Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
34 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1934–2003 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lee v. O'Quinngreen2 sentences1971The ruling by the majority of the court that acceleration of the indebtedness could be made only upon declaration thereof by the holder, and notification of such determination to the obligor, was based on Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 , supra. In that case the acceleration clause of the note provided that failure to comply with the terms of the contract would accelerate the principal "at the option of the holder of this note," and this court, with one Justice dissenting, held that a default in payment did not automatically accelerate the indebtedness, but the creditor must evidence his intent 1971The ruling by the majority of the court that acceleration of the indebtedness could be made only upon declaration thereof by the holder, and notification of such determination to the obligor, was based on Lee v. O’Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 , supra. In that case the acceleration clause of the note provided that failure to comply with the terms of the contract would accelerate the principal "at the option of the holder of this note,” and this court, with one Justice dissenting, held that a default in payment did not automatically accelerate the indebtedness, but the creditor must evidence his intent | 2 | 4 |
Lawrimore v. Sun Finance Co.green2 sentences1980The debtors alleged in *821 particular that the loan contract contained an acceleration clause whereby appellant “contracted for charges in excess of those permitted by said Act,” in violation of Code § 25-316; more particularly, that said loan contract was made in violation of the decision of Lawrimore v. Sun Finance Co., 131 Ga. App. 96 ( 205 SE2d 110 ), affirmed 232 Ga. 637 ( 208 SE2d 454 ). 1980The debtors alleged in *821 particular that the loan contract contained an acceleration clause whereby appellant “contracted for charges in excess of those permitted by said Act,” in violation of Code § 25-316; more particularly, that said loan contract was made in violation of the decision of Lawrimore v. Sun Finance Co., 131 Ga. App. 96 ( 205 SE2d 110 ), affirmed 232 Ga. 637 ( 208 SE2d 454 ). | 1 | 5 |
SUN FINANCE COMPANY v. Lawrimoregreen2 sentences1980The debtors alleged in *821 particular that the loan contract contained an acceleration clause whereby appellant “contracted for charges in excess of those permitted by said Act,” in violation of Code § 25-316; more particularly, that said loan contract was made in violation of the decision of Lawrimore v. Sun Finance Co., 131 Ga. App. 96 ( 205 SE2d 110 ), affirmed 232 Ga. 637 ( 208 SE2d 454 ). 1980The debtors alleged in *821 particular that the loan contract contained an acceleration clause whereby appellant “contracted for charges in excess of those permitted by said Act,” in violation of Code § 25-316; more particularly, that said loan contract was made in violation of the decision of Lawrimore v. Sun Finance Co., 131 Ga. App. 96 ( 205 SE2d 110 ), affirmed 232 Ga. 637 ( 208 SE2d 454 ). | 1 | 5 |
Bragg v. Household Finance Corp.green2 sentences1977This court construed a similar acceleration clause in Bragg v. Household Finance Corp., 140 Ga. App. 75 (2) ( 230 SE2d 55 ), and concluded that the contract did not violate provisions of the Industrial Loan Act. 2. 1977This court construed a similar acceleration clause in Bragg v. Household Finance Corp., 140 Ga. App. 75 (2) ( 230 SE2d 55 ), and concluded that the contract did not violate provisions of the Industrial Loan Act. 2. | 1 | 2 |
