acceleration clause in North Dakota

1932Bank, 49 N. D. 611 , 192 N. W. 967 ; Baird v. Meyer, 55 N. D. 930 , 215 N. W. 542 , 56 A.L.R. 175 ), the precise question involved here was not involved, but under the rule announced in these decisions the acceleration clause is a valid contr*actual provision enforcible according to the intention of the parties; and may always be invoked in an action to foreclose the mortgage.

1932Bank, 49 N. D. 611 , 192 N. W. 967 ; Baird v. Meyer, 55 N. D. 930 , 215 N. W. 542 , 56 A.L.R. 175 ), the precise question involved here was not involved, but under the rule announced in these decisions the acceleration clause is a valid contr*actual provision enforcible according to the intention of the parties; and may always be invoked in an action to foreclose the mortgage.

1997This court concluded “the trial court acted within the scope of its equitable discretion by allowing Lawrence Schmidt to make payments to bring the contract current, thus reinstating the contract for deed.” 359 N.W.2d at 364 . [¶ 20] The judgments are affirmed insofar as they award Patrick and Lillian a hay credit of $46,200 at $5,000 per year against the payments due on the contracts for deed.

1995Following Honn, 311 N.W.2d at 2 , only when the acceleration clause is automatic, or when the creditor “unequivocally exercises” an option to accelerate, does the entire debt become immediately due.

1989That interpretation is also supported by our decision in Johnson v. Gray, 265 N.W.2d 861 (N.D.1978), involving a notice of cancellation of a contract for deed and an acceleration clause.

1982Geigle specifically points to the following language in Ryan, supra 48 N.D. at 718— 719, 186 N.W. at 822 , in support of his argument: “However, we are of the opinion that the defendant should be accorded, upon equitable principles, a further time beyond that allowed by the trial court within which to make good the defaults found. . . .

1982Geigle specifically points to the following language in Ryan, supra 48 N.D. at 718— 719, 186 N.W. at 822 , in support of his argument: “However, we are of the opinion that the defendant should be accorded, upon equitable principles, a further time beyond that allowed by the trial court within which to make good the defaults found. . . .

1978The Iowa Supreme Court, in holding that a seller cannot accelerate the payments due on an installment contract and then base a forfeiture on the entire unpaid balance under the provisions of the Iowa cancellation statute, made the following statement in Hampton, supra 133 N.W.2d at 874 -875: “From the vendors’ standpoint forfeiture presents a swift and inexpensive remedy in the event of a default.

1932While questions relating to and involving the acceleration clause in a mortgage have been considered by this court in several cases (Cosgrave v. McAvay, 24 N. D. 343 , 139 N. W. 693 ; Doolittle v. Nurnberg, 27 N. D. 521 , 147 N. W. 400 ; McCarty v. Goodsman, 39 N. D. 389 , 167 N. W. 503 , L.R.A.1918F, 160; State Bank v. First Nat.

1932While questions relating to and involving the acceleration clause in a mortgage have been considered by this court in several cases (Cosgrave v. McAvay, 24 N. D. 343 , 139 N. W. 693 ; Doolittle v. Nurnberg, 27 N. D. 521 , 147 N. W. 400 ; McCarty v. Goodsman, 39 N. D. 389 , 167 N. W. 503 , L.R.A.1918F, 160; State Bank v. First Nat.

1932While questions relating to and involving the acceleration clause in a mortgage have been considered by this court in several cases (Cosgrave v. McAvay, 24 N. D. 343 , 139 N. W. 693 ; Doolittle v. Nurnberg, 27 N. D. 521 , 147 N. W. 400 ; McCarty v. Goodsman, 39 N. D. 389 , 167 N. W. 503 , L.R.A.1918F, 160; State Bank v. First Nat.

1932While questions relating to and involving the acceleration clause in a mortgage have been considered by this court in several cases (Cosgrave v. McAvay, 24 N. D. 343 , 139 N. W. 693 ; Doolittle v. Nurnberg, 27 N. D. 521 , 147 N. W. 400 ; McCarty v. Goodsman, 39 N. D. 389 , 167 N. W. 503 , L.R.A.1918F, 160; State Bank v. First Nat.

