44 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1927–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Campbell v. Wernergreen2 sentences2017Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 461 So.2d 93, 95 (Fla. 1984) (citing Campbell v. Werner, 232 So.2d 252, 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)). 2014An acceleration clause contained in a note which by its terms requires payment in installments “confers a contract right upon the mortgagee which he may elect to enforce, upon a default.” Campbell v. Werner, 232 So. 2d 252, 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). | 3 | 4 |
Greene v. Burseygreen2 sentences2015See Campbell v. Werner, 232 So.2d 252 , 254 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (noting that the filing of a suit for foreclosure amounted to the exercise of the option to accelerate and operated as notice to the mortgagor of such election); Rones v. Charlisa, Inc., 948 So.2d 878, 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting Central Home Trust Co. of Elizabeth v. Lippincott, 392 So.2d 931, 933 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)) (holding acceleration option was exercised by filing of foreclosure complaint and noting that “to constitute an acceleration after default, where the holder has the option to accelerate, the holder or payee 2014See Greene v. Bursey, 733 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 8 1999) (noting that in an installment contract with an optional acceleration clause, “the entire debt does not become due on the mere default of payment; rather, it become[s] due when the creditor takes affirmative action to alert the debtor that he has exercised his option to accelerate.”); Monte v. Tipton, 612 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Smith v. F.D.I.C., 61 F.3d 1552, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995)(holding, “when the promissory note secured by a mortgage contains an optional acceleration clause, the foreclosure cause of action accrues, a | 2 | 2 |
Central Home Trust Co. v. Lippincottgreen2 sentences2015See Campbell v. Werner, 232 So.2d 252 , 254 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (noting that the filing of a suit for foreclosure amounted to the exercise of the option to accelerate and operated as notice to the mortgagor of such election); Rones v. Charlisa, Inc., 948 So.2d 878, 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting Central Home Trust Co. of Elizabeth v. Lippincott, 392 So.2d 931, 933 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)) (holding acceleration option was exercised by filing of foreclosure complaint and noting that “to constitute an acceleration after default, where the holder has the option to accelerate, the holder or payee 1993Rather, the acceleration clause at hand requires after a default that First Union "take some clear and equivocal [sic] action indicating its intent to accelerate all payments under the note, and such action should apprise the maker of the fact that the option to accelerate has been exercised." Central Home Trust Co. v. Lippincott, 392 So.2d 931, 933 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). | 2 | 2 |
Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. DeLoachgreen2 sentences1990Further, as explained by this court in Coast Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. DeLoach, 362 So.2d 982, 984 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), "[b]y retaking possession either for his own account or for the account of the lessee, a lessor loses the right to recover the full amount of remaining rental due on the basis of an acceleration clause. 1980These alternatives were stated by this court in Coast Federal Savings and Loan Association v. DeLoach, 362 So.2d 982, 984 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978): The lessor may treat the lease as terminated and retake possession for his own account, thus terminating any further liability on the part of the lessee; or the lessor may retake possession of the premises for the account of the lessee, holding the lessee liable for the difference between rental stipulated to be paid under *376 the lease agreement and what, in good faith, the lessor is able to recover from a reletting; or the lessor may stand by and do n | 2 | 2 |
Gus' Bath, Inc. v. Lightbowngreen2 sentences1966See Gus’ Baths v. Lightbown, 1931, 101 Fla. 1205 , 133 So. 85 , 135 So. 300 . 1966See Gus’ Baths v. Lightbown, 1931, 101 Fla. 1205 , 133 So. 85 , 135 So. 300 . | 2 | 2 |
Williams v. Aeroland Oil Companygreen2 sentences1981Furthermore, it is well settled that in the absence of an acceleration clause in a lease, “future rent is demandable only in the amounts and at the times named in the lease [and] the total cannot be recovered at law in a lump sum in advance of the accrual of the installments.” Williams v. Aeroland Oil Co., 155 Fla. 114 , 20 So.2d 346, 348 (1944). 1981Furthermore, it is well settled that in the absence of an acceleration clause in a lease, “future rent is demandable only in the amounts and at the times named in the lease [and] the total cannot be recovered at law in a lump sum in advance of the accrual of the installments.” Williams v. Aeroland Oil Co., 155 Fla. 114 , 20 So.2d 346, 348 (1944). | 1 | 4 |