Reese v. Termplan, Inc., Boltongreen2 sentences1977Hence, although not specifically treated by counsel for appellants we consider the question as to an acceleration clause which here provided: "If Buyer fails to pay the Total of Payments or any part thereof when due or fails to comply with any of the other terms or conditions of this agreement, the entire unpaid balance shall at holder’s election, without notice, become immediately due and payable.” In Reese v. Termplan, Inc., Bolton, 125 Ga. App. 473, 475 ( 188 SE2d 177 ), and Garrett v. G. 1977Hence, although not specifically treated by counsel for appellants we consider the question as to an acceleration clause which here provided: "If Buyer fails to pay the Total of Payments or any part thereof when due or fails to comply with any of the other terms or conditions of this agreement, the entire unpaid balance shall at holder’s election, without notice, become immediately due and payable.” In Reese v. Termplan, Inc., Bolton, 125 Ga. App. 473, 475 ( 188 SE2d 177 ), and Garrett v. G. | 1 | 2 |
Lewis v. Termplan, Inc.green2 sentences1974An acceleration clause was dealt with in Lewis v. Termplan, Inc., Bolton, 124 Ga. App. 507, 509 ( 184 SE2d 473 ), where the court asserted that "there may be a valid exercise of acceleration provisions where only the principal balance [and earned but unpaid interest] is sought, but to attempt to accelerate the payment of that part of the instalments including unearned interest... *103 obviously gives a higher interest return on the use of the money than is authorized under the statute, and therefore nullifies the entire transaction." The holding in that case was that "the election to exercise 1974An acceleration clause was dealt with in Lewis v. Termplan, Inc., Bolton, 124 Ga. App. 507, 509 ( 184 SE2d 473 ), where the court asserted that "there may be a valid exercise of acceleration provisions where only the principal balance [and earned but unpaid interest] is sought, but to attempt to accelerate the payment of that part of the instalments including unearned interest... *103 obviously gives a higher interest return on the use of the money than is authorized under the statute, and therefore nullifies the entire transaction." The holding in that case was that "the election to exercise | 1 | 2 |
Woodall v. Beauchampgreen2 sentences2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 | 1 | 1 |
Toole v. Brownlow & Sons Co.green2 sentences2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 | 1 | 1 |
Meadow River Lumber Co. v. University of Georgia Research Foundation, Inc.green2 sentences2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 | 1 | 1 |
Jernigan Auto Parts, Inc. v. Commercial State Bankgreen2 sentences2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 | 1 | 1 |
Atlanta Car Wash, Inc. v. Schwabgreen2 sentences2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 | 1 | 1 |
Lakeside Investments Group, Inc. v. Allengreen2 sentences2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Eastersgreen2 sentences1993AFLAC contends that the acceleration clause is unenforceable because it is only an agreement to agree on commissions due at a later date and that the clause provides no basis for calculating the commissions. “ ‘ “Unless all the terms and conditions are agreed on, and nothing is left to further negotiations, a contract to enter into a contract in the future is of no effect.” (Cit.) “An agreement to reach an agreement is a contradiction in terms and imposes no obligation on the parties thereto.” (Cit.)’ [Cits.]” Jackson v. Easters, 190 Ga. App. 713, 715 (1) ( 379 SE2d 610 ) (1989). 1993AFLAC contends that the acceleration clause is unenforceable because it is only an agreement to agree on commissions due at a later date and that the clause provides no basis for calculating the commissions. “ ‘ “Unless all the terms and conditions are agreed on, and nothing is left to further negotiations, a contract to enter into a contract in the future is of no effect.” (Cit.) “An agreement to reach an agreement is a contradiction in terms and imposes no obligation on the parties thereto.” (Cit.)’ [Cits.]” Jackson v. Easters, 190 Ga. App. 713, 715 (1) ( 379 SE2d 610 ) (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Cann v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authoritygreen2 sentences1993The acceleration clause also lacks “such definite terms and certainty that [no] court may determine what has been agreed upon. . . .” Cann v. MARTA, 196 Ga. App. 495, 496 (1) ( 396 SE2d 515 ) (1990). 1993The acceleration clause also lacks “such definite terms and certainty that [no] court may determine what has been agreed upon. . . .” Cann v. MARTA, 196 Ga. App. 495, 496 (1) ( 396 SE2d 515 ) (1990). | 1 | 1 |
