acceleration clause in Kansas

2008More specific to our circumstances, "a past practice of excusing defaults occasioned by late payments may under certain circumstances be construed as an implied waiver of an acceleration clause." Freel, 10 Kan.App.2d at 287 , 698 P.2d 382 (citing Smith, 186 Kan. at 735 , 352 P.2d 1036 ).

2008More specific to our circumstances, "a past practice of excusing defaults occasioned by late payments may under certain circumstances be construed as an implied waiver of an acceleration clause." Freel, 10 Kan.App.2d at 287 , 698 P.2d 382 (citing Smith, 186 Kan. at 735 , 352 P.2d 1036 ).

2022Gordon defaulted on March 1, 1973, and Marsha remarried on March 23, 1973. 4 Kan.

2022In reaching this ruling, this court stressed that the trial court had discretion to include the acceleration clause in Marsha and Gordon's divorce decree and that Gordon never appealed their divorce decree. 4 Kan.

2021Kennedy v. Gibson, 68 Kan. 612, 617 , 75 P. 1044 (1904).

2021Kennedy v. Gibson, 68 Kan. 612, 617 , 75 P. 1044 (1904).

2021App. 2d 853, 854 , 923 P.2d 520 (1996), when a note contains a clause allowing a noteholder to accelerate the borrower's loan due date upon the borrower's default, the noteholder must take two steps to exercise the note's acceleration clause, which results in triggering K.S.A. 60- 511(1)'s five-year statute of limitations: Under the first step, the noteholder must clearly and unequivocally express an intention to accelerate the loan.

2021This court determined that under the clause's plain language, a lender had to notify the Kellers if it exercised its right to accelerate their loan's repayment date and provide the Kellers time to cure their default. 22 Kan.

2008"By the language of the acceleration clause . . . the default in the interest payment of its own force, without any declaration, notice, or exercise of an option on the part of the creditor, matured the entire debt. . . . [Citations omitted.]" (Emphasis added.) Miles ' automatic acceleration clause is in contrast to the optional acceleration clause this court addressed 1 year earlier in Bank v. Grisham, 105 Kan. 460 , Syl. ¶ 10, 185 Pac. 54 , (1919), where we stated: "Where a debt is secured by a mortgage on realty, and the note evidencing the debt merely provides that default in the payment o

2008"By the language of the acceleration clause . . . the default in the interest payment of its own force, without any declaration, notice, or exercise of an option on the part of the creditor, matured the entire debt. . . . [Citations omitted.]" (Emphasis added.) Miles ' automatic acceleration clause is in contrast to the optional acceleration clause this court addressed 1 year earlier in Bank v. Grisham, 105 Kan. 460 , Syl. ¶ 10, 185 Pac. 54 , (1919), where we stated: "Where a debt is secured by a mortgage on realty, and the note evidencing the debt merely provides that default in the payment o

2008This court set forth the acceleration clause as follows: "The `Additional Provisions' of the security agreement signed by the Spillmans stated: `Upon the happening of . . . (i) default in the payment . . ., the Secured Party at its option may declare all of the Obligations to be immediately due and payable and shall then have the remedies of a secured party under the Commercial Code, or other applicable law.'" (Emphasis added.) 242 Kan. at 700 , 750 P.2d 1024 .

2008This court set forth the acceleration clause as follows: "The `Additional Provisions' of the security agreement signed by the Spillmans stated: `Upon the happening of . . . (i) default in the payment . . ., the Secured Party at its option may declare all of the Obligations to be immediately due and payable and shall then have the remedies of a secured party under the Commercial Code, or other applicable law.'" (Emphasis added.) 242 Kan. at 700 , 750 P.2d 1024 .

2007“The plaintiff did not waive its right to pursue its contractual remedies merely because it chose not to do so for a 9-month period (October 04 — June 05).” “The general rule is that where a mortgage contains an acceleration clause relating to default of a required payment, the mortgagee is entitled because of such default to enforce the acceleration clause at once according to its terms.” Carpenter v. Riley, 234 Kan. 758, 764 , 675 P.2d 900 (1984).

2007“The plaintiff did not waive its right to pursue its contractual remedies merely because it chose not to do so for a 9-month period (October 04 — June 05).” “The general rule is that where a mortgage contains an acceleration clause relating to default of a required payment, the mortgagee is entitled because of such default to enforce the acceleration clause at once according to its terms.” Carpenter v. Riley, 234 Kan. 758, 764 , 675 P.2d 900 (1984).

2007App. 1976) (“The basis for such a rule is to prevent an obligee from lulhng an obligor into a false sense of security by accepting late payments over an extended period of time, without demand for punctuality, and then at a future date of his own choosing accelerate the entire balance due on the obligation when the late’ payment complained of falls within the same pattern.”); Barker v. Agee, 93 N.C.

2007Smith v. Smith, 186 Kan. 728, 735 , 352 P.2d 1056 (1960).