In the Matter of Lhd Realty Corporation, Debtor. Appeal of National Life Insurance Companygreen2 sentences1991In the Matter of LHD Realty Corp., 726 F.2d 327 (7th Cir.1984), the Court specifically limits its ruling to the facts of the case and indeed states that "Courts could deal with the difficulty of [intentional default] by denying the acceleration exception in appropriate cases." Atlantic Federal firmly established here that the borrower willfully defaulted on the loan after being unable to negotiate a waiver of the prepayment penalty with Atlantic Federal officers and as a result of his business plan to sell the apartment building being frustrated when the sale did not close in March 1984 as sch 1990See Matter of LHD Realty Corp., 726 F.2d 327 (7th Cir.1984). | 1 | 2 |
Broward County v. Coegreen1 sentence2024In that sense, a default is an acceleration event. 7 ‘Somewhere the curtain must ring down on litigation.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Broward Cnty v. Coe, 376 So. 2d 1222, 1223 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979))). | 1 | 1 |
David v. Sun Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'ngreen1 sentence2017Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 461 So.2d 93, 95 (Fla. 1984) (citing Campbell v. Werner, 232 So.2d 252, 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)). | 1 | 1 |
The Travis Co. v. Mayesgreen1 sentence2016Even so, Singleton’s pronouncement that an “acceleration and foreclosure [action] predicated upon subsequent and different defaults present[s] a separate and distinct” claim expresses the better reasoned view. 882 So. 2d at 1007 . 3 This analysis of Singleton neither undermines nor contradicts prior Florida Supreme Court or other Florida precedent, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Travis Co. v. Mayes, 36 So. 2d 264, 265-66 (Fla. 1948). | 1 | 1 |
U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Gullottagreen2 sentences2016Assn. v. Gullotta, 120 Ohio St.3d 399, 405 , 899 N.E.2d 987, 992 (2008) (holding Ütat each missed payment under a promissory note and mortgage did not give rise to a new claim because "[o]nce [the borrower] defaulted and [the lender] invoked the acceleration clause of the note, the ... obligations to pay each installment merged into one obligation to pay the entire balance on the note”). 2016Assn. v. Gullotta, 120 Ohio St.3d 399, 405 , 899 N.E.2d 987, 992 (2008) (holding Ütat each missed payment under a promissory note and mortgage did not give rise to a new claim because "[o]nce [the borrower] defaulted and [the lender] invoked the acceleration clause of the note, the ... obligations to pay each installment merged into one obligation to pay the entire balance on the note”). | 1 | 1 |
Singleton v. Greymar Associatesgreen2 sentences2016Even so, Singleton's pronouncement that an "acceleration and foreclosure [action] predicated upon subsequent and different defaults presents] a separate and distinct” claim expresses the better reasoned view. 882 So.2d at 1007. . 2016Even so, Singleton’s pronouncement that an “acceleration and foreclosure [action] predicated upon subsequent and different defaults present[s] a separate and distinct” claim expresses the better reasoned view. 882 So. 2d at 1007 . 3 This analysis of Singleton neither undermines nor contradicts prior Florida Supreme Court or other Florida precedent, including the Supreme Court’s decision in Travis Co. v. Mayes, 36 So. 2d 264, 265-66 (Fla. 1948). | 1 | 1 |
Rones v. Charlisa, Inc.green1 sentence2015See Campbell v. Werner, 232 So.2d 252 , 254 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (noting that the filing of a suit for foreclosure amounted to the exercise of the option to accelerate and operated as notice to the mortgagor of such election); Rones v. Charlisa, Inc., 948 So.2d 878, 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting Central Home Trust Co. of Elizabeth v. Lippincott, 392 So.2d 931, 933 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)) (holding acceleration option was exercised by filing of foreclosure complaint and noting that “to constitute an acceleration after default, where the holder has the option to accelerate, the holder or payee | 1 | 1 |
Adkinson v. Nyberggreen1 sentence2015See Adkinson v. Nyberg, 344 So.2d 614, 615-16 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporationgreen1 sentence2014See Greene v. Bursey, 733 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 8 1999) (noting that in an installment contract with an optional acceleration clause, “the entire debt does not become due on the mere default of payment; rather, it become[s] due when the creditor takes affirmative action to alert the debtor that he has exercised his option to accelerate.”); Monte v. Tipton, 612 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Smith v. F.D.I.C., 61 F.3d 1552, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995)(holding, “when the promissory note secured by a mortgage contains an optional acceleration clause, the foreclosure cause of action accrues, a | 1 | 1 |
Dobbs v. Petkogreen1 sentence1997See Dobbs v. Petko, 207 So.2d 11, 13 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968). | 1 | 1 |
| Chesnel v. Paradisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hulley v. Cape Kennedy Leasing Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Pompano Paint Co. v. Pompano Beach Bank & Trust Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Midcoast Investment Co.
