10 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1954–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Moss v. McDonaldgreen1 sentence2020We therefore do not address this issue. 5 perform some clear, unequivocal affirmative act evidencing his intention to take advantage of the accelerating provision.” Id. (quoting Moss v. McDonald, 772 P.2d 626, 628 (Colo. App. 1988)). | 1 | 1 |
Charles Boren v. US National Bank Associatigreen1 sentence2018See Boren, 807 F.3d at 1104 ; Paggen v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 17-CV-012410RBJ, 2018 WL 4075881 , at *5 (D. | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Lhd Realty Corporation, Debtor. Appeal of National Life Insurance Companygreen1 sentence2002See also In re LHD Realty Corp., supra, 726 F.2d at 381 ("Should such intentional defaults become a problem ... we believe courts could deal with the difficulty by denying the acceleration exception in appropriate cases."). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hassler v. Account Brokers of Larimer County, Inc.
green
2 sentences2012The security agreement contained an acceleration clause, which authorized the credit union to accelerate the loan and require immediate payment of the outstanding balance if the buyer was in "default." - Id. at 1 7, 274 P.3d at 549 . 2012The security agreement contained an acceleration clause, which authorized the credit union to accelerate the loan and require immediate payment of the outstanding balance if the buyer was in "default." - Id. at 1 7, 274 P.3d at 549 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Moreland v. Marwich, Ltd.
green
1 sentence1989In light of the fact that the primary purpose of a Rule 120 hearing is “to test whether, considering all relevant evidence, there is a reasonable probability that a default exists,” Moreland, 665 P.2d at 618 , the resolution of any question relating to the Goodwins’ default necessarily depended upon whether Marjory Ollson and Etta Mae Vann waived their right to exercise, or were estopped from exercising, the acceleration clause of the promissory note and the power of sale under the deed of trust. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Smith v. Certified Realty Corp.
green
1 sentence1979Certified Realty Company (CRC) appeals from the judgment of the court of appeals, 41 Colo. App. 170 , 585 P.2d 293 (1978), reversing the district court’s holding that Smith could recover only overdue payments despite an acceleration clause in the promissory note. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Ulander v. Allen
green
2 sentences1978He contends that the trial court erred in refusing to enforce an acceleration clause in the note and in fashioning an equitable remedy similar to that approved in Ulander v. Allen, 37 Colo.App. 279 , 544 P.2d 1001 . 1978He contends that the trial court erred in refusing to enforce an acceleration clause in the note and in fashioning an equitable remedy similar to that approved in Ulander v. Allen, 37 Colo.App. 279 , 544 P.2d 1001 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Washburn v. Williams
neutral
1 sentence1973Lovell v. Goss, 45 Colo. 304 , 101 P. 72 ; Washburn v. Williams, 10 Colo. App. 153 , 50 P. 223 ; 55 Am. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Lovell v. Goss
green
1 sentence1973Lovell v. Goss, 45 Colo. 304 , 101 P. 72 ; Washburn v. Williams, 10 Colo. App. 153 , 50 P. 223 ; 55 Am. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Colorado Kenworth Corporation v. Whitworth
green
2 sentences1969Colorado Kenworth Corporation v. Whitworth, 144 Colo. 541 , 357 P.2d 626 , 97 A.L.R.2d 990 ; Barday v. Steinbaugh, 130 Colo. 10 , 272 P.2d 657 . 1969Colorado Kenworth Corporation v. Whitworth, 144 Colo. 541 , 357 P.2d 626 , 97 A.L.R.2d 990 ; Barday v. Steinbaugh, 130 Colo. 10 , 272 P.2d 657 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Barday v. Steinbaugh
green
2 sentences1969Colorado Kenworth Corporation v. Whitworth, 144 Colo. 541 , 357 P.2d 626 , 97 A.L.R.2d 990 ; Barday v. Steinbaugh, 130 Colo. 10 , 272 P.2d 657 . 1969Colorado Kenworth Corporation v. Whitworth, 144 Colo. 541 , 357 P.2d 626 , 97 A.L.R.2d 990 ; Barday v. Steinbaugh, 130 Colo. 10 , 272 P.2d 657 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Thomas v. Beirne
neutral
2 sentences1954The exact situation here has not heretofore been passed upon by our Court; however, to this situation, we apply our ruling in Thomas v. Beirne, 94 Colo. 429 , 30 P. (2d) 863 , concerning the acceleration clause under a chattel mortgage, in which we quoted from 5 R.C.L., p. 463, “Although partial payments made previous to the maturity of the debt do not affect the mortgagee’s right to the possession of the entire property, in the absence of a provision in the instrument to that effect, a partial payment made after default and accepted by the mortgagee is to be regarded as a waiver by the latter 1954The exact situation here has not heretofore been passed upon by our Court; however, to this situation, we apply our ruling in Thomas v. Beirne, 94 Colo. 429 , 30 P. (2d) 863 , concerning the acceleration clause under a chattel mortgage, in which we quoted from 5 R.C.L., p. 463, “Although partial payments made previous to the maturity of the debt do not affect the mortgagee’s right to the possession of the entire property, in the absence of a provision in the instrument to that effect, a partial payment made after default and accepted by the mortgagee is to be regarded as a waiver by the latter | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.