acceleration clause in Maryland

1970Even conceding that the maturity of the debt could have been accelerated under the provisions of the mortgage, had Hadjis been in default in the performance of any covenant for 30 days, it is clear that an acceleration clause is not self-operating, since it is inserted for the protection of the mortgagee, who may or may not elect to rely upon it, Better v. Williams, 203 Md. 613 , 102 A. 2d 750 (1954) ; Kleiman v. Kolker, 189 Md. 647 , 57 A. 2d 297 (1948) ; 59 C.J.S.

1970Even conceding that the maturity of the debt could have been accelerated under the provisions of the mortgage, had Hadjis been in default in the performance of any covenant for 30 days, it is clear that an acceleration clause is not self-operating, since it is inserted for the protection of the mortgagee, who may or may not elect to rely upon it, Better v. Williams, 203 Md. 613 , 102 A. 2d 750 (1954) ; Kleiman v. Kolker, 189 Md. 647 , 57 A. 2d 297 (1948) ; 59 C.J.S.

1985In Fontana v. Walker, 249 Md. 459 , 240 A.2d 268 , *90 cert. denied, 393 U.S. 927 , 89 S.Ct. 262 , 21 L.Ed.2d 263 (1968), the Court of Appeals explained that the purpose of an acceleration clause is solely to protect the mortgagee or principal creditor in a deed of trust.

1985In Fontana v. Walker, 249 Md. 459 , 240 A.2d 268 , *90 cert. denied, 393 U.S. 927 , 89 S.Ct. 262 , 21 L.Ed.2d 263 (1968), the Court of Appeals explained that the purpose of an acceleration clause is solely to protect the mortgagee or principal creditor in a deed of trust.

1970Even conceding that the maturity of the debt could have been accelerated under the provisions of the mortgage, had Hadjis been in default in the performance of any covenant for 30 days, it is clear that an acceleration clause is not self-operating, since it is inserted for the protection of the mortgagee, who may or may not elect to rely upon it, Better v. Williams, 203 Md. 613 , 102 A. 2d 750 (1954) ; Kleiman v. Kolker, 189 Md. 647 , 57 A. 2d 297 (1948) ; 59 C.J.S.

1970Even conceding that the maturity of the debt could have been accelerated under the provisions of the mortgage, had Hadjis been in default in the performance of any covenant for 30 days, it is clear that an acceleration clause is not self-operating, since it is inserted for the protection of the mortgagee, who may or may not elect to rely upon it, Better v. Williams, 203 Md. 613 , 102 A. 2d 750 (1954) ; Kleiman v. Kolker, 189 Md. 647 , 57 A. 2d 297 (1948) ; 59 C.J.S.

2002See Andresen, 317 Md. at 387-88 , 564 A.2d 399 ; Platt, 302 Md. at 15 , 485 A.2d 250 ; Hughes, 276 Md. at 385-86 , 347 A.2d 837 . “[T]he language of the Rule, which merely restates in substance the rule at common law, embraces all the power the courts of this State have to revise and control enrolled judgments and decrees.” Eliason, 230 Md. at 59 , 185 A.2d 390 .

2002See Andresen, 317 Md. at 387-88 , 564 A.2d 399 ; Platt, 302 Md. at 15 , 485 A.2d 250 ; Hughes, 276 Md. at 385-86 , 347 A.2d 837 . “[T]he language of the Rule, which merely restates in substance the rule at common law, embraces all the power the courts of this State have to revise and control enrolled judgments and decrees.” Eliason, 230 Md. at 59 , 185 A.2d 390 .

2002In support, he cites Spencer v. Franks, 173 Md. 73 , 195 A. 306 (1937).

2002In support, he cites Spencer v. Franks, 173 Md. 73 , 195 A. 306 (1937).

2002The circuit court explicitly relied on our decision and language in McClayton v. McClayton, 68 Md.App. 615 , 515 A.2d 231 (1986), in determining that the acceleration clause in the 1989 divorce judgment was an “irregularity” that may be stricken under Rule 2-535(b).

2002The circuit court explicitly relied on our decision and language in McClayton v. McClayton, 68 Md.App. 615 , 515 A.2d 231 (1986), in determining that the acceleration clause in the 1989 divorce judgment was an “irregularity” that may be stricken under Rule 2-535(b).

2002See Andresen, 317 Md. at 387-88 , 564 A.2d 399 ; Platt, 302 Md. at 15 , 485 A.2d 250 ; Hughes, 276 Md. at 385-86 , 347 A.2d 837 . “[T]he language of the Rule, which merely restates in substance the rule at common law, embraces all the power the courts of this State have to revise and control enrolled judgments and decrees.” Eliason, 230 Md. at 59 , 185 A.2d 390 .