1932Bank, 49 N. D. 611 , 192 N. W. 967 ; Baird v. Meyer, 55 N. D. 930 , 215 N. W. 542 , 56 A.L.R. 175 ), the precise question involved here was not involved, but under the rule announced in these decisions the acceleration clause is a valid contr*actual provision enforcible according to the intention of the parties; and may always be invoked in an action to foreclose the mortgage.

1932Bank, 49 N. D. 611 , 192 N. W. 967 ; Baird v. Meyer, 55 N. D. 930 , 215 N. W. 542 , 56 A.L.R. 175 ), the precise question involved here was not involved, but under the rule announced in these decisions the acceleration clause is a valid contr*actual provision enforcible according to the intention of the parties; and may always be invoked in an action to foreclose the mortgage.

1932Bollenbach v. Ludlum, 84 Okla. 14 , 201 Pac. 982 .

1932Bollenbach v. Ludlum, 84 Okla. 14 , 201 Pac. 982 .

1927In the case of Rasmussen v. Levine, 28 Colo. 448 , 65 Pac. 94 , the court says in the body of the decision: “The conditions in the mortgages could only be taken advantage of for the purpose of declaring due the note thereby secured for the purpose of foreclosing such mortgages, and no other.” The case of McClelland v. Bishop, 42 Ohio St. 113 and the case of Owings v. McKenzie, 133 Mo. 323 , 40 L.R.A. 154 , 33 S. W. 802 , are to the same effect.

1927In the case of Rasmussen v. Levine, 28 Colo. 448 , 65 Pac. 94 , the court says in the body of the decision: “The conditions in the mortgages could only be taken advantage of for the purpose of declaring due the note thereby secured for the purpose of foreclosing such mortgages, and no other.” The case of McClelland v. Bishop, 42 Ohio St. 113 and the case of Owings v. McKenzie, 133 Mo. 323 , 40 L.R.A. 154 , 33 S. W. 802 , are to the same effect.

1927In the case of Rasmussen v. Levine, 28 Colo. 448 , 65 Pac. 94 , the court says in the body of the decision: “The conditions in the mortgages could only be taken advantage of for the purpose of declaring due the note thereby secured for the purpose of foreclosing such mortgages, and no other.” The case of McClelland v. Bishop, 42 Ohio St. 113 and the case of Owings v. McKenzie, 133 Mo. 323 , 40 L.R.A. 154 , 33 S. W. 802 , are to the same effect.

1927In Birken v. Rickey, 42 S. D. 472, 176 N. W. 137 , the court says: that with reference to the acceleration clause in the mortgage “the intent in such case being merely to give to the payee or his endorsees the right to realize on the security at once or on the happening of the contingencies, leaving all personal liabilities to be determined on the provisions of the note.” It will be noticed the note makes no reference to this acceleration clause and from the terms of the note itself it is clear the parties intended it to be a negotiable instrument.

1927Rep. 746 , 32 Atl. 305 , the court held that such an acceleration clause in bonds does not become “a right of action for the principal before maturity of the bonds, independently of foreclosure proceedings.” In that case bonds were issued and stated they were secured by mortgage but the corrrt says “these bonds are not given as collateral to a note secured by mortgage hut the mortgage is security for the bonds themselves.” And again says “the bonds do not make the terms of the mortgage a part of the contract.” They simply recite that they are secured by a mortgage,” and states that you cannot

1918Nor are we concerned with such a question as was before the supreme court of Missouri, in Boyd v. Buchanan, 176 Mo. App. 56 , 162 S. W. 1075 (cited by appellant), where the stipulation was that “on failure to pay any instalment of interest when due, the holder . . . may collect the principal and interest, at once.” It was held in the latter case that the cause of action accrued, within the language of the Statute of Limitations, at once, upon the default, and it will be observed that the acceleration clause said nothing about an option to declare any sum due.

1918Nor are we concerned with such a question as was before the supreme court of Missouri, in Boyd v. Buchanan, 176 Mo. App. 56 , 162 S. W. 1075 (cited by appellant), where the stipulation was that “on failure to pay any instalment of interest when due, the holder . . . may collect the principal and interest, at once.” It was held in the latter case that the cause of action accrued, within the language of the Statute of Limitations, at once, upon the default, and it will be observed that the acceleration clause said nothing about an option to declare any sum due.

1918See 27 Cyc. 1101; also Hall v. Jameson, 151 Cal. 606 , 12 L.R.A.