13 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1936–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cowan v. Murphygreen2 sentences2020Although that case involved a note with a mandatory acceleration clause, the panel commented that, “[h]ad the acceleration clause been merely optional,” the lender’s acceptance of late payments on the promissory note would have waived acceleration, so no cause of action would have accrued “until the whole note had become due.” Cowan, id. at 572 , 333 N.E.2d at 805–06. 2020Although that case involved a note with a mandatory acceleration clause, the panel commented that, “[h]ad the acceleration clause been merely optional,” the lender’s acceptance of late payments on the promissory note would have waived acceleration, so no cause of action would have accrued “until the whole note had become due.” Cowan, id. at 572 , 333 N.E.2d at 805–06. | 2 | 3 |
Huston v. Fatkagreen2 sentences1983See Huston v. Fatka (1903), 30 Ind.App. 693 , 66 N.E. 74 ." (Emphasis added.) Id. 165 Ind.App. at 572 , 333 N.E.2d 802 . 1983See Huston v. Fatka (1903), 30 Ind.App. 693 , 66 N.E. 74 ." (Emphasis added.) Id. 165 Ind.App. at 572 , 333 N.E.2d 802 . | 2 | 2 |
Hamlin v. Stewardgreen2 sentences2019See Hamlin v. Steward , 622 N.E.2d 535 , 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (absent an acceleration clause, the holder of a note can collect only the payments due at the time of default and as each installment payment becomes due). 2019See Hamlin v. Steward , 622 N.E.2d 535 , 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (absent an acceleration clause, the holder of a note can collect only the payments due at the time of default and as each installment payment becomes due). | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Watsongreen2 sentences2005Roberts v. Watson, 172 Ind.App. 108 , 359 N.E.2d 615, 621 (1977), reh'g denied. 2005Roberts v. Watson, 172 Ind.App. 108 , 359 N.E.2d 615, 621 (1977), reh'g denied. | 1 | 1 |
Carey v. Piphusgreen2 sentences1994See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 , 98 S.Ct. 1042 , 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1977). 1994See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 , 98 S.Ct. 1042 , 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Kuhn v. Kuhngreen2 sentences1993See Griese-Traylor Corp. v. Lemmons (1981), Ind.App., 424 N.E.2d 173, 183 , trans. denied (citing Kuhn v. Kuhn (1980), 273 Ind. 67, 71-72 , 402 N.E.2d 989, 992 ). 2 . 1993See Griese-Traylor Corp. v. Lemmons (1981), Ind.App., 424 N.E.2d 173, 183 , trans. denied (citing Kuhn v. Kuhn (1980), 273 Ind. 67, 71-72 , 402 N.E.2d 989, 992 ). 2 . | 1 | 1 |
Griese-Traylor Corp. v. Lemmonsgreen1 sentence1993See Griese-Traylor Corp. v. Lemmons (1981), Ind.App., 424 N.E.2d 173, 183 , trans. denied (citing Kuhn v. Kuhn (1980), 273 Ind. 67, 71-72 , 402 N.E.2d 989, 992 ). 2 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smither v. Asset Acceptance, LLC
green
2 sentences2019This was a period the court found was "a per se unreasonable amount of time to wait before invoking an acceleration clause." Id. (quoting Smither , 919 N.E.2d at 1161-62 ). [37] Guided by Stroud , we find that EMC delayed an unreasonable amount of time by waiting until April of 2011 to invoke the acceleration clause. 2019Id. at 43. [20] To the degree that the trial court denied the Blairs' statute-of-limitations defense, it rejected the Blairs' claim that EMC did not invoke the acceleration clause in a reasonable time: Indiana law is clear that "if an installment loan contract or promissory note has an optional acceleration clause, ... a creditor may (but is not required) to declare all future installments on the loan immediately due and payable after a debtor's default." Smither v. Asset Acceptance, LLC , 919 N.E.2d 1153 , 1160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Otto v. Park Garden Associates
green
1 sentence2020The facts of this case are sufficiently similar to the facts in Otto v. Park Garden Assocs., 612 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), reh’g denied, [trans. denied,] a case in which a lender was granted a foreclosure of a mortgage that had been signed by the debtor[.] The designated evidence shows that Defendant Barrows waived presentment and demand for payment, Crossroads reserved the right to invoke the acceleration clause without notice to Barrows, Defendant Barrows was in default at the time that the acceleration took place (for not making monthly payments in a timely fashion and for failing to | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Heritage Acceptance Corporation v. Chris L. Romine
green
2 sentences2019Id. 2019Id. at 464 . [33] Heritage relied on Smither , 919 N.E.2d at 1153 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Formall, Inc v. Community National Bank
green
1 sentence2013In support, they cite Formall, Inc. v. Community National Bank of Pontiac, 360 N.W.2d 902 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Barnes
green
2 sentences1981Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Barnes, (1972) 126 Ga.App. 444 , 191 S.E.2d 121 , did not involve the problem of acceptance of late payments, but did involve the validity of an acceleration clause. 1981Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Barnes, (1972) 126 Ga.App. 444 , 191 S.E.2d 121 , did not involve the problem of acceptance of late payments, but did involve the validity of an acceleration clause. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Kiskadden v. Allen
neutral
1 sentence1936“Stated broadly, the overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that where a note is made payable on a definite day and also contains a conditional promise to pay at an earlier time, the instrument is not rendered non-negotiable by the acceleration clause; Kiscadden v. Allen, 7 Colo. 206 ( 3 Pac. 221 ); Walker v. Woollen, 54 Ind. 164 ( 23 Am. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Walker v. Woollen
green
1 sentence1936“Stated broadly, the overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that where a note is made payable on a definite day and also contains a conditional promise to pay at an earlier time, the instrument is not rendered non-negotiable by the acceleration clause; Kiscadden v. Allen, 7 Colo. 206 ( 3 Pac. 221 ); Walker v. Woollen, 54 Ind. 164 ( 23 Am. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Charlton v. Reed
green
1 sentence1936Rep. 639 ); Charlton v. Reed, 61 Iowa 166 , 47 Am. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.