green
2 sentences1965Co., 127 Fla. 455 , 173 So. 348, 350 , in which it was stated that "* * * if the note and mortgage contained an acceleration clause of which the lender takes advantage, then the bonus or excess will be prorated only over the period of time for which the lender has elected to allow the obligation to run"; but we are not persuaded that *862 this rule should be applied to make criminally usurious that which was only civilly usurious in its inception and where the lender is not seeking to recover the full face value of the note, but only the amount actually loaned.' We feel that under Shorr v. Sha 1965Co., 127 Fla. 455 , 173 So. 348, 350 , in which it was stated that "* * * if the note and mortgage contained an acceleration clause of which the lender takes advantage, then the bonus or excess will be prorated only over the period of time for which the lender has elected to allow the obligation to run"; but we are not persuaded that *862 this rule should be applied to make criminally usurious that which was only civilly usurious in its inception and where the lender is not seeking to recover the full face value of the note, but only the amount actually loaned.' We feel that under Shorr v. Sha | 5 | 1952–1965 |
Ayvas v. Green
green
2 sentences1965Even if not, however, it became so under the proscription set out in the quoted portion of Ayvas v. Green, supra, when Home Credit sought to recover the full face value of the two notes as exhibited by the face of its complaint. 1953In the case of Alabama-Florida Co. v. Mays, 111 Fla. 100 , 149 So. 61, 64 , 91 A.L.R. 139 , this Court said: “ * * * The ground of the grantee’s liability adopted by this court is that of contract, an application of the now prevailing American doctrine that the grantee’s assumption of the mortgage debt is a contract made and intended by the formal parties thereto, not alone for their own benefit, but also for the direct benefit of a third party, the mortgagee, who may sue upon it"at law as the real party in interest (see section 4201, C.G.L.1927), even though the agreement to assume is contain | 3 | 1953–1965 |
Baader v. Walker
green
2 sentences1999In Baader v. Walker, 153 So.2d 51 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 156 So.2d 858 (Fla.1963), the court construed an acceleration clause in a promissory note as being “self-executing” or “absolute. ” The note provided: Upon default in the payment of principal and/or interest due on any note, secured by said mortgage, all notes so secured and remaining unpaid shall forthwith be come due and payable notwithstanding their tenor. 1989Appellee relies on Baader v. Walker, 153 So.2d 51 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 156 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1963), in which the court held that an acceleration clause identical to the clause in the note here was automatic. | 2 | 1989–1999 |
Andrade v. Dade County
green
2 sentences1999In Baader v. Walker, 153 So.2d 51 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 156 So.2d 858 (Fla.1963), the court construed an acceleration clause in a promissory note as being “self-executing” or “absolute. ” The note provided: Upon default in the payment of principal and/or interest due on any note, secured by said mortgage, all notes so secured and remaining unpaid shall forthwith be come due and payable notwithstanding their tenor. 1989Appellee relies on Baader v. Walker, 153 So.2d 51 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 156 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1963), in which the court held that an acceleration clause identical to the clause in the note here was automatic. | 2 | 1989–1999 |
Quiring v. Plackard
green
2 sentences1996In Quiring v. Plackard, 412 So.2d 415 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), this court affirmed the exclusion of extrinsic evidence regarding an acceleration clause and a discount clause within a mortgage, finding no ambiguity. 1996In Quiring v. Plackard, 412 So.2d 415 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), this court affirmed the exclusion of extrinsic evidence regarding an acceleration clause and a discount clause within a mortgage, finding no ambiguity. | 2 | 1996–1996 |
Jimmy Hall's Morningside v. Blackburn & Peck Enter.
green
2 sentences1980Williams v. Aeroland Oil Co., 155 Fla. 114 , 20 So.2d 346 (1944); Jimmy Hall's Morningside, Inc. v. Blackburn & Peck Enter., Inc., 235 So.2d 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970). 1978Williams v. Aeroland Oil Co., 155 Fla. 114 , 20 So.2d 346 (1944); Jimmy Hall's Morningside, Inc. v. Blackburn & Peck Enter., Inc., 235 So.2d 344 (Fla.2d DCA 1970). | 2 | 1978–1980 |
Treb Trading Co. v. Green
neutral
2 sentences1971Treb Trading Co. v. Green, 102 Fla. 238 , 135 So. 510 , and 102 Fla. 238 , 136 So. 688 (Fla. 1931). 1971Treb Trading Co. v. Green, 102 Fla. 238 , 135 So. 510 , and 102 Fla. 238 , 136 So. 688 (Fla. 1931). | 2 | 1970–1971 |
Cone Et Ux. v. Armstrong
neutral
2 sentences1971Treb Trading Co. v. Green, 102 Fla. 238 , 135 So. 510 , and 102 Fla. 238 , 136 So. 688 (Fla. 1931). 1970In the case of Treb Trading Co. v. Green, 102 Fla. 238 , 135 So. 510 , 136 So. 688 , after holding that foreclosure can be had for an entire mortgage indebtedness upon election to accelerate for a default consisting of nonpayment of taxes, required to be paid by a mortgage which contains a clause authorizing acceleration for default therein, the Supreme Court said: "* * * Such an agreement is not prohibited by statute, nor is it against public policy; it is not in the nature of a forfeiture nor a hard contract which it would be unconscionable to enforce, because an investor may very properly i | 2 | 1970–1971 |
Shorr v. Skafte
green