Bridges v. RELIANCE TRUST COMPANYgreen2 sentences1993See Bridges v. Reliance Trust Co., 205 Ga. App. 400 (2) ( 422 SE2d 277 ) (1992). 1993See Bridges v. Reliance Trust Co., 205 Ga. App. 400 (2) ( 422 SE2d 277 ) (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Weaver v. ABC BUS, INC.green2 sentences1991The record shows, however, that Woods failed to raise this issue in the trial court. “ [I]t is axiomatic that a ground urged for the first time on appeal will not be considered.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Weaver v. ABC Bus, 191 Ga. App. 614, 615 (2) ( 382 SE2d 380 ) (1989). 1991The record shows, however, that Woods failed to raise this issue in the trial court. “ [I]t is axiomatic that a ground urged for the first time on appeal will not be considered.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Weaver v. ABC Bus, 191 Ga. App. 614, 615 (2) ( 382 SE2d 380 ) (1989). | 1 | 1 |
Nickerson v. Candler Building, Inc.green2 sentences1990Compare Nickerson v. Candler Bldg., 156 Ga. App. 396 ( 274 SE2d 582 ) (5) (1980) (holding that a default judgment for unpaid rent was properly limited to payments which were past-due at time suit was filed). 1990Compare Nickerson v. Candler Bldg., 156 Ga. App. 396 ( 274 SE2d 582 ) (5) (1980) (holding that a default judgment for unpaid rent was properly limited to payments which were past-due at time suit was filed). | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. McLaingreen2 sentences1988See Martin v. McLain, 51 Ga. App. 336 (3) ( 180 SE 510 ) (1935); Whitley Constr. 1988See Martin v. McLain, 51 Ga. App. 336 (3) ( 180 SE 510 ) (1935); Whitley Constr. | 1 | 1 |
| Scroggins v. Whitfield Finance Co.green | 1 | 1 |
Curl v. Federal Savings & Loan Ass'ngreen2 sentences1982“Reasonable notice requires more than the assertion of an acceleration clause, for the other party must be given a reasonable opportunity to cure any deviations from the exact terms before foreclosure can be commenced due to defaults which were tolerated under the quasi new agreement.” Curl v. Federal Svgs. &Loan Assn., 241 Ga. 29, 30 ( 244 SE2d 812 ) (1978). 1982“Reasonable notice requires more than the assertion of an acceleration clause, for the other party must be given a reasonable opportunity to cure any deviations from the exact terms before foreclosure can be commenced due to defaults which were tolerated under the quasi new agreement.” Curl v. Federal Svgs. &Loan Assn., 241 Ga. 29, 30 ( 244 SE2d 812 ) (1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Redwine v. Frizzellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Blalock v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bell v. Loosier of Albany, Inc.
green
2 sentences1978As shown by the opinions in Bell v. Loosier of Albany, Inc., 137 Ga. App. 50 (1) ( 222 SE2d 839 ) (1975); revd. 237 Ga. 585 ( 229 SE2d 374 ) (1976); on remand, 140 Ga. App. 393 ( 231 SE2d 142 ) (1976), an acceleration clause purporting to collect unearned interest does not violate RIHSSA, but the same clause plus an attempt under it to collect unearned interest does violate RIHSSA. 1978As shown by the opinions in Bell v. Loosier of Albany, Inc., 137 Ga. App. 50 (1) ( 222 SE2d 839 ) (1975); revd. 237 Ga. 585 ( 229 SE2d 374 ) (1976); on remand, 140 Ga. App. 393 ( 231 SE2d 142 ) (1976), an acceleration clause purporting to collect unearned interest does not violate RIHSSA, but the same clause plus an attempt under it to collect unearned interest does violate RIHSSA. | 2 | 1978–1978 |
Bell v. Loosier of Albany, Inc.
