 .

2024Furthermore, there is nothing contained in the record showing Judge Moody reviewed a transcript of the preliminary hearing either before or during the acceleration hearing and relied upon that transcript in making the court's finding. ¶10 "[A]t an acceleration hearing, the court only makes a factual determination involving the existence of a violation of the terms of the deferred sentence." Hagar v. State , 1999 OK CR 35, ¶ 10 , 990 P.2d 894, 898 .

1977In Lawton v. Lincoln, 200 Okl. 182 , 191 P.2d 926 (1948), a real estate mortgage foreclosure case involving waste, the Court acknowledged that acceleration clauses in a mortgage were not objectionable as being in the nature of a penalty or forfeiture, although there are cases where it “becomes closely akin thereto” and equity will relieve against operation of an acceleration clause where the conduct of the mortgagee has been unconscionable or inequitable.

1977In Lawton v. Lincoln, 200 Okl. 182 , 191 P.2d 926 (1948), a real estate mortgage foreclosure case involving waste, the Court acknowledged that acceleration clauses in a mortgage were not objectionable as being in the nature of a penalty or forfeiture, although there are cases where it “becomes closely akin thereto” and equity will relieve against operation of an acceleration clause where the conduct of the mortgagee has been unconscionable or inequitable.

2024Without a stipulation by the parties, it was an abuse of discretion for Judge Moody to take judicial notice and consider any of the preliminary hearing evidence at the acceleration hearing.</p> <p>&#182;9 So long as the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, this Court has allowed the State to admit a transcript of a preliminary hearing at a revocation hearing and for the presiding judge to consider that evidence when deciding if there is sufficient, competent evidence to find a defendant has violated his or her probation. <i>See Wortham v. State</i>, <span> 2008 OK CR 18

2024Without a stipulation by the parties, it was an abuse of discretion for Judge Moody to take judicial notice and consider any of the preliminary hearing evidence at the acceleration hearing.</p> <p>&#182;9 So long as the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, this Court has allowed the State to admit a transcript of a preliminary hearing at a revocation hearing and for the presiding judge to consider that evidence when deciding if there is sufficient, competent evidence to find a defendant has violated his or her probation. <i>See Wortham v. State</i>, <span> 2008 OK CR 18

2024Without a stipulation by the parties, it was an abuse of discretion for Judge Moody to take judicial notice and consider any of the preliminary hearing evidence at the acceleration hearing.</p> <p>&#182;9 So long as the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, this Court has allowed the State to admit a transcript of a preliminary hearing at a revocation hearing and for the presiding judge to consider that evidence when deciding if there is sufficient, competent evidence to find a defendant has violated his or her probation. <i>See Wortham v. State</i>, <span> 2008 OK CR 18

2024Without a stipulation by the parties, it was an abuse of discretion for Judge Moody to take judicial notice and consider any of the preliminary hearing evidence at the acceleration hearing.</p> <p>&#182;9 So long as the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, this Court has allowed the State to admit a transcript of a preliminary hearing at a revocation hearing and for the presiding judge to consider that evidence when deciding if there is sufficient, competent evidence to find a defendant has violated his or her probation. <i>See Wortham v. State</i>, <span> 2008 OK CR 18

2020Sav. & Loan Ass'n , 438 N.W.2d 814, 819 (S.D. 1989) (an acceleration clause will be enforced absent fraud, bad faith, or other conduct on part of the mortgagee which would make it unconscionable to enforce the clause); Key Int'l Mfg., Inc. v. Stillman , 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530 (1984) (absent some element of fraud, exploitative overreaching or unconscionable conduct by the creditor, the court should enforce an acceleration clause), aff'd as modified , 66 N.Y.2d 924, 498 N.Y.S.2d 795, 489 N.E.2d 764 (1985); Bowen v. Danna , [276 Ark. 528,] 637 S.W.2d [560,] 564 [(1982)](a court in

2020Sav. & Loan Ass'n , 438 N.W.2d 814, 819 (S.D. 1989) (an acceleration clause will be enforced absent fraud, bad faith, or other conduct on part of the mortgagee which would make it unconscionable to enforce the clause); Key Int'l Mfg., Inc. v. Stillman , 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530 (1984) (absent some element of fraud, exploitative overreaching or unconscionable conduct by the creditor, the court should enforce an acceleration clause), aff'd as modified , 66 N.Y.2d 924, 498 N.Y.S.2d 795, 489 N.E.2d 764 (1985); Bowen v. Danna , [276 Ark. 528,] 637 S.W.2d [560,] 564 [(1982)](a court in

2020Sav. & Loan Ass'n , 438 N.W.2d 814, 819 (S.D. 1989) (an acceleration clause will be enforced absent fraud, bad faith, or other conduct on part of the mortgagee which would make it unconscionable to enforce the clause); Key Int'l Mfg., Inc. v. Stillman , 103 A.D.2d 475, 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530 (1984) (absent some element of fraud, exploitative overreaching or unconscionable conduct by the creditor, the court should enforce an acceleration clause), aff'd as modified , 66 N.Y.2d 924, 498 N.Y.S.2d 795, 489 N.E.2d 764 (1985); Bowen v. Danna , [276 Ark. 528,] 637 S.W.2d [560,] 564 [(1982)](a court in

