16 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wheel Estate Corp. v. Webbgreen2 sentences2018Unless the creditor exercises the option, the statute of limitations applies to each installment separately, and does not begin to run on any installment until it is due.”); Wheel Estate Corp. v. Webb, 139 Ariz. 506, 508 (App. 1983) (cause of action accrues when holder exercises option to accelerate). 2012See Wheel Estate, 139 Ariz. at 508 , 679 P.2d at 531 (citation omitted) (“[T]he assignees exercised the option to accelerate by taking possession of the mobile home.”); see also Markle v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 483 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Mo.Ct.App.1972) (describing repossession as “a sufficient overt act” to exercise option to accelerate). ¶ 16 We reverse the judgment of the superior court and remand for further appropriate proceedings, which may include consideration of Madison’s laches claim. 1 The superior court has not yet considered that issue given its dismissal on statute of l | 2 | 2 |
Ciavarelli v. Zimmermangreen2 sentences1979As we recently stated in discussing the election to invoke an acceleration clause: “We do not believe that appellees’ insistence that they be paid according to the terms of the note and deed of trust constitutes harsh, oppressive, or inequitable conduct.” Ciavarelli v. Zimmerman, 122 Ariz. 143 , 593 P.2d 697 (1979). 1979As we recently stated in discussing the election to invoke an acceleration clause: “We do not believe that appellees’ insistence that they be paid according to the terms of the note and deed of trust constitutes harsh, oppressive, or inequitable conduct.” Ciavarelli v. Zimmerman, 122 Ariz. 143 , 593 P.2d 697 (1979). | 1 | 5 |
BASELINE FINANCIAL SERVICES v. Madisongreen2 sentences2018The court of appeals reaffirmed this rule in Baseline , adding that even though the acceleration clause did not require notice to the debtor, a creditor "must undertake some affirmative act to make clear to the debtor it has accelerated the obligation" before the statute of limitations begins to run. 229 Ariz. at 544 ¶ 8, 278 P.3d at 322 . ¶ 14 Here, relying on Navy Federal and Baseline , the court of appeals held that "the bank could not sue to collect the outstanding balance on the account unless and until [Santos] failed to comply with a demand for payment in full or a notice by the lender 2018The court of appeals reaffirmed this rule in Baseline , adding that even though the acceleration clause did not require notice to the debtor, a creditor "must undertake some affirmative act to make clear to the debtor it has accelerated the obligation" before the statute of limitations begins to run. 229 Ariz. at 544 ¶ 8, 278 P.3d at 322 . ¶ 14 Here, relying on Navy Federal and Baseline , the court of appeals held that "the bank could not sue to collect the outstanding balance on the account unless and until [Santos] failed to comply with a demand for payment in full or a notice by the lender | 1 | 2 |
Navy Federal Credit Union v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2019Decision of the Court defaulted installment.” Id. (quoting 54 C.J.S. 2018Credit Union v. Jones, 187 Ariz. 493, 495 (App. 1996) (“[I]f the acceleration clause in a debt payable in installments is optional, a cause of action as to future nondelinquent installments does not accrue until the creditor chooses to take advantage of the clause and accelerate the balance. | 1 | 2 |
Browne v. Nowlingreen1 sentence2022An acceleration clause, however, is only “exercisable at the lender’s option.” Browne v. Nowlin, 117 Ariz. 73, 75 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Barnett v. Hitching Post Lodge, Inc.green1 sentence2020Those cases involved a judicial foreclosure seeking the principal amount, Barnett v. Hitching Post Lodge, Inc., 101 Ariz. 488, 492 (1966), or an acceleration clause that was automatically invoked when the debtor defaulted, Prevo v. McGinnis, 142 Ariz. 298, 302 (App. 1984). | 1 | 1 |
Meadowbrook Gardens, Ltd. v. WMFMT Real Estate Ltd. Partnershipgreen1 sentence2020P’ship, 980 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tex. App. 1998) (finding that a notice of intent to accelerate combined with a notice of trustee’s sale was sufficient to accelerate the debt). | 1 | 1 |
Prevo v. McGinnisgreen1 sentence2020Those cases involved a judicial foreclosure seeking the principal amount, Barnett v. Hitching Post Lodge, Inc., 101 Ariz. 488, 492 (1966), or an acceleration clause that was automatically invoked when the debtor defaulted, Prevo v. McGinnis, 142 Ariz. 298, 302 (App. 1984). | 1 | 1 |
Markle v. Columbia Union National Bank & Trust Co.green1 sentence2012See Wheel Estate, 139 Ariz. at 508 , 679 P.2d at 531 (citation omitted) (“[T]he assignees exercised the option to accelerate by taking possession of the mobile home.”); see also Markle v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 483 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Mo.Ct.App.1972) (describing repossession as “a sufficient overt act” to exercise option to accelerate). ¶ 16 We reverse the judgment of the superior court and remand for further appropriate proceedings, which may include consideration of Madison’s laches claim. 1 The superior court has not yet considered that issue given its dismissal on statute of l | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Arizona Coffee Shops, Inc. v. Phoenix Downtown Parking Ass'n