green
2 sentences1978As shown by the opinions in Bell v. Loosier of Albany, Inc., 137 Ga. App. 50 (1) ( 222 SE2d 839 ) (1975); revd. 237 Ga. 585 ( 229 SE2d 374 ) (1976); on remand, 140 Ga. App. 393 ( 231 SE2d 142 ) (1976), an acceleration clause purporting to collect unearned interest does not violate RIHSSA, but the same clause plus an attempt under it to collect unearned interest does violate RIHSSA. 1978As shown by the opinions in Bell v. Loosier of Albany, Inc., 137 Ga. App. 50 (1) ( 222 SE2d 839 ) (1975); revd. 237 Ga. 585 ( 229 SE2d 374 ) (1976); on remand, 140 Ga. App. 393 ( 231 SE2d 142 ) (1976), an acceleration clause purporting to collect unearned interest does not violate RIHSSA, but the same clause plus an attempt under it to collect unearned interest does violate RIHSSA. | 2 | 1978–1978 |
Phillips Lumber Co. v. Bush
green
1 sentence2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Tuttle v. Stovall
green
1 sentence2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Wall v. Citizens & Southern Bank
green
2 sentences2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Conway v. Romarion
green
2 sentences2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Camp v. Hatcher
green
2 sentences2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 2003NOTES [1] Jernigan Auto Parts v. Commercial State Bank, 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [2] Conway v. Romarion, 252 Ga.App. 528 , 557 S.E.2d 54 (2001). [3] Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [4] Wall v. C & S Bank of Houston County, 247 Ga. 216 -217(1), 274 S.E.2d 486 (1981). [5] Lee v. O'Quinn, 184 Ga. 44, 45 (2), 190 S.E. 564 (1937). [6] 186 Ga.App. 267 , 367 S.E.2d 250 (1988). [7] Id. at 271 (3), 367 S.E.2d 250 . [8] Compare Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga.App. 543, 545 (1), 236 S.E.2d 529 (1977). [9] (Citations omitted.)Id. [10] 252 Ga.App. 528 , 5 | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Jones v. Clark
green
2 sentences1988Furthermore, even if the lease had contained an acceleration clause, it would have been illegal and void as a penalty, because it failed to meet any of the criteria for validity set forth in Jones v. Clark, 147 Ga. App. 657 (2) ( 249 SE2d 619 ) (1978). (e) Glen Oak’s conclusion that the issue of payments due in the future was in fact previously adjudicated, is not supported by the pleadings, evidence, verdict, judgment, or inference. 1988Furthermore, even if the lease had contained an acceleration clause, it would have been illegal and void as a penalty, because it failed to meet any of the criteria for validity set forth in Jones v. Clark, 147 Ga. App. 657 (2) ( 249 SE2d 619 ) (1978). (e) Glen Oak’s conclusion that the issue of payments due in the future was in fact previously adjudicated, is not supported by the pleadings, evidence, verdict, judgment, or inference. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Barnwell v. Hanson
green
2 sentences1982Barnwell v. Hanson, 80 Ga. App. 738 ( 57 SE2d 348 ) (1950). 1982Barnwell v. Hanson, 80 Ga. App. 738 ( 57 SE2d 348 ) (1950). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin
green
1 sentence1982Ford Motor Co. v. Milhollin, supra, 555 U. S. at pp. 563-564, n. 8. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Curl v. FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION OF GAINESVILLE
green
2 sentences1982An award of damages for wrongful foreclosure based on failure to provide such notice was approved in Curl v. Federal Svgs. & Loan Assn., 243 Ga. 842 ( 257 SE2d 264 ) (1979). 2. 1982An award of damages for wrongful foreclosure based on failure to provide such notice was approved in Curl v. Federal Svgs. & Loan Assn., 243 Ga. 842 ( 257 SE2d 264 ) (1979). 2. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Bell v. Loosier of Albany, Inc. green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Morris v. Yates neutral | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Frazier v. COURTESY FINANCE COMPANY neutral | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Hinsley v. LIBERTY LOAN CORPORATION green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Hartsfield Co. v. Demos green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| McRae v. Federal Land Bank green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Roberts v. Allied Finance Co. green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| White v. Turbidy green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Saleens v. Travelers Insurance neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| McBurney v. Union Assurance Society green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Delray Inc. v. Piedmont Investment Co. green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Harris v. Powers green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Stringer v. Atlanta Box Factory neutral | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Liles v. Bank of Camden County green | 1 | 1936–1936 |
| Tuck v. National Bank neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Jones v. Owens neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Stapler v. Anderson green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Smith v. Gholstin green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Jaudon v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Stagemann v. Emery green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Clay v. Girdner green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.