2004For example, the New York Supreme Court has determined that a liquidated damages clause which applies to a number of covenants is an unenforceable penalty “if the loss which might be anticipated as resulting from a breach of even the least important of them is disproportionate to the amount of liquidated damages, or if the loss which might result from a breach of any one of the covenants is readily ascertainable.” Vernitron Corp. v. CF 48 Associates, 104 App. Div. 2d 409, 410, 478 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1984); see Jolley v. Georgeff, 92 Ohio App. 271 , 110 N.E.2d 23 (1952); 49 Am.

1993The general rule in Michigan is that a trial court, lacks authority “ ‘to decree the entire amount due in the absence of an acceleration clause in the contract.’ ” 147 Mich. App. at 564 .

1993The general rule in Michigan is that a trial court, lacks authority “ ‘to decree the entire amount due in the absence of an acceleration clause in the contract.’ ” 147 Mich. App. at 564 .

1993The Barnetts rely on Nelson v. Robinson, 184 Kan. 340 , 336 P.2d 415 (1959), as support for the trial court’s decision to enter an in personam judgment against the Hamills for the entire balance due under the contract in the absence of an acceleration clause.

1993The Barnetts rely on Nelson v. Robinson, 184 Kan. 340 , 336 P.2d 415 (1959), as support for the trial court’s decision to enter an in personam judgment against the Hamills for the entire balance due under the contract in the absence of an acceleration clause.

1984In Morris v. Matthews, 263 Ark. 298 , 564 S.W.2d 509 (1978), the crucial word in the acceleration clause was “sell” and the question for the Arkansas Supreme Court was whether a conditional contract of sale triggered the clause.

1984In Morris v. Matthews, 263 Ark. 298 , 564 S.W.2d 509 (1978), the crucial word in the acceleration clause was “sell” and the question for the Arkansas Supreme Court was whether a conditional contract of sale triggered the clause.

1984In Wisconsin Wire I the Wisconsin court dealt with an acceleration clause which was triggered upon “a conveyance or other transfer.” 58 Wis. 2d at 102 .

1984In Insurance Co. v. Puckett, 97 Kan. 428 , 155 Pac. 930 (1916), the mortgage agreement entered into by the parties contained a stipulation that upon mortgagor’s failure to pay principal and interest when due, or if taxes assessed against the mortgaged property was not paid when due, the whole debt became due and the mortgage became subject to foreclosure at the option of the mortgagee.

1984In Insurance Co. v. Puckett, 97 Kan. 428 , 155 Pac. 930 (1916), the mortgage agreement entered into by the parties contained a stipulation that upon mortgagor’s failure to pay principal and interest when due, or if taxes assessed against the mortgaged property was not paid when due, the whole debt became due and the mortgage became subject to foreclosure at the option of the mortgagee.

1984They recognize their argument that it would be against public policy to enforce the acceleration clause is no longer a viable issue in view of Capitol Fed’l Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Glenwood Manor, Inc., 235 Kan. 935 , 686 P.2d 853 (1984).

1984They recognize their argument that it would be against public policy to enforce the acceleration clause is no longer a viable issue in view of Capitol Fed’l Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Glenwood Manor, Inc., 235 Kan. 935 , 686 P.2d 853 (1984).

1960The appellee contends “this court and the courts of other states have definitely established the rule that where a delay or default has been made in paying interest at the time it falls due on a promissory note, an acceleration clause making all future sums due and payable at the time of such default cannot be enforced if the creditor later receives the delayed payment and applies it definitely to past due interest.” The case of Andregg v. Sparrow, 152 Kan. 744 , 107 P. 2d 739 , is cited as authority for the above proposition.

1960The appellee contends “this court and the courts of other states have definitely established the rule that where a delay or default has been made in paying interest at the time it falls due on a promissory note, an acceleration clause making all future sums due and payable at the time of such default cannot be enforced if the creditor later receives the delayed payment and applies it definitely to past due interest.” The case of Andregg v. Sparrow, 152 Kan. 744 , 107 P. 2d 739 , is cited as authority for the above proposition.

1922(Liphart v. Myers, 97 Kan. 686 , 156 Pac. 693 .) The original petition made no explicit allegation of payments, but stated that there was due the plaintiff $3,000 with interest from November 13, 1915, and contained a copy of the note with all the indorsements thereon, among which appeared the following: “Paid on Prin.

1922(Liphart v. Myers, 97 Kan. 686 , 156 Pac. 693 .) The original petition made no explicit allegation of payments, but stated that there was due the plaintiff $3,000 with interest from November 13, 1915, and contained a copy of the note with all the indorsements thereon, among which appeared the following: “Paid on Prin.

1920(National Bank v. Peck, 8 Kan. 660 ; Snyder v. Miller, 71 Kan. 410 , 80 Pac. 970 ; 17 R.

1920(National Bank v. Peck, 8 Kan. 660 ; Snyder v. Miller, 71 Kan. 410 , 80 Pac. 970 ; 17 R.

1920(National Bank v. Peck, 8 Kan. 660 ; Snyder v. Miller, 71 Kan. 410 , 80 Pac. 970 ; 17 R.

1915(Land Co. v. Bassett, 85 Kan. 48 , 116 Pac. 475 .) .

1915(Land Co. v. Bassett, 85 Kan. 48 , 116 Pac. 475 .) .