green
2 sentences1985An action to accelerate and foreclose a mortgage being an equitable proceeding, Arizona Coffee Shops v. Phoenix Downtown Parking Ass’n, 95 Ariz. 98 , 387 P.2d 801 (1963), it is not enough to allege merely that the acceleration clause has been violated. 1985An action to accelerate and foreclose a mortgage being an equitable proceeding, Arizona Coffee Shops v. Phoenix Downtown Parking Ass’n, 95 Ariz. 98 , 387 P.2d 801 (1963), it is not enough to allege merely that the acceleration clause has been violated. | 3 | 1969–1985 |
Mertola, LLC v. Santos
neutral
2 sentences2018The court of appeals reaffirmed this rule in Baseline , adding that even though the acceleration clause did not require notice to the debtor, a creditor "must undertake some affirmative act to make clear to the debtor it has accelerated the obligation" before the statute of limitations begins to run. 229 Ariz. at 544 ¶ 8, 278 P.3d at 322 . ¶ 14 Here, relying on Navy Federal and Baseline , the court of appeals held that "the bank could not sue to collect the outstanding balance on the account unless and until [Santos] failed to comply with a demand for payment in full or a notice by the lender 2018The court of appeals reaffirmed this rule in Baseline , adding that even though the acceleration clause did not require notice to the debtor, a creditor "must undertake some affirmative act to make clear to the debtor it has accelerated the obligation" before the statute of limitations begins to run. 229 Ariz. at 544 ¶ 8, 278 P.3d at 322 . ¶ 14 Here, relying on Navy Federal and Baseline , the court of appeals held that "the bank could not sue to collect the outstanding balance on the account unless and until [Santos] failed to comply with a demand for payment in full or a notice by the lender | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Central Home Trust Co. v. Lippincott
green
1 sentence2012As in Lippincott , the internal write off was simply an “accounting procedure within the bank” and not an affirmative exercise of the optional acceleration clause. 392 So.2d at 933 . ¶ 15 Repossession of the Cadillac in December 2007, on the other hand, was an affirmative act sufficient to exercise the acceleration clause. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Frei v. Hamilton
green
2 sentences1984Frei v. Hamilton, 123 Ariz. 544 , 601 P.2d 307 (App.1979). 1984Frei v. Hamilton, 123 Ariz. 544 , 601 P.2d 307 (App.1979). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Baltimore Life Insurance Company v. Harn
green
2 sentences1983“It follows that the invocation of the [acceleration] clause must be based on grounds that are reasonable on their face.” 15 Ariz.App. at 81 , 486 P.2d at 193 . 1983“It follows that the invocation of the [acceleration] clause must be based on grounds that are reasonable on their face.” 15 Ariz.App. at 81 , 486 P.2d at 193 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Baker v. Leight
green
2 sentences1983Other statutory restrictions prohibit the full exercise of due-on-sale clauses by limiting the fee lenders can charge for transfer of a loan, or by restricting or disallowing interest rate changes during the life of the mortgage, or upon assumption of the mortgage loan.” 7 The evolution of state restrictions on the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses in Arizona begins with Baker v. Leight, 91 Ariz. 112 , 370 P.2d 268 (1962), wherein the court held that an agreement to sell is a conveyance within the meaning of an acceleration clause. 1983Other statutory restrictions prohibit the full exercise of due-on-sale clauses by limiting the fee lenders can charge for transfer of a loan, or by restricting or disallowing interest rate changes during the life of the mortgage, or upon assumption of the mortgage loan.” 7 The evolution of state restrictions on the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses in Arizona begins with Baker v. Leight, 91 Ariz. 112 , 370 P.2d 268 (1962), wherein the court held that an agreement to sell is a conveyance within the meaning of an acceleration clause. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Munger v. Boardman
green
2 sentences1969Appellants cite Munger v. Boardman, 53 Ariz. 271 , 88 P.2d 536 (1939) and Arizona Coffee Shops, Inc. v. Phoenix Downtown Parking Association, 95 Ariz. 98 , 387 P.2d 801 (1963) in support of their position. 1969Appellants cite Munger v. Boardman, 53 Ariz. 271 , 88 P.2d 536 (1939) and Arizona Coffee Shops, Inc. v. Phoenix Downtown Parking Association, 95 Ariz. 98 , 387 P.2d 801 (1963) in support of their position. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.