2 sentences1965Co., 127 Fla. 455 , 173 So. 348, 350 , in which it was stated that "* * * if the note and mortgage contained an acceleration clause of which the lender takes advantage, then the bonus or excess will be prorated only over the period of time for which the lender has elected to allow the obligation to run"; but we are not persuaded that *862 this rule should be applied to make criminally usurious that which was only civilly usurious in its inception and where the lender is not seeking to recover the full face value of the note, but only the amount actually loaned.' We feel that under Shorr v. Sha 1962Co., 127 Fla. 455 , 173 So. 348, 350 , in which it was stated that `* * * if the note and mortgage contained an acceleration clause of which the lender takes advantage, then the bonus or excess will be prorated only over the period of time for which the lender has elected to allow the obligation to run'; but we are not persuaded that this rule should be applied to make criminally usurious that which was only civilly usurious in its inception and where the lender is not seeking to recover the full face value of the note, but only the amount actually loaned." We feel that under Shorr v. Shafte, | 2 | 1962–1965 |
Monte v. Tipton
green
1 sentence2014See Greene v. Bursey, 733 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 8 1999) (noting that in an installment contract with an optional acceleration clause, “the entire debt does not become due on the mere default of payment; rather, it become[s] due when the creditor takes affirmative action to alert the debtor that he has exercised his option to accelerate.”); Monte v. Tipton, 612 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Smith v. F.D.I.C., 61 F.3d 1552, 1561 (11th Cir. 1995)(holding, “when the promissory note secured by a mortgage contains an optional acceleration clause, the foreclosure cause of action accrues, a | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Barnes v. Resolution Trust Corp.
green
1 sentence2012In Barnes v. Resolution Trust Corp., 664 So.2d 1171 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), this court held: An acceleration clause in a mortgage confers upon the mortgagee a contract right of constitutional dimensions. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Cook v. Merrifield
green
1 sentence1999In the first case, Cook v. Merri-field, 335 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), the installment instrument provided: Failure to pay any installment herein promptly when due shall cause the entire indebtedness to become immediately due and payable. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Rohrt v. Kelley Manufacturing Company
green
2 sentences1989Co. [ 162 Tex. 534 ], 349 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. 1961); Pirkle & Williams v. Shreveport Jitney Jungle, 140 So. 837 (La. 1989Co. [ 162 Tex. 534 ], 349 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. 1961); Pirkle & Williams v. Shreveport Jitney Jungle, 140 So. 837 (La. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Geiger Mutual Agency, Inc. v. Wright
green
2 sentences1989This would in effect be a double remedy, which is conflicting and antagonistic."4 2 For purposes of this decision the court does not find it necessary to determine whether such a clause really is an acceleration clause. 3 Geiger Mutual Agency, Inc. v. Wright, 233 So.2d 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); see also Chesnel v. Paradis, 453 A.2d 1184 (Me. 1983); Rohrt v. Kelly [Kelley] Mfg. 1989This would in effect be a double remedy, which is conflicting and antagonistic."4 2 For purposes of this decision the court does not find it necessary to determine whether such a clause really is an acceleration clause. 3 Geiger Mutual Agency, Inc. v. Wright, 233 So.2d 444 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); see also Chesnel v. Paradis, 453 A.2d 1184 (Me. 1983); Rohrt v. Kelly [Kelley] Mfg. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Pirkle & Williams, Inc. v. Shreveport Jitney Jungle, Inc. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Clark v. Lachenmeier green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| The Trenton Banking Co. v. Hawley green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Financial Fed. S. & L. Ass'n v. Continental Ent. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Windowmaster Corporation v. Jefferson Const. Co. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Yeaton v. Roberts neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| In Re Estate of Rentz green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Neill Ex Rel. Neill v. Bach neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Carlon, Inc. v. Southland Diversified Co. green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Gray Corp. of North Miami v. Cisky neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Aldridge v. Liberty Air, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Meredith v. Long green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Kirk v. VanPetten green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Home Credit Company v. Brown green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Kreiss Potassium Phosphate Co. v. Knight green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Hoefer v. Fortmann neutral | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Groner-Youngerman, Inc. v. Denison green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Lieberbaum v. Surfcomber Hotel Corp. green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| River Holding Co. v. Nickel green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Perry v. Beckerman green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Benson v. First Tr. Svgs. Bk., as Trustee green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Alabama-Florida Co. v. Mays green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Clay v. Girdner green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Land v. May neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Blood v. Hunt green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Taylor v. American National Bank green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.