2002See Andresen, 317 Md. at 387-88 , 564 A.2d 399 ; Platt, 302 Md. at 15 , 485 A.2d 250 ; Hughes, 276 Md. at 385-86 , 347 A.2d 837 . “[T]he language of the Rule, which merely restates in substance the rule at common law, embraces all the power the courts of this State have to revise and control enrolled judgments and decrees.” Eliason, 230 Md. at 59 , 185 A.2d 390 .

2002See Andresen, 317 Md. at 387-88 , 564 A.2d 399 ; Platt, 302 Md. at 15 , 485 A.2d 250 ; Hughes, 276 Md. at 385-86 , 347 A.2d 837 . “[T]he language of the Rule, which merely restates in substance the rule at common law, embraces all the power the courts of this State have to revise and control enrolled judgments and decrees.” Eliason, 230 Md. at 59 , 185 A.2d 390 .

2002See Andresen, 317 Md. at 387-88 , 564 A.2d 399 ; Platt, 302 Md. at 15 , 485 A.2d 250 ; Hughes, 276 Md. at 385-86 , 347 A.2d 837 . “[T]he language of the Rule, which merely restates in substance the rule at common law, embraces all the power the courts of this State have to revise and control enrolled judgments and decrees.” Eliason, 230 Md. at 59 , 185 A.2d 390 .

1998The debtor’s covenant not to encumber property, like the contractor’s covenant not to assign moneys to become due under his contract, should be treated, as on the whole the case law has done, as a covenant “merely personal”—good enough to give rights against the covenantor for breach, to bring an acceleration clause into play, to constitute an “event of default” under a loan agreement, but not good enough to give rights, whether they be called legal or equitable, in property.’ ” Equitable Trust, 287 Md. at 270 , 412 A.2d at 106 .

1998The debtor’s covenant not to encumber property, like the contractor’s covenant not to assign moneys to become due under his contract, should be treated, as on the whole the case law has done, as a covenant “merely personal”—good enough to give rights against the covenantor for breach, to bring an acceleration clause into play, to constitute an “event of default” under a loan agreement, but not good enough to give rights, whether they be called legal or equitable, in property.’ ” Equitable Trust, 287 Md. at 270 , 412 A.2d at 106 .

1993It was the appellant itself that invoked the acceleration provision of Santini v. Fritkin, 240 Md. 542, 544-545 , 214 A.2d 578 (1965), and, *771 thereby, accelerated the pulling of the trigger that started limitations running.

1993It was the appellant itself that invoked the acceleration provision of Santini v. Fritkin, 240 Md. 542, 544-545 , 214 A.2d 578 (1965), and, *771 thereby, accelerated the pulling of the trigger that started limitations running.

1989Long ago, the Court of Appeals so held in Walker v. Cockey, 38 Md. 75 (1873).

1985In Fontana v. Walker, 249 Md. 459 , 240 A.2d 268 , *90 cert. denied, 393 U.S. 927 , 89 S.Ct. 262 , 21 L.Ed.2d 263 (1968), the Court of Appeals explained that the purpose of an acceleration clause is solely to protect the mortgagee or principal creditor in a deed of trust.

1966Schiff v. Schindler, 98 Pa. Super. 207 (1930). [7] Cf. Sellers v. Qualls, 206 Md. 58, 65 , 110 A.2d 73, 76-77 (1954).

1966Schiff v. Schindler, 98 Pa. Super. 207 (1930). .

1954Guarantee Co., supra. We have held that an acceleration clause is valid and enforceable, Lotterer v. Leon, 138 Md. 318 , although it may be waived and in some cases there must be positive evidence of an election by the mortgagee to exercise it.

1954Guarantee Co., supra. We have held that an acceleration clause is valid and enforceable, Lotterer v. Leon, 138 Md. 318 , although it may be waived and in some cases there must be positive evidence of an election by the mortgagee to exercise it.

1954Guarantee Co., supra. We have held that an acceleration clause is valid and enforceable, Lotterer v. Leon, 138 Md. 318 , although it may be waived and in some cases there must be positive evidence of an election by the mortgagee to exercise it.

1954Guarantee Co., supra. We have held that an acceleration clause is valid and enforceable, Lotterer v. Leon, 138 Md. 318 , although it may be waived and in some cases there must be positive evidence of an election by the mortgagee to exercise it.