2020Sav. & Loan Ass'n , 438 N.W.2d 814, 819 (S.D. 1989) (an acceleration clause will be enforced absent fraud, bad faith, or other conduct on part of the mortgagee which would make it unconscionable to enforce the clause); Key Int'l Mfg., Inc. v. Stillman , 103 A.D.2d 475 , 480 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530 (1984) (absent some element of fraud, exploitative overreaching or unconscionable conduct by the creditor, the court should enforce an acceleration clause), aff'd as modified , 66 N.Y.2d 924 , 498 N.Y.S.2d 795 , 489 N.E.2d 764 (1985); Bowen v. Danna , [ 276 Ark. 528 ,] 637 S.W.2d [560,] 564 [(1982)](a cour

2001Mack v. State, 1981 OK CR 160, ¶ 3 , 637 P.2d 1262 .

2001Mack v. State, 1981 OK CR 160, ¶ 3 , 637 P.2d 1262 .

1995The Tenth Circuit denied use of that power in Resolution Trust Corporation v. Mustang Partners, 946 F.2d 103 (10th Cir.1961), where the evidence showed the debtors knew they were in default.

1995However, Husband has waived determination of the proposition by failing to assert it in his Motion for New Trial. 12 O.S.1991, § 991(b); Reeves v. Agee, 769 P.2d 745 (Okla.1989).

1991He contends that this acceleration clause creates a contingency which makes the actual sum of money owed indefinite, rendering the order invalid under authority such as Trosper v. Trosper, 308 P.2d 320 (Okla. 1057).

1991See supra note 4 for the pertinent provisions of 15 O.S.1981 § 63; Ware v. City of Tulsa, Okl., 312 P.2d 946 syllabus 2 (1957). .

1977Ray v. Oklahoma Furniture Manufacturing Co., 170 Okl. 414 , 40 P.2d 663 (1935) contains the following provision in the promissory note covering fixtures; “This note shall at the option of the holder, become at once due and payable if any change takes place in the ownership of the business of the maker * * * or if any stock of goods or fixtures be damaged by fire, or if maker * * * or either of them become insolvent, or if I fail to pay any other indebtedness to the payee hereof at maturity, or if I be sued by any other creditor, or if a chattel mortgage be placed on his stock of goods or fixtu

1977Ray v. Oklahoma Furniture Manufacturing Co., 170 Okl. 414 , 40 P.2d 663 (1935) contains the following provision in the promissory note covering fixtures; “This note shall at the option of the holder, become at once due and payable if any change takes place in the ownership of the business of the maker * * * or if any stock of goods or fixtures be damaged by fire, or if maker * * * or either of them become insolvent, or if I fail to pay any other indebtedness to the payee hereof at maturity, or if I be sued by any other creditor, or if a chattel mortgage be placed on his stock of goods or fixtu

1961Under our view of the law it is immaterial, under the circumstances, whether defendants received notice. *296 In Luke v. Patterson, 192 Okl. 631 , 139 P.2d 175 , 148 A.L.R. 679 , this court held that an acceleration clause authorizing the mortgagee to declare the entire indebtedness due, without notice, on failure of the mortgagors to pay an installment or taxes when due was legal and valid and may be relied on.

1961Under our view of the law it is immaterial, under the circumstances, whether defendants received notice. *296 In Luke v. Patterson, 192 Okl. 631 , 139 P.2d 175 , 148 A.L.R. 679 , this court held that an acceleration clause authorizing the mortgagee to declare the entire indebtedness due, without notice, on failure of the mortgagors to pay an installment or taxes when due was legal and valid and may be relied on.

1944See Altman v. Kilburn, 45 N.M. 453 , 116 P. 2d 812 , 136 A.L.R. 554 , where, in addition, an acceleration clause was added; City of Knoxville v. Gervin, 169 Tenn. 532 , 89 S.W. 2d 348 , and other cases to illustrate this found in Am.

1944See Altman v. Kilburn, 45 N.M. 453 , 116 P. 2d 812 , 136 A.L.R. 554 , where, in addition, an acceleration clause was added; City of Knoxville v. Gervin, 169 Tenn. 532 , 89 S.W. 2d 348 , and other cases to illustrate this found in Am.

1936The cited case of Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Adams, 169 Okla. 572 , 38 P. (2d) 26 , states the rule as applied in this state, that where an acceleration clause exists giving the option to declare or not declare as mortgagee may elect, is permissive and not self-executing, and that under such circumstances the limitation does not commence to run on partial default, but only from maturity of full principal or last installment of the principal. *260 7.

1936The cited case of Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Adams, 169 Okla. 572 , 38 P. (2d) 26 , states the rule as applied in this state, that where an acceleration clause exists giving the option to declare or not declare as mortgagee may elect, is permissive and not self-executing, and that under such circumstances the limitation does not commence to run on partial default, but only from maturity of full principal or last installment of the principal